Part One

Sustaining Effective Policy and Practice for Education in Africa
Developments and Issues
Regarding Universal Primary Education (UPE) in Tanzania

by Justinian C.J. GALABAWA

Introduction

Tanzania has consistently focused its development strategies on combating ignorance, disease and poverty. Investment in human capital and provision of education as human rights have been recognized as central to quality of life (see URT, 1989). At national policy making there is a general consensus in the objective to offer education and literacy for all in Tanzania. Among national leadership this goal has been repeated continuously since the United Nations (UN) formulation of the relevant Basic Human Rights document half a century ago. The bells on Universal Primary Education (UPE) and Education For All (EFA) rang louder after the 1990 Jomtien Declaration which in a sense emphasized that “revitalized partnership at all levels” should be built in order to achieve Education For All (WCEFA, 1990). How to achieve this ambition and sustain it on the other hand, seems more difficult to determine and carry out. The call for casting wider the partnership net in UPE/EFA provision (at local and global level) and in the development of education, constitute a great challenge for education policy makers, planners and administrators (Shaeffer, 1994).

In spite of the very impressive expansionary education policies and reforms in the 1970s, the goal to attain UPE which was once targeted for achievement in 1980, is way out of reach. Similarly, the Jomtien objective to achieve Basic Education For All in 2000 is, on the part of Tanzania, unrealistic. The participation and access levels (as shown by enrollment and intake rates) have declined to the point that attainment of UPE is once again an issue in itself (see Ministry of Education and Culture (MOEC), Education Sta-
tatus Report, 2001). Other developments and trends indicate a decline in the quantitative goals set rather than being closer to them (Cooksey and Riedmiller, 1997; Mbilinyi, 2000). At the same time serious doubt is being raised about school quality and relevance of education provided (Galabawa, Senkoro and Lwaitama, (eds), 2000). The forces against achievement of UPE are many and complex but it is now accepted that a holistic approach to provision and financing may be the quickest route. Erratic planning and project style implementation will continue to make it impossible to keep up early positive enrollment numbers irrespective of the UPE attainment crisis (Narman, 2001).

The UPE program in Tanzania, which was actually built on the philosophy of “Ujamaa” (African Socialism)\(^2\) and the Education for Self-Reliance (ESR)\(^3\) reforms, had a good chance of succeeding. The ESR philosophy had addressed some relevant novel ideas of relevance of education, egalitarianism, practicality and elimination of elitism. However, the fact that the UPE program was accompanied by high and rapid growth in enrollment rates for a few years which later levelled off and then fell, need exploration so as to provide a contribution to the overall issue of Education for All and, an agenda of the Government(s) and development communities/agencies.

**Summary of the argument\(^4\)**

The importance of providing Universal Primary Education (UPE) in Tanzania and other less developed countries of the peripheral has never been disputed. The question is how? It is not the mere initial enthusiasm to expansion of primary education and achieving quantity in the short run, which matters. Rather, the Government must consider the long-run implications of UPE efforts as related to cost-effectiveness of investments as well as the commitment to achieve, the institutional arrangement/capacity/competence and developmental mind-set. And given the limited resources and low/weak institutional capacity available, difficult decisions have to be made regarding trade-offs between investments that promote school quality relative to choices that expand school network and enrollments. Thus the achievement of UPE begs for appropriate and strategic investment to allow for a feasible joint pursuit of access and quality in a holistic manner.

\(^2\) «Ujamaa» (African Socialism) ideology dominated most of the 1967 – 1985 era of the late Mwalimu J.K. Nyerere. The highlight of this era was the nationalization of production and provision of goods and services by the state and the dominance of the ruling party in community mobilization and participation.

\(^3\) Education for Self Reliance (ESR) reform and philosophy authored by Mwalimu J.K. Nyerere gave a thorough critique of the education system inherited from the colonial state by showing that it was elitist (for the few), theoretical and bookish (not integrated with production) and alienating (divorcing the recipients of it from his/her African society in general).

\(^4\) The major argument here is that pursuit of effective UPE needs visionary and committed leadership, ready to protect the achievements over time through macro commitment to general efficiency and broad human development and through poverty alleviation. Even so one needs the right institutional arrangements and capacity to deliver UPE.
In the pursuit of an effective holistic approach to UPE several factors may contribute to the sustainability of UPE achievements. The demands made on the educational system and its institutions are increasingly numerous and complex. On the one hand, the resources made available to these institutions and their managers are proportionately fewer. Such resources have usually been secured under conditions of cost effectiveness. Government, on the other hand, has to reduce public expenditure while still pursuing equity goals. Educational management and administration has to play a key role in resolving some of the problems which emerge in this climate of unlimited demands with limited resources with which to implement the desired UPE program. Meanwhile parents and students are clamouring for quality education for all. The negative labor market signals and unfavorable employment prospects in Government and other parts of the “formal” sector seem to erode the perceived value of schooling. This situation is made worse by the reduced external efficiency of education and general lack of relevance to people’s lives and work. Yet, the problems of implementation and sustained provision of UPE, such as the lack of a quality teaching force, the unavailability of textbooks and other learning materials, low nutritional status of children and overcrowded classrooms militate against positive achievement as a characteristic of the ineffective implementation syndrome.

The contingent supportive internal and external environment is a pre-condition to achieving UPE and therefore necessitates contingency strategies. Internally, given the regional and districts’ diversity, the partnership net has to be cast wide by promoting local capacity/competence policy reforms on empowerment, autonomy, pluralism, decentralization, equalization and stimulation. Externally, debt-relief and its management through structural adjustments and the general globalization processes must be managed properly so that they can work for the poor in the provision of goods and services, UPE inclusive.

The UPE phenomenon: trends and indicators

The UPE drive in Tanzania has been explored by describing, analyzing and discussing three measures:

- The measures of access to the first year of primary education, the apparent intake rate. This is based on the total number of new entrants in the first grade regardless of age. This number is in turn expressed as a percentage of the population at the official primary school entrance age and the net intake rate based on the number of new entrants in the first grade who are of the official primary school entrance age expressed as percentage of the population of the corresponding age;

- The measures of participation, the gross enrollment ratio representing the number of children enrolled in primary education, regardless of age, expressed...
as a percentage of the eligible official primary school-age population; while the net enrollment ratio corresponds to the number of children of the official primary school age enrolled in primary education expressed as a percentage of the corresponding population.

- The measures of internal efficiency of the education system—such as dropouts, promotions and repetitions—which reflect the dynamics of different operational, and decision making events over the school cycle.

**Access to primary education: Older primary school entrants**

The absolute numbers of new entrants to grade one of the primary school cycles have grown steadily since the 1970s (See Table 1 and Figure 1). The number of new entrants increased from around 400,000 in 1975 to 617,008 in 1990 and to 851,743 in 2000, a rise of 212.9 percent in relative terms. An erratic trend is observed in the level of the apparent (gross) intake rates (probably due to unreliability of data). The apparent intake rate was high at around 80% in the 1970s, dropping to 70% in 1975 and rising up to 77% in 2000. This level reflects shortcomings in primary education provision. The apparent intake rates vary widely across the country’s 113 districts. In terms of gender, the rates are generally consistently higher for boys than girls except in Kilimanjaro, Dar es Salaam, Mbeya, Mara, Iringa and Arusha (see MOEC Education Status Report, 2001; TADREG, 1998). These regions have higher levels of gender parity. Tanzania is marked by wide variations in both apparent and net intake rates-between urban and rural districts with the former districts performing higher. Low net intake rates in rural areas reflect the fact that many children do not enter school at the official age of seven years (Kuleana, 1999, PRSP, 2000).

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5 Some scholars have measured school quality (or access) by whether there is a school within a one-hour walk! The danger of using this measure is the inherent assumption that “distance” is a major and probably significant determinant of access, when in-fact even if a school is within walking distance, if the child has no ability to pay for the direct costs he/she will not be able to access schooling.

6 The recently executed MOEC Education Status Report (2001) suggests major differences in education achievement across geographical, rural-urban and gender differences. While most Tanzanians are comfortable at explaining instances of gender and urban-rural differences few would like to discuss geographical/district/regional ones for fear of being labeled “tribalistic.”
Table 1. Primary school participation, access and internal efficiency rates (1970 – 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GER (NER)1</th>
<th>GIR (NIR)2</th>
<th>DR (R.R)3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>39.1 (27.0)</td>
<td>83 (37.0)</td>
<td>0.9 (0.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>54.1 (47.1)</td>
<td>84 (34.0)</td>
<td>1.1 (1.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>98.0 (68.0)</td>
<td>78.2 (34.0)</td>
<td>(1.1) (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>85.5 (67.8)</td>
<td>70.3 (32.0)</td>
<td>2.7 (2.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>73.5 (54.3)</td>
<td>77.0 (21.0)</td>
<td>4.8 (3.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>77.6 (55.5)</td>
<td>72.0 (18.0)</td>
<td>4.8 (4.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>77.7 (56.7)</td>
<td>77.0 (15.0)</td>
<td>6.6 (4.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>(89.0) (61.0)4</td>
<td>85.0 (27.0)</td>
<td>6.6 (3.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1. Trends in participation in primary education are indicated by gross and net enrollment rates, 2. Trends in access to primary education are indicated by apparent (gross) and net intake rates, 3. Trends in internal efficiency are indicated by dropout rates and repetition rates, 4. These are Basic Education Strategy Projections

Figure 1. Evolution of participation in primary education (enrollment rates)

The foregoing analysis suggests that a large number of primary school entrants in Tanzania are actually older than the official entrance age. The Education Status Report (2001), Kuleana (1999), The World Bank (1996) and EFA (2000) have cited some of the factors underlying late entry into primary schooling. These include economic hardship, opportunity costs (paid and unpaid) of child labor, distance from school and access to transportation. In the case of Tanzania and in the district of Kisarawe, Kibaha, Kilosa and Sumbawanga in particular, increases in the number of “older” entrants need also to be interpreted positively. They have resulted from literacy campaigns, school mapping initiatives, mobilization related to the achievement of EFA goals, or demand stimulating attempts like Complementary Basic Education and Training (COBET) and Community Education Fund (CEF) arrangements.
prepare parallel systems to accommodate children who have already passed the official entrance age.

**Participation in primary education:**

**Regression of GERs and NERs**

The regression in the gross and net primary school enrollment ratios (See Table 2); the exceptionally low intake at secondary and vocational levels; and, the general low internal efficiency of the educational sector have combined to create a UPE crisis in Tanzania's education system⁷ (Education Status Report, 2001).

Development efforts directed at expansionary policies during the years following independence in 1961 resulted in increased access, participation and low internal inefficiency of the primary education system.

There were 3,161,079 primary school pupils in Tanzania in 1985. In the subsequent decade primary enrollment rose dramatically by 30% to 4,112,167 in 1999. This was in keeping with the efforts of the “third phase” government's objective to achieve UPE and poverty reduction. These absolute increases were not translated into gross/net enrollment rates' which actually experienced a decline threatening the sustainability of quantitative gains.

The Gross Enrollment Rates which were 35.1% in late 1960's and early 1970s' grew appreciably to 98.0% in 1980 when the Net Enrollment Rate was 68%. This is mainly because the general will to achieve UPE was at its highest in the 1970's, partly due to the then ruling party's (Tanganyika African Nation Union) ideology and the committed mass mobilization effort led by Mwalimu J.K. Nyerere. This period also experienced an increasing allocation of Government recurrent expenditure to education which averaged 17% of the total education expenditure relative to the country GNP which was also high at around 4.9% (high as compared to the Africa South of Saharan average of 3.3%).

The period 1980 to 1990 experienced declines in both GERs and NERs while the period 1995 to 2001 is experiencing both higher GERs and NERs in line with the basic education investment strategy (see EDSDP – Primary Education Initiation Plan, 2001).

The expansion of the sector in the 1970s led to a crisis of distortions in terms of priorities. There were problems of sustainability, payment of fees and general decline of the system’s efficiency and effectiveness. The burden of

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⁷ Our view which is also shared by Cooksey and Riedmiller (1997) is that as the transition and absorption rates into secondary and vocational education respectively declined, this situation acted as a disincentive to parents who had wanted their children to proceed to these levels of schooling after primary.
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The government solely providing for primary education remained appreciably high as the resources continued to be scarce because of low revenues and low tax take relative to GDP.

Table 2. Grade-specific enrollment rates* in primary schools in Tanzania 1992-1999 (%)

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>70.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>68.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BEST, various; Population Planning Unit for Population Projections

* The magnitude of GERs is affected by the assumed population growth rate of the age group. Since there has been no national census since 1998.

Internal efficiency and UPE: A resource wasteful undertaking?

The input/output ratio shows that it takes an average of 9.4 years (instead of the planned 7 years) for a student to complete primary education. The extra years are due to starting late, drop-outs, repetition and high failure rate which is pronounced at Standard Four where a competency/mastery examination is administered (ESDP, 1999, p.84). The average social resource envelope wastage at primary school level is huge—estimated at US$ 106 per child per cohort of seven years.

The drive towards UPE has been hampered by high wastage rates. It should be noted that with average and under age children and those repeating grades, a country’s gross enrollment rates could be more than 100%. The rates for Tanzania have been significantly below the 100% mark. This situation is quite alarming since it shows that in quantitative terms the differences in education opportunity are widening over time and across schooling levels.

It is vital that during the UPE drive efforts be directed at increasing retention levels in the education system. Indeed, for the whole period 1985 – 1999

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8 The Tanzania Government with the support of the World Bank and Donors has recently produced a “Primary Education Strategy and Investment Initiation Plan” whose major policy drive is “enrollment expansion and quality improvement”. Financing gaps are expected to be covered by HIPIC relief initiative reallocations.

9 The numbers on internal efficiency trends for the period 1990 – 2000 need to be interpreted with care due to unavailability of census information. However, if our population projections are correct then the system which loses almost 30% of a “seven year cohort” could be tentatively described as wasteful.
the Tanzania primary education system was at risk because available data (which incidentally is not generally reported for international comparison purposes and is seldom used internally) suggest that learners are not performing effectively and completing each cycle in the education system. The primary school life expectancy which was 6.60 and 6.23 in 1980 and 1985, respectively, dropped to 5.48 in 1990 and slightly improved to 5.66 in 1998. This means that the total number of years of schooling which a Tanzania child of age 7 can expect to receive in the future, (assuming, that her/his probability of being enrolled at any particular future age is equal to the current enrollment ratio for that age) is 5.66 in 1998. The low school life expectancy is also reflected in the low public spending on education as a percentage of GDP which translates into an index of spending efficiency of 2.26 in 1998/99; an inefficient index level of spending when compared with a 1.3 figure of S.S.A (See Table 3).

The Tanzania experience shows that the move towards UPE should be accompanied by action directed at introducing internal efficiency gain measures. There are several competing explanations which can be combined to form intervention policies. It has been shown that at the first grade most parents prefer that their children repeat first year because at the first enrollment most of them feel that their children are not yet acquainted with the school environment. Early years of schooling tend not to be child friendly. The low repetition rates at higher grades can be explained by the policy in the country that does not allow repetition and grade make up. The existence of a grade four “weeding-out” examination explains the high repetition rate at that level.

**Table 3. Index of the education system’s coverage efficiency in Tanzania (1985 – 2000)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School life expectancy (year)</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>5.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public spending on Educ. as % of GDP</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Index of Spending Efficiency**

<table>
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<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.S.A</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Dropout rates in Tanzania primary school system tend to be associated with age, gender and socio-economic status. With the exception of the coastal districts and gender insensitive areas like Tarime, Ngorogoro and Bariadi, dropout rates are higher among boys than among girls. They tend to be high at grades one, four and six because of possible disinterest in schooling and the dry curriculum offered. The general lack of careful school monitoring of
learning, achievement and quality is another determinant of dropout. It is therefore important that social mobilization campaigns, collective national efforts and other interventions pursue policies which could curb children from dropping out of school or being excluded from school.

**Gender perspective**

The primary school level female gross enrollment ratio has declined from 83.2 in 1985 to 77.6 in 1999. The corresponding ratio for males is 83.8 and 75.3 respectively. Thus the GERs for both boys and girls have slightly declined between 1985 and 1999. However the decline is sharper for boys than for girls. Net Enrollment Rates for girls are slightly higher than for boys. This might suggest that the opportunity to stay on and repeat is more limited for girls although more girls of the school-going age than boys are in school. It might also suggest that once girls are enrolled in school it is easier to retain them than boys, more so at the relevant grade.

**UPE and collective national thought**

The achievement of UPE very much depends on a national collective effort. Three phases in Tanzania political governance can be associated with the performance of UPE numbers and quality (See Table 4). The first phase spanning the period 1967 to early 1980s could be described as the “self-reliance expansionary collective national thought phase”. This is the period of second national vision (the first one being the vision to achieve independence). The Arusha Declaration on Socialism and Self-Reliance was the major philosophy. Universal Primary Education (UPE) was part of the socio-economic transformation envisaged in the principles and programs of the Arusha Declaration.

Attainment of education for all in Tanzania as anywhere else, carried with it both political and moral imperatives. In the early 1970s, the first phase government, under a directive issued by the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ruling and sole political party, TANU, the government embarked on an enormous national campaign for universal access to primary education, to all children of school going age. It was resolved that the nation should have attained Universal Primary Education by 1977, which was a reduction by 12 years from 1989, the date cautiously suggested and predicted by UNESCO and other experts and educational planners.
Throwing caution to the wind, the Party, under the leadership of the former president, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, directed the government to put in place mechanisms for ensuring that the directive, commonly known as the Musoma Resolution, was implemented. The argument behind this move was essentially that, in as much as education was a right of each and every citizen, but more, that a government committed to the development of an egalitarian socialist society cannot desegregate and discriminate against her people in the provision of education, especially at the basic level. For this matter the process of Universal Primary Education in Tanzania, was contemplated and implemented with the full cost borne by the government.

Both internal and external observers witnessed something akin to a miracle as enrollments in primary schools across the nation soared and the nation was gravitated in the frenzy to implement the call for education for all in a poor country committed to an equitable and fair provision of education to all the citizens. Report after report, particularly from the government itself, paid glowing tribute to the extraordinary success of the campaign.

Imbedded in this “success” story, were internal structural weakness as well as external factors which were to work towards not only eroding and reversing the achievements of the Universal Primary Education campaign in Tanzania, but also compromising the quality of primary education leading to growing disenchantment and despair amongst the populace in general, and the elite in particular.

To start with, it is worth noting that, given the socialist inclination thriving in Tanzania at that time, traditional partners in educational provision were either reluctant to come forward to support the efforts Tanzania was putting in the campaign or, most arguably, the government itself was reluctant to call for assistance from such sources. Thus, in the annals of implementation of that phase of UPE, the involvement of the international donor agencies and other partners in development is only but minimally apparent. It may also be recalled that, not long before, in 1967, with the Arusha Declaration, most denominational schools run by Christian missions had been nationalized and de-denominationalised by the government. Thus, with a sense of “wait and see” relationship hanging in the air between the traditional partners in educational provision and the Tanzanian government, the latter was basically on her own in the fight for universalization of education in the country.

As will be shown later, this was to prove too much of an undertaking to be borne by the government alone, since not only was educational provision free, but also in the same egalitarian spirit, other services, especially health, were provided universally free by the government. Thus, the government’s readiness, ability and capacity to handle such an enormous task within a short time and limited resources were put into question. And as student
enrollment across the country soared, it was increasingly apparent that the government was biting more than it could chew (Ishumi, 1984; Malekela, 1984; Mgunda, 1999).

**Table 4. Typology of social-economic phases, policy reforms and characteristic features**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typology</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reforms/Policy Features</th>
<th>Characteristic Feature/Results</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase I</td>
<td>1970's, early 1980's</td>
<td>ESR, strong state intervention, no fees, high community mobilization (Ujamaa), low civil society groups participation; top-down self help schemes, &quot;expansionary collective national thought&quot;, education as instrument of social change</td>
<td>Increasing participation and access; high internal efficiency, quality for the few; increasing education spending; lack of consistency and massive growth of the population; slow growth of the economy and thinly spread.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase II</td>
<td>Late 1980's, early 1990's</td>
<td>Liberalization, private school ownership, reduced supervisory role of government, control, SAPs, cost-sharing, &quot;growth of the economy collective national thought&quot; fees and user charges/contributions, reduced role of government, education as instrument of efficiency</td>
<td>Falling/declining participation and access, low internal efficiency rates; declining education spending, low quality of provision and product.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase III</td>
<td>Late 1990's and early 2000</td>
<td>Vision and Mission 2025, civil and institutional financial reforms, education sector development program, Poverty Reduction Strategy, rethinking &quot;income and non-income poverty collective national thought&quot;, local government reform, Debt-Relief Initiative (HIPC), Social Sector Strategy (SSS), education as an instrument of economic and qualitative change</td>
<td>Increasing participation and access; high internal inefficiency; low quality provision; increasing education spending; commitment to social/economic parametric assumptions, UPE fees abolished no-contributions on admission.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The government was the only provider of social services with limited support from donors. Efforts to tackle UPE were channelled through centrally directed, medium-term and long-term development plans resulting in significant access to primary education. Through central instruments the government facilitated Universal Primary Education (UPE) basic requirements including the massive training of teachers. The government was very strategically placed to affect UPE since it had all the necessary and legitimate organs. The state was very close to educational institutions as manifested by leadership and availability of finances though the relationship was dominated by elements of control rather than promoting quality and excellence (Mushi, 1997).
The second phase spanning the period of the late 1980s to early 1990s can be described as the period of “growth of the economy collective national thought”. This phase was characterized by new liberal ideas such as free choice, market-oriented schooling and cost efficiency leading to the loosening of government control of the Universal Primary Education (UPE) agenda. Though expansion of Universal Primary Education (UPE) and other social services were a national priority the economy was not able to sustain their provision. The irony is that the first phase government emphasized a lot on self-reliance and expansion but in reality it tended to achieve the opposite.

The education sector lacked quality teachers as well as teaching/learning materials and infrastructure to address the expansion of Universal Primary Education (UPE) while being self-reliant on the other hand. The solution lay in revamping the economy and reducing the government role through wider stakeholder partnership in provision and financing of the social sectors. A vacuum was created while fragmented donor driven projects dominated primary education support. The introduced individual (household) cost sharing (rather than community cost-sharing) hit most the poorest of the poor.

During the second phase government the situation was significantly gloomy, the reforms in government, starting with the structural adjustment policies (SAPs) of the mid-eighties dealt another blow to UPE in Tanzania. The decreased government support for the provision of social services including education as well as cost-sharing policies were not taken well, given that most incomes were below the poverty line. SAPs led to a situation where farmers received less or no subsidies; a large number of workers lost their means of livelihood through retrenchment and rationalization of the workforce, particularly in the civil service and other areas of public domain; cost-sharing permeated other areas, particularly health services. All these created a situation where the loser was education especially amongst low income earners.

The third phase government spanning the period 1995 and after, can be described as the era of “income and non-income poverty collective national thought”. The era is trying to address both income and non-income poverty so as to generate capacity for provision and consumption of better social services. As part of the underlying underpinnings of the third phase government and the articulated vision 2025; the following impediments to achieving socio-economic progress were given:

- a donor dependency syndrome and a dependent and defeatist developmental mindset;
- a weak and low capacity for education (or economic) management;
- failures in good governance and in the organization of production (UPE provision); and
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- ineffective implementation syndrome (URT, Tanzania Development Vision, 2025).

Figure 2. Rise and fall of GER and spending on education

[Graph showing the rise and fall of GER and education spending over time from 1970 to 2000]

Macro-economic context and challenges

Tanzania had experienced a long and deep economic crisis (late 1970s' to mid – 1980s). In this case the main challenge to UPE achievements could be described in one word: sustainability. How could the positive post reform achievements be sustained in the long run? This was the main challenge with respect to both GDP real growth and inflation and with regard to self-reliance. The economy has continued to exhibit a marked deficiency in that exports can finance only a small portion of imports. Indeed, imports exceed exports by far, ranging from over three times for the Mainland (1998) to over thirty times for Zanzibar (1999). The balance between revenue and expenditure has influenced the development of UPE and general education as reflected in higher expenditure to GDP ratios, and revenue/GDP ratios. The strategic pronged approach has been a simultaneous drive towards increasing revenue earnings and reducing expenditure in absolute terms or in adopting efficiency enhancing measures.

The structure and pattern of public revenue and expenditure over time could be characterized as (a) domestic government revenue remaining stable at around 12 – 13% of GDP for the period 1990 – 1999; (b) external revenue support increasing steadily but with notable fluctuations and unpredictability on the budget support component; (c) more of the external resources going into capital investments rather than budget support (d) servicing of government external debt consuming around 22.6% of recurrent expenditure for the period 1995 – 1999.

11 It is interesting to note that the overall macro-economic achievements over time have been positive but these positive developments have not been associated with relative positive trends in primary school enrollments and quality outputs for a long time.
The economic trends did certainly reduce government capacity to finance provision of social services, including education. The percentage share of expenditure on education to GNP was 4.5% in 1970s and reached a maximum of 5.0% in 1980; dropped to 2.3% by 1990 and slightly rose to 2.7% in 2000 (See Figure 2). As percentage of government recurrent expenditure the education sector share was high in 1975 at 19%, falling to a minimum low of 12.7% in 1985 and rising to 21.2% in 1995. The planned figure for 2001 is 22%\(^2\).

**Table 5. Comparative data: Macro-economic context for Tanzania (1998)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Region</th>
<th>Least Developed Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population growth rate (% p.g)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Revenues as % of GDP</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>(17.8)</td>
<td>(21.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Public spending on education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Region</th>
<th>Least Developed Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As % of total govt. spending</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As % of GDP</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In fact, in terms of proportion of public expenditure allocated to the education sector, Tanzania compares unfavourably with other comparatively poor countries which have allocated higher proportions to education. Burundi (30%), Rwanda (26%) and to a lesser extent Zimbabwe (20%), Kenya (16%) and Uganda (15%) (UNICEF, 1999, 1998, pp 22) are a case in point. In this regard, the large fluctuations in the allocations to education would tend to suggest that the allocation of significant resources to education (indirectly to UPE) would seem to be more a result of policy phases, political commitments and effective implementation of human resource development strategies than a consequence of national earnings capacity.

Local revenue mobilization efforts have an influence on the level of financing and provision to UPE. The figure of 11.5% government revenue as a percentage of GDP remains low by regional comparisons\(^3\) (See Tables). Despite improved efficiency in tax-administration and improved collection improvements by Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) the revenue effort is not

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\(^2\) Data on how much really goes into education needs further reconciliation; otherwise, readers are at first glance always confused. However, it should be noted that the estimated percentage share of public spending on education in total public spending is NOT the same thing as the sector share of education spending as a percentage of total government spending (i.e. total education budget share in total government spending) which includes estimated nongovernment budget.

\(^3\) Tanzania government spending is around 11.8% of the GDP compared with 23.6% in the least developed countries and 36.5% in sub-Saharan Africa. The problem seems to be the low proportion of public revenue captured through the tax net in Tanzania, not that Tanzania is allocating a low proportion of disposable tax income to education.
expected to go beyond 13% by fiscal year 2002 (Public Expenditure Review, 1999). It has to be noted that public spending on education as a percent of total government spending has been as high as 22.9% in 1997, a figure well above that of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) average of 14% and higher still than that of the least developed countries (13%). Within government resources education has been prioritized, but not to the same levels across the three government phases. Total public spending on education has been lower than that of other sub-Saharan African countries or even lower than that of the least developed countries. This situation suggests that during UPE drive there is need for casting wider the partnership net in mobilising resources for education.

The excessively weak macro-economic context in which UPE was implemented is exemplified by the trend of international debt payment. The decline in enrollment rates corresponded to falling real levels of spending on education and to increasing debt service charges. The ratio of debt service to government expenditure which was 7.6% in fiscal years 1969/70 rose to 11% in fiscal years 1984/85; to 23% in fiscal years 1995/96 and to 27.9% in the years 1995/2000.

The high levels of debt servicing continued in the 1990s with little prospects that the budget would be able to keep pace with demographic trends and internal wrong prioritisation of allocations to education. Indeed, the debt service to education spending ratio increased from 94.9 in 1995 to 157.2 in 1997, and to 174.8 in 1999 (See Table 6 and Figure 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Government Recurrent Spending</th>
<th>Service of External Debt</th>
<th>Debt Service/ Rec. Spending</th>
<th>Education Spending</th>
<th>% Debt Service/Educ. Spending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>386.6</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>470.0</td>
<td>120.0</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>119.6</td>
<td>100.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>587.1</td>
<td>164.3</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>104.5</td>
<td>157.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>711.9</td>
<td>227.0</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>118.9</td>
<td>190.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>791.9</td>
<td>194.1</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>111.1</td>
<td>174.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


We should hasten to add that a prudent debt management framework is being worked out to complement the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) relief by converting the high social opportunity costs of debt servicing into high gains in human welfare of debt relief. The expectation is that education for debt swap will increase education sector financing and UPE financing in particular. Already, the government of Tanzania is committing 30% of HIPC funds to education (PRSP, 2000).
One is not even sure that the HIPC initiative would be sufficient to address the UPE-debt overhang in Tanzania. A starting point would be to prepare a strategy for converting debt savings into UPE investment (or other priorities) so as to ensure that debt relief is not used for other purposes like other past “windfall” gains. As regards UPE there would be need to address concerns related to inefficiencies and absorption capacity.

The changing country population and the macro-demographic trends and dynamics have continued to exert pressure on the provision of UPE. The increasing numbers of school going children did not make it possible to release enough resources to improve the magnitude and quality of UPE. Population growth remained high though it declined from 3.1% during the period 1975 – 1995 to around 2.7% from 1995 – 2000 (in the absence of a country wide census since 1988 these projected figures need to be taken with caution). It is estimated that the number of primary school-going children aged (7 – 13 yrs) has grown from around 5.3 million in 1990 to around 6.8 million in 2000 (MOEC, 1999). The fertility rate, estimated at 5.4%, remains relatively high. This adversely impacts on UPE. Yet, the costs of providing for UPE fall on those of working age just when around 53% of the population is below the age of 18 which contributes to the dependency ratio (though falling from 80% to around 70%) has remained high.

The period 1985 – 2000 has experienced the HIV/AIDS scourge. Its impact was to increase the dependency on the government resources for both education direct costs and the HIV/AIDS related economic loss of skilled teaching staff. The Education Status Report warns of the effect of HIV/AIDS on the education sector brought about by a declining demand for education. Recent survey studies (see Katabaro, 1999) suggest that limited household resources are being diverted to taking care of the HIV/AIDS related diseases...
in the household rather than education. Meanwhile the deaths of adults in the households are decreasing household labor income, part of which would have been used to finance UPE-schooling.

By 1993 the most HIV/AIDS affected area in Tanzania was Kagera Region on the western side of Lake Victoria. In three studied districts of the region, namely Bukoba rural, Karagwe and Muleba, net enrollment rates for primary education were respectively 43.9%, 42.1% and 44%, quite below the national average figure of around 54%. In the same districts the teacher attrition rate had increased from around 0.8% in 1980s’ to 1.6% in the 1990s. The supply side impact of HIV/AIDS on education has recently been associated with unfavorable Teacher Pupil Ratios in Iringa region (Luhanga, 2001) to the detriment of UPE quality provision.

**Constraints of structural adjustments**

The widely talked about and criticized action, which constrained the UPE, is the structural adjustment program implemented under the Bretton Woods Institutions’ inspired economic reforms of the mid-1980s. The reforms in the education sector were part and parcel of the economy-wide reforms, which began in earnest with the adoption of the Economic Recovery Program(s). The reforms addressed four key macro issues of access, quality, finance efficiency and the greater role to be played by the private sector.

It has to be appreciated that the success stories in enrollment expansion of the 1970s were achieved through centrally directed, medium and long-term development plans. The majority of the 11,409 primary schools currently in operation were constructed during the 1970s. Most of the teacher training colleges were also established during the period. Priority was given to primary education while secondary and post-secondary education expansion was narrowly determined by future manpower needs as per obtained skill mix ratios pertaining to the economy wide projections.

The first comprehensive structural adjustment program, “Economic Recovery Program I (ERP I)” (supported by multilateral donor agencies) was followed by ERP (II) in 1989 – 93. which aimed at dismantling the system of state control and promoting the private sector. The economy experienced a major transition from a state controlled system to freemarkets (World Bank 2001).

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14 Note that the Education and Training Policy (1995) actually had somewhat conflicting messages. On the one hand it proclaimed cost-sharing; on the other, access. It could be argued that some of these changes were not actually consistent with improving access!
Table 7. Primary school UPE indicators during SAP period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Schools (%)</td>
<td>10,437(0.4)</td>
<td>10,945(4.9)</td>
<td>10,879(-0.6)</td>
<td>10,878(0.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Streams (%)</td>
<td>91,614(-2.9)</td>
<td>99,299(8.4)</td>
<td>103,925(4.7)</td>
<td>105,811(1.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Teachers*</td>
<td>104,892</td>
<td>101,306</td>
<td>101,816</td>
<td>103,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Enrol. (%)</td>
<td>3,507,384(3.9)</td>
<td>3,599,580(2.6)</td>
<td>3,732,943(3.7)</td>
<td>3,793,201(1.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NER</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher/Pupil Ratio**</td>
<td>1:33.5</td>
<td>1:35.6</td>
<td>1:36.6</td>
<td>1:36.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BEST 1990 – 1994, June 1995 (Based on Public System)

* This figure is the total of public and private schools. Since 1992 the No. of private schools has remained at 131/132 schools, but this number has increased since 1995/96.

** Based on total teachers and pupils in all schools

The SAP’s policies in education emphasized and encouraged:
- cost efficiency gains;
- cost sharing between the government, parents, students and other stakeholders; and
- the development of non-state schools. Liberal ideas of freedom to own schools, market-oriented education programs and loosening of government control, dominated the scene. The catch-all political phrase of ‘education for all’ could no longer be sustained.

The outcome of SAPs has been summarized by Mbilinyi (1990) as follows: “(1) growing inequalities in access to education at all levels, (2) growing disparities in the quality of education, and (3) a change in the direction and vision of education” (p.2).
The magnitude of the problems facing primary education were revealed during the SAP period. Resources available for education declined and the allocation to the primary education sub-sector for 1994/95 dropped in real terms of expenditure per primary school pupil from the 1992/93 figures (Svantesson, 1994). Total contributions by the parents for primary education overtook contributions by the government (See Figure 5); an illustration of state withdrawal. The dual economy was firmly established with an ever-widening gap between the state on the one hand, and parents and communities on the other in the financing of primary education. The poor were being squeezed more and more, thus leading to threatened access in equity provision and consumption. (Wort, 2000). Thus while efforts were directed at improving the macro-disequilibrium, human development and most likely poverty reduction goals were sacrificed.

The number of primary schools decreased from 10,960 in 1992/93 to 10,891 in 1994/95. It was partly against this background that increases in the number of class streams was considered a priority by the third phase government; a move which further crowded classrooms.

Gross enrollment in public primary schools fluctuated during the SAP period having increased from 3,600,000 in 1992/93 to around 3,800,000 in 1994/95 (Wort, 1996). Table 7 and Figure 4 show that the gross enrollment ratio decreased slightly from 74.9% in 1992/93 to 74% in 1994/95. The decline was also registered in the NER for all school children attending primary schools from 1992 (54.2) to 1994 (NER = 52.6).

---

15 Actually, school level survey data reported in the Unit Cost Analysis section of the Education Status Report suggest that parents prior to abolishing contributions and fees at primary school level contributed as much as the government to primary and secondary education as well as teachers colleges. Thus the "popular" statement that the major financer of the sector is the central government is not strictly correct; at least not by 1999.
The disenabling environment of SAP was further reflected in the number of children of school age who were not in school by 1993. The figure had increased from 700,780 in 1980 to 2,027,419 by 1993. The failure of the concepts of choice and market forces was vivid during and after the SAP period. The promised land of possibilities of choice between schools, improved school and student performance and diversity of school options did not materialise. Efficient and well performing schools were not rewarded. However, inefficient and poorly performing schools survived. The market invisible hand had not made schools responsible to the wishes of parents and students!

The history of SAP in Tanzania is incomplete if the World Bank and its affiliated agencies IMF and IDA are not given due mention. Incidentally, few people have appreciated liability of these creditors for the failure of policies which they imposed and the disastrous performance of UPE. In the rush to advise, the World Bank view was that there was probably considerable scope for increasing school fees and contributions (1991, p.49). Its enrollment and cost projections for the year 2000 seem to have been based on the assumption that nearly 80 percent of 7 year olds were attending school in 1989. However, the MOEC figures actually showed it to be a mere 12 percent. In the following two years it declined to 11 and 10 percent (World Bank, 1991, p. 90). As it later turned out, both the cost and parametric assumptions were wrong. The cause of non-enrollment and dropout was that the direct costs were too high.

Closely associated with SAPs, there were parents who were finding competing demands for the shrinking income making it difficult for them to give priority to education. This is leading to the emergence of an elite who are finding the education offered through public schools too poor for their children. Thus, either their children are enrolled in the so called private “international schools”, English middle schools; or in some cases the children are enrolled in primary schools outside the country.

It has been argued (Muganda, 1999), that this particular practice has a negative effect on the whole process of education for all, especially UPE. In Tanzania, since it means that not only the total expenditure on public education is divided between the affluent private schools and the poorly resourced public schools, but also the will to assist the public schools is diminished by the practice. This is particularly so considering that those who take their children outside the public system, also happen to command considerable influence on the policy-making process in the country. The pressure on the government to support the schools and raise the standard of education needs to be undertaken by all parents who have the capacity, ability and stake in schools, rather than leaving the overseeing of the public education system to be dealt with in a detached manner.
The UPE drive: quality or quantity?  

In a thought provoking paper presented during the NASEDEC (1999) Conference in Vaasa, Finland, Marope (1999), while acknowledging the crisis facing education in sub-Saharan Africa, took trouble to show that the center of the crisis is the ambitious aspiration to “pursue the double pronged agenda of expanding access to education while improving its quality”. Is quality provision just an ambitious pursuit or a necessary course of action if UPE numbers have to be improved and sustained?

The role of school quality in enhancing primary school outcomes has been widely studied and debated (DAE, 1995, Hynemann and Loxley, 1981, Mosha, 1994). Yet, focusing on primary school quality alone may not be a priority when a significant portion of the school age population (43%) are not in school. To a keen observer therefore it may not be sufficient to argue that only primary school quality matters! The issue needing resolution becomes how to consider and make choices related to cost-effectiveness that matter most in improving school quality relative to investments that expand enrollment numbers (Handa and Simler, 2000).

Evidence suggests that during the UPE drive in Tanzania the quality of primary education declined and this trend had negative influence on enrollments (Cooksey and Riedmiller, op. cit; TADREG, 1993). The search for quality during UPE demands that the reality must resemble the rhetoric as perceived by clients, parents and pupils in particular. The realization that their children are not learning much discourages many parents from sending their children to school (TADREG, 1993). One mother according to TADREG commented: “… all of my children have completed standard 7 but none knows how to read and write!” Lamentations on perceived falling standards are common as exemplified by the statement that:

*During those good old days, schools and nearly each and everything [the speaker lists a large number of items]…all these things were provided free of charge. Today our schools hardly have these things despite the fact that we are paying some money as school fees…We cannot expect our children to learn very much in the absence of all these things mentioned above.* (TADREG, 1993, p.35).

The “disenabling environments” have made quality Universal Primary Education a daunting challenge. For Tanzania the issue has been the attainment of optimal trade offs between available resources and learning outcomes. To be able to gauge the efficiency in the transformation of tangible resources into learning outcomes we use data collected from 113 districts of Tanzania.

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16 There is still a big group of people mainly policy makers who believe that quantity and quality cannot be achieved together. Our argument is that if parents and students perceive low quality in provision, demand for schooling will be curtailed. We are not talking of resource constraint; but of the optimal path to trade off the two.
The impact of education inputs on enrollment (NER) and on primary school leaving examination results (PSLE) is established. At primary school level in Tanzania, the PSLE performance and NER (enrollment) are evaluated as outcomes using correlation and multiple regression analysis based on the following assumption:

- overcrowded classes are associated with poor performance in examinations;
- quantity and quality of teaching contribute to good performance in PSLE;
- the level and quality of staffing encourage enrollment;
- overcrowded classrooms discourage enrollment because they are not child friendly;

The data and analysis in this section of this paper are adopted from TADREG (1999) and enriched with information from the Education Status Report (2001). The TADREG report summarizes quantitative data on district level poverty and education indicators for Mainland Tanzania. The PSLE indicator data were obtained from the National Examination Council (NECTA). The other data were obtained from the MOEC central data base developed by its planning and policy department.

Table 8 shows the correlation between the selected education inputs and outputs in the 113 districts of Mainland Tanzania. The selected inputs were: class size as shown by average school age Population per Class Room (PCR); proportion of Grade A Teachers in district (TAR) (in contrast to proportion of Grade B teachers who are usually considered less qualified/untrained than their Grade A counterparts) and the average Pupil Teacher Ratio (PTR) in the district. The outputs of each district were defined as the Net Enrollment Ratio (NER) as well as the average Primary School Leaving Examination Score (PSLE) for each district.

The correlation results between primary education inputs and outputs in the 113 districts shown in Table 8 would tend to suggest that:

- the districts where the level of inputs is low or poor (high PCR, low TAR and poor PTR) do also record poor performance in participation (NER) and poor achievement in relevant national examination (PSLE);
- there is an inverse relationship between the average teacher pupil ratio (PTR) of the district and the average PSLE performance of the district;
- there is a positive relationship between the proportion of Grade A teachers in the district (as compared to total of Grade A plus Grade C) and the average performance of the district in PSLE;
- there is a positive relationship between the proportion of Grade A teachers in the districts and participation as indicated by NER;
- there is a negative relationship between school age population per class room (PCR) and both average district PSLE performance and districts' average NER.
Table 8. Correlation between primary education inputs and outputs in the 113 districts of Tanzania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PCR</th>
<th>TAR</th>
<th>PTR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NER</td>
<td>-41%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>-24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSLE</td>
<td>-21%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>-19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes:
1. as the number of pupils per classroom increases (overcrowding) the number of school age children enrolled in the districts decreases and vice-versa;
2. as the number of pupils per classroom increases (overcrowding) the district average performance in the primary school examination (PSLE) decreases (falls) (and vice-versa);
3. as the average district teacher pupils ratio, increases (large number of pupils per teacher) the average of school age children enrolled in the districts decreases; (classroom overcrowding discourages enrollment of school age children);
4. high average district teacher pupil ratios are associated with poor performance in primary school leaving examination (PSLE)

These findings bring us back to the perspectives on the quantity and quality relationship in UPE provision. That NERs are positively associated with both the PTR indicator of quality and the quality of the teachers (as shown by proportion of Grade A teachers) tends to reinforce the perspective that participation and quality should not be approached as operationally alternative strategic policy options in achieving UPE.

Apart from the burden of provision on the part of the government, a few other salient and connected issues that are deemed to have collectively contributed to the decline of UPE quality in Tanzania are also worth of explication. To start with, it has to be noted that the pace at which the process was put into place, of necessity ignored or glossed over serious preparatory requirements.

The need for availability of structures, materials and environment conducive to teaching and learning of an expanded student population put a strain on the capacity of the relevant operation. This has been documented and addressed by most observers of UPE process in Tanzania. The capacity to mobilize local resources in this regard seem to have been long exhausted and only in some instances, especially where external assistance played a hand, do we note some improvement either in infrastructure or even in the availability of some of the basic teaching and learning materials. Of late there is also a growing sense of disparity depending on the socio-location of particular primary schools. Some of the schools located in the more affluent communities, particularly in urban areas receive more community support in comparison with schools serving less affluent communities.

Researchers in this regard have pointed out the unavailability of teaching materials, classrooms toilets, textbooks, chalk and other basic requirements for a school to operate at minimum standards. It is common knowledge that unless there is a close correlation between student intake and the facilities that make learning possible, the result will be dissatisfied students and
disgruntled teachers – with little teaching and learning taking place. This was never taken into consideration during the implementation of Universal Primary Education in Tanzania and the requisite facilities has been declared too inadequate for appropriate teaching and learning.

Equally, and perhaps more seriously there was the problem of teachers and teacher recruitment. The Tanzania government having been mandated to foresee the implementation of the campaign, instituted an innovation, whereby teachers were trained from a distance – dubbed the Village-Based Teacher Training Program (Ishumi 1984, Malekela 1994). This program managed to produced about 40,000 teachers within a period of three years (1974 – 1977). These teachers were usually primary school leavers who had not proceeded with further education. These were recruited to volunteer to teach in primary schools while they underwent distance education in basic curriculum areas. The method produced many teachers in a short time, at a fraction of the cost, compared to residential courses. However, it has also been a central aspect to the criticism of the declining quality of primary education in Tanzania.

The quality of teachers and their general satisfaction with the job are the most important single ingredients in education which anyone planning for quality education should take into serious and careful consideration. The case of UPE in Tanzania reveals that the teachers recruited to cover the serious shortfall of teachers in the mid-seventies are still in the system as recent surveys indicated. For example, a SADC (2000:143) report on the assessment of needs for educational policy development and planning management, states that:

By 1997, it was widely believed that the dramatic decline in educational quality was due to the overwhelming presence in schools of unqualified teachers recruited in the 1974 mobilization for UPE.

Muganda (1999) has also made similar observations about the quality of education and the negative effect reflected from the employment of under-qualified teachers in primary schools; implying that the quality of teachers has a direct influence on the motivation of children to enroll and to remain at school. Muganda (1999) further argues that when the future of the children does not seem to be determined by their performance at school, children would soon “choose” alternative attractions outside the school.

Teachers have been labeled the single most important tool for educational effectiveness (Hernes 2001) and the case of UPE in Tanzania should not be an exception. In as much as the teachers command of their field is vital, so is their perception of how they are treated, managed and supported professionally. In Tanzania the record for teachers support in primary schools has been wanting for a long time and in recent years the situation has experienced
even further decline (Alphonce 1993, 2000). It may be argued, therefore, that when teachers are poorly remunerated, ill-trained, and inadequately supported for career advancement and professional growth, they may not offer their services at the most optimal levels, thus leaving students and parents dissatisfied with school experience.

**UPE relevance to peoples’ lives and work**

For the purpose of analysis one would like to separate issues of UPE quality and relevance to peoples’ lives and work. They are actually interwoven. Relevance may be considered broadly to include issues of employment, productivity and external efficiency of UPE investment. If the UPE numbers achieved in the late 1970s and early 1980s had to be sustained, primary education provided by then had to be relevant to peoples’ lives and work. In the period after independence in the early 1960s; education was seen as a rare resource which entitled those who acquired it to income and easy exit from general poverty.

**Table 9. Annual returns to investment in education in Tanzania by shortcut method (1998/99) in Tshs.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>E(high)</th>
<th>E(low)</th>
<th>Private Costs</th>
<th>Social Costs</th>
<th>Social Return</th>
<th>Private Return</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>1,127,172</td>
<td>420,00*</td>
<td>(48,000)</td>
<td>(91,696)</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(14%)</td>
<td>(10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>1,349,400</td>
<td>1,118,316</td>
<td>(152,007)</td>
<td>(307,954)</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(9%)</td>
<td>(16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher/Univ.</td>
<td>2,536,188</td>
<td>1,349,400</td>
<td>313,525</td>
<td>3,675,863</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(8%)</td>
<td>(23%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Estimated as equal to minimum wage or the going market price of unskilled labor
Source: Computed from Data available in Education Status Report (2001)

The years of ESR implementation (1967-) and thereafter showed very little progress towards the objective of making primary education terminal and in a sense of preparing pupils for self-employment.

The tendency for parents and pupils has been to aim at post primary and secondary school education or some white collar jobs. “Success” in educational achievement was culturally defined as being accepted into academic secondary schools, thereby defining the 95% of pupils who were not selected into post primary as “failures” by default? (UNDP, 1999). It is our considered opinion that UPE as enshrined in ESR was pushed down the throat of popular opinion. The contradictions between official policy and household intentions are not helped by recent findings. In Tanzania like in other developing countries, private returns to investment in secondary and university education are higher than private returns to investing in primary schooling (See Table 9).
The Basic Education Strategy plans to raise the transition to secondary to 20%. However, the majority of pupils run the risk of seeing themselves as failures. This is precisely because there are too few viable alternatives that can build human capacity and lead to income generation (UNDP, 1999). The only was to alter this is through a search for a premium mobile that would create employment opportunities by restructuring investment patterns.

The link between education and work includes questions about the habits and characteristics of productive workers. However the educational ambitions of young people ought to reflect the conditions of the labor market rather than the unrealistic career aspirations of these young people. Of recent, the informal sector has assumed a significant role in contributing to GDP and hence employment. This is an aspect of existing labor market conditions which ought to be reflected in educational curriculum innovations.

**Universal Primary Education (UPE) and strategy for district allocation of investment**

Although Tanzania (Mainland) is made up of 20 regions and 113 districts with different resource endowments and differing economy-wide performance indicators, the Universal Primary Education (UPE) drive was implemented without a well thought out strategy for allocation of investment. The process of transferring the investment management function of primary education to local control was not effectively initiated and followed through. A real division of functions and roles in primary education between the center and localities appears in the Tanzania case to be a pre-condition for Universal Primary Education (UPE) success.

Districts and local councils or authorities show major differences with respect to both taxable wealth, needs and the prices they encounter for educational resources. Poverty and high prices in several districts are sometimes positively correlated, creating an unfortunate situation. Rural districts notably, Mtwara, Rural Lindi, Rural Kisarawe, Bagamoyo, Kigoma, Igunga, Serengeti, Ngara, Nzega and Maswa were unable to raise money for schools support over the government subsidies because households in the area are too poor. At the same time qualified teachers (mainly grade A teachers) have shown unwillingness to work in far-flung areas at the salary rate they would accept in the urban areas. The system did not design “hardship” salary increments for teachers' who are willing to teach in low-income rural areas.

Many of the low quality Universal Primary Education (UPE) issues are directly linked to lack of funds for school inputs essential for adequate education delivery, e.g. scarcity of school inputs such as teaching and learning materials; school operation and other supplies; and teacher pedagogical support and
professional training. As the subsidy from central government continued to cover 90% of personal emolument, the residual costs of Universal Primary Education (UPE) and the other charge components (school recurrent costs of delivery) could not adequately be covered by the remaining 10% proportion.

The Universal Primary Education (UPE) drive was implemented without ensuring efficient fund flow and their effective utilisation at school level for each district. Institutional constraints became a major impediment to Universal Primary Education (UPE). These constraints include: low school-community capacity for implementing Universal Primary Education (UPE) delivery, weak district and central level capacity for coordination among the various stakeholders and management of the system, faulty policy and planning mechanisms, lack formative financial management, monitoring and evaluation. In essence, Universal Primary Education (UPE) implementation and success requires the establishment of minimum parameters of fund mobilization and flow so as to facilitate fast fund flow and effect utilisation at school level.

A progressive Universal Primary Education (UPE) achieving investment strategy would take consideration of two approaches (i) first, to adjust the flow of funds to the recipient district under two broad criteria of: the needs of the district to spend money on Universal Primary Education (UPE) and the ability of the district to meet these needs from its own fiscal resources (ii) second to ensure that allocations are made in accordance with regional needs, as per development index.

We attempted to define seven Universal Primary Education (UPE) performance indicators for the twenty regions and constructed a development index to guide investment as follows:

- Regional share in national GDP (the lower the share, the more the need).
- Primary School, Gross Enrollment Ratio (GER) (the lower the rate, the more the need).
- Illiteracy rate, IA (the lower the ratio, the lower the need).
- Students/Classroom Ratio, SCR (the higher the ratio, the more the need).
- Pupil per Untrained Teacher, UTT (the higher the ratio, the more the need).
- Pupil Teacher Ratio, PTR (the higher the ratio, the more the need).
- Primary School Leaving Examination, PSLE (the lower the performance, the more the need).

These indicators are assigned weights ranging from 10% to 20%. The regional GDP indicator and GER are assigned the weight of 20%. The regions are subsequently ranked on the basis of their weighted performance in each of the indicators from “most” (rank 1) to “least” (rank 20) in need. The composite
score of the regions were then converted into percentages to determine the share of investment of each region. Table 10 shows the computed investments share of each region based on the development index drawn.

Table 10. Development index weighted ranking by region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>GER</th>
<th>IA</th>
<th>SCR</th>
<th>UTT</th>
<th>PTR</th>
<th>PSLE</th>
<th>Composite Score</th>
<th>Final Rank</th>
<th>Share Investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arusha</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSM</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dodoma</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>8.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iringa</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kagera</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kigoma</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8.57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kniaro</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindi</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mara</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbeya</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morogoro</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtwara</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>4.50</td>
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<td>7.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mwanza</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>4.86</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pwani</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rukwa</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruvuma</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>6.32</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinyanga</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singida</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabora</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanga</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>6.08</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GDP= Share of Region's GDP (the smaller the share the more in need), GER = Primary School Gross Enrollment Ratio (the lower the rate, the more in need), IA = Adult Illiteracy rate (the lower the ratio the lower the need), SCR = Students per Classroom (the higher the ratio, the more in need), UTT = Pupil per Untrained Teacher (the higher the ratio the more in need), PTR = Pupil Teacher Ratio (the higher the ratio, the more in need), PSLE = Primary School Leaving Examination (the lower the performance the more in need), Composite Score = WEIGHTED Rank for each of the six indicators, Final Rank = The Rank of the Regions based on their composite score arranged from ‘least’ (RANK 1) to “most” (RANK 20) in need.

Based on the development index Shinyanga is the most in need of intervention among the 20 regions, and should therefore receive the biggest share of investment. Tabora is the next in need. Iringa is the last but one while Kilimanjaro is the least in need. Within the region, allocations will be determined by peculiar needs identified internally and for each district. However, during the Universal Primary Education (UPE) drive grants where allocated every financial year to districts based on the current enrollment figures rather than on a combination of needs and fiscal capacity. Although grants where allocated on the basis of the number of children enrolled in primary education by districts, figures varied from an average in urban areas of Tsh. 14,199 to Tsh. 12,279 in rural areas for the year 1995.

Table 11 shows the implications of having in place a composite index driven investment criteria for regional/districts’ allocations as follows:

- composite score index for each region is correlated positively with gross enrollment ratio ($r = 0.621, p = 0.01$) and primary school leaving examination performance ($r = 0.808, p = 0.05$);
Developments and Issues
Regarding Universal Primary Education (UPE) in Tanzania

The irony of top-down approach for UPE

Is it not a historical irony that UPE should be engineered from the central bureaucracy? Systems dependent on central management and implementa-
tion of UPE have remained unconvincing in a climate of declining resources and insensitive institutional arrangements. Top-down approaches and stereotyping in setting and implementing UPE and the Education Sector Development Program have been common in Tanzania to the detriment of the sector. UPE is a huge undertaking and has the potential of distressing any good intentions. Organising for UPE achievement can be a key problem in the Ministry of Education and Culture; the overseer of Education and Training Policy (1995) and standards. The nature of the UPE implementation activities exhibit/display several issues to be dealt with immediately in order to revive UPE. Such issues include: lack and need for modernisation; lack for setting priorities; need to avoid confusion and inability to make right choices, the large size of the sector and the ministry itself, data management and its effective utilisation, and the inertia to try innovative ideas.

A modern democratic education system is one that enables learners, parents and teachers to be informed, to participate, and to influence the decisions that affect them. The organizational functioning of the MOEC is not best suited for primary education effective implementation unless it is organised in some way as to directly involve its stakeholders, mainly parents, teachers and districts through strong parents/teachers associations. The stakeholder voice in UPE policy making has remained muted. The tradeoffs between the public and private sectors in provision and financing have sharpened overtime. The scenario that has emerged between the two sectors is that of control and competition rather than the two complementing each other in UPE provision.

After the reintroduction of local governments in 1984, the MOEC has counted on the Ministry responsible for local governments to implement the UPE policy. However, this thinking may be wrong because it was mainly political and financial concerns that led to the reintroduction of local governments (Liviga, 1992). Educational issues played a minor role, although primary education is the most important and largest activity of local governments (Thirkildsen, 1993). During the UPE drive the local governments showed problems related to: low capacity and competence to deliver; misallocation of funds from government subsidies and especially those earmarked for education; structural supervisory incompetence (of MOEC); weak fiscal revenue base and general lack of organizational and operational efficiency (as shown by low TPRs, poor management of teachers and low performance in PSLE).

On the other hand in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the donor community played a major role in the reforms of the education sector especially in primary education. This led to the evolving of several policy packages in the MOEC. The result was “an aid financed and fragmented sector, overwhelmed by workshops and assorted strategy exercises, that existed in a partial vacuum from mainstream activity” (Wort, 2000). The result has been
a reduced supervisory role of central government and its general impact on institutional weakening manifested in various limitations on the central implementation of UPE.

### Table 12. Gross enrollment changes in school mapping pilot districts (%) (Post implementation figures in brackets)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>G.E.R</th>
<th>N.E.R</th>
<th>P.T.R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kisarawe</td>
<td>75(78)</td>
<td>66(67)</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musoma (Rural)</td>
<td>69(75)</td>
<td>30(42)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serengeti</td>
<td>75(76)</td>
<td>62(64)</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bagamoyo</td>
<td>70(73)</td>
<td>53(56)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morogoro (Urban)</td>
<td>84(86)</td>
<td>70(71)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magu</td>
<td>60(61)</td>
<td>51(50)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Galabawa, Agu and Miyazawa (2000)

A key strategy in UPE implementation is through developing empowerment to and commitment of communities for the development of primary education. One of the key UPE mission is that the districts therefore are able to operationalise strategies and take ownership. Besides, the national commitment of the “third phase” government; this ownership and empowerment of communities has been the secret behind the now rising enrollment rates. School/districts based programs have a high chance of success in raising enrollments and school admissions. Three case studies illustrate this position:

**Case one: The district based Community Education Fund (CEF)**

This case study represents the Tanzania Human Resources Development Pilot Project (World Bank 1997) administered by the Ministry of Education and Culture under the Human Resources Development Program. As part of a development credit from IDA to the United Republic of Tanzania a sum of SDR 15.0 million, the equivalent of US$ 20.9 million, and on standard IDA terms, with maturity 40 years, was loaned to help finance the Human Resources Development (HRD) component of Community Education Fund (CEF). At Primary school level, the objective of the project is to increase funding in a manner that will contribute to improved outcomes and increased accountability of schools to parents. This component is being implemented through the Community Education Fund (CEF) which aims at raising enrollments and quality/learning outcomes of primary education through increased parental participation and financing, school-based quality enhancement initiatives, and improved support for schools at the district level. The capacity building component of the project aims at building capacity through CEF programs at the district and community levels and through selective training and project implementation at the Central Level. It is expected that MOEC will be able to formulate and implement solutions to problems in primary education. A matching grant is provided to communities.
The Project Outcomes: The major expected project outcomes under the CEF component were; increased enrollment, improved performance as measured on PSLE, improved school environment for learning, increased parental and community involvement, improved school management and improved school financial base.

Project Selected Findings: Selected categories of impact findings on this CEF project tend to suggest that:

- enrollments in CEF districts showed higher average growth rates trends than those shown by non-CEF but comparable districts for the same period of 1994 – 1998;
- CEF district enrollment trends tend to be positive for schools which are two years old in the project while those which have been in the project beyond or above three years tend to experience negative enrollment trends;
- the average school enrollment for the 370 CEF schools has increased from 316 pupils (two years ago) to 328 pupils (to date);
- CEF schools tend to show improvement and score gains in PSLE when compared with other non-CEF schools at the regional level;
- CEF schools tend to show significant performance gains in the first and second years of project implementation while tending to fall off slightly in the third year within district comparisons.

Case two: Positive Impact of school mapping (at district level) (See Table 12)

With the support of UNICEF and JICA the district school mapping process was designed to do the following: (i) strengthen local capacities to collect, organise, analyzes and use educational data to make informed decision for educational development; (ii) improve districts’ administrative, planning and monitoring capacities with respect to education; (iii) mobilise communities to participate in the development/improvement of education indicators; (iv) put in place accurate/reliable, detailed and accessible education information for use in decision making and action. The school mapping exercise in Tanzania adapted and used the instruments and techniques developed by the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP); and outlined and followed a number of processes. The vision is that the use of these instruments and techniques/ processes, along with the data generated through them by the people themselves, will impact positively on the status of education in the areas concerned.

The findings:

One, the number of school age children increased in three of the districts (Musoma, Serengeti and Magu) and decreased in the other three districts.
(Kisarawe, Bagamoyo and Morogoro Urban). There could be two possible competing explanations for the above developments; (i) that there was an improvement in data collection for the districts which experienced increase in the number of school age children; (ii) that there was an improvement in the Standard One Admission Rate as a result of school mapping for the districts which experienced a decrease in the number of school age children outside school. Both explanations point to a positive impact of school mapping.

Two, there was an increase in GER in all relevant districts and this development with respect to gross enrollment ratio (GER) is interesting. While gross enrollment increased at various levels in all the six districts, the pattern for the gross enrollment ratio is mixed. It increased in three districts – Musoma Rural (69% to 75%), Bagamoyo (70% to 73%), Morogoro urban (84.6% to 86%) and decreased in the three districts – Kisarawe (88% to 85%), Serengeti (86% to 85%), and Magu (61% to 60%). The explanations for the trends in GER is related to the way GER is defined. It is defined as the ratio between the total number of school children enrolled in the current year to the total number of school age children in the population of the district multiplied by one hundred. In this case then, any policy intervention which affects the size of total enrollment or total number of student population will have positive or negative effects on the GER. The school mapping exercise affected the GERs in the following ways: (i) by identifying more of the school age children and putting them in school, thereby increasing the size of the denominator and subsequently increasing GER; (ii) by mobilising and sensitising parents to enrol their children in Standard One at the right age of seven years; this facilitated a decrease in the number of over-age children in school and thus decreased GER since the denominator decreased in this case. Both situations are indicators of positive impact.

Three, the Net Enrollment Ratios (NER) increased at varying degrees in the four districts – Kisarawe, Musoma, Serengeti and Morogoro urban – that had the information available. While in Musoma rural, it increased from 30% to 42% (12%); in Serengeti, it increased by 2% and by 1% each in Kisarawe and Morogoro urban districts. This trend suggests that the overall number of school age children in school has increased relative to the over aged children. However, NERs are lower than GERs for the districts. This is an indication that although the situation did improve a good proportion of school age children was still not in school.

Case three: The District Based Support to Primary Education (DBSPE).
The District Based Support to Primary Education (DBSPE) is a national program developed by the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) to improve the quality and access to primary education. The major outputs
outlined in the DBSPE plan have been carefully linked to the major components of the Basic Education Master Plan (BEMP) within the framework of the Education Sector Development Program (ESDP). DBSPE has grown out of previous projects/programs supported by joint donors. Currently, the government with the support of three major donor funding agencies; DBSPE, the Royal Danish Embassy (Danida), and Royal Netherlands have committed themselves to support 62 districts by the year 2001. These include the 14 districts of the MoEC/Danida PEP test phase. Likewise, the Embassy of Finland supports a total of the 11 districts. Further, the program relates in many ways to the SDP process together with the Local Government Reform (LGR) initiatives, by building capacity at the district and school level for decentralised planning and implementation. DBSPE has already established operating procedures for launching the program in the new districts and implementation procedures are outlined in the District Operational manual and the District Finance Manual.

The program impact: The program has improved the performance of district education staff, teachers and pupils in the targeted districts. Improvements have been registered in the broad support to districts to manage access and quality of primary schooling. In each district, DBSPE has created a system of Teachers’ Resources Centres (TRCs) and school clustering to carry out In-service Teacher Training close to the schools. School Plans have been prepared covering school rehabilitation, teacher development and improved school management.

The three cases bring us back to the crucial question “how did CEF, school mapping and DBSPE contribute to the changes shown?” The programs/projects which are district based contributed in strengthening the capacities of the schools and communities by improving the school-community linkages. The communities have been mobilised and empowered to support primary education. They increased their participation in school activities by making more contributions to the improvement of the school environment and also followed up school attendance. That is to say, the communities participated both on the supply and demand sides of the schooling process. This made the change. The improved physical environment of schools not only attracted children to school but also provided more access. The follow up on attendance and dropping out ensured that more children stayed in school. The cumulative effect of both, in addition to parental interests in schooling facilitated the implementation of decisions on enrollment of Standard One pupils. The “exit in voice and royalty” has been turned around! A different ownership of schools, which has the ability to update schools, has been achieved.
Current policy concerns on the education sector

The trends and issues observed in the foregoing analysis reflect, at least partially, the changing policies, practices and commitment of the primary education authorities. We need to convey a more dynamic picture of primary education in Tanzania as a sub system that is in part the product of active policy intervention.

Recent efforts to redefine the role of the state in Tanzania education have included the implementation of the Public Service Reform Program (PSRP) that began in 1993. Redefinitions have necessitated central government withdrawal from direct production/provision of goods and services; restructuring of the public service and reduction of employment levels by approximately 25%. The decentralization process is being spearheaded by rationalisation of tiers of government through a restructuring of the regional administration and the launching of the Local Government Reform Program (LGRP). This will help to narrow down the scale of implementation based at the local government level.

All public interventions which are focussed on primary education are now realigned to correspond with the LGRP. On-going programs and projects are being designed to benefit local communities by not only provision of services but also developing their capacity for active participation through small scale implementation.

A series of policy reviews and planning initiatives, articulating the long-term vision of the education sector culminated in the formulation of the Education and Training Policy (ETP) in 1995. Unlike previous education policies, the ETP covers the entire education sector. The main thrust of the policy framework is “broadening the base of source of revenue and seeking to improve financial efficiency and effectiveness in executing the medium term mission of the sector. That is to achieve quality provision, equitable access, expansion of facilities and efficiency gains”.

The long-term policy objectives of UPE are now articulated within a pool of complementary macro policy initiatives. In particular, this is done through the Poverty Reduction Strategy (2000) which focuses efforts on (i) reducing income poverty (ii) improving human capabilities, survival and social well being and (iii) containing extreme vulnerability among the poor. On the other hand Vision 2025 aims at creating a well-educated nation and a high quality of life.
The primary education sub-system has for a long time operated without a donor assistance strategy. Donor assistance to the primary education sub-sector has been fragmented. The project based approach has resulted into serious vertical and horizontal distortions. Inequities have emerged in primary schooling access and quality between districts, schools, gender and disadvantaged groups (see Primary Education Implication Plan, 2001). The donor driven project style approach of primary school development often demanded unique and parallel management and reporting systems for each project over and above the normal official government structures. This led to inordinate expenditure of human, financial resources, time and general duplication of effort. To correct this situation the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS) is designed to ensure local ownership and leadership, promotion of partnership in designing and executing development programs, encouraging good governance and transparency, capacity building and aid-donor support effectiveness. The key word here is development assistance for local empowerment.

A sound primary education initiation investment plan has been prepared with the support of donors and the World Bank. This followed from prepared analytical work that established the basic education strategic framework, with which policy interventions and investments formed the main elements of the initiation plan. Currently policy interventions and investments in primary education are related to the issues identified in the education status report. These are: enrollment expansion and access promotion; quality improvement; strengthened institutional capacity and arrangement; ensuring adequate resources and efficient financial management; improvement of designs and interventions.

**Conclusions and implications**

As the facts and figures suggest and further explicate the argument it can be concluded that the conditions for Universal Primary Education in Tanzania are not yet ripe. Even now if certain structural weaknesses are not resolved out, the UPE target may still fall seriously short. The role of the state in the provision of education as well as the involvement of communities have to be clearly stated and worked out. The teachers have not only to be well trained, but also they have to be professionally supported and motivated to follow through the whole exercise. The students and parents have to be recognized as clients who are motivated by outcomes too. As the quality of education declines in Tanzania, so is the raison d’etre for enrolling and staying in schools for most students. This is because for these students other compelling and lifesaving alternatives may quickly be found instead of spending time in school which does not guarantee beneficial outcome. Parents may also reasonably find it better to spend their limited income on...
health, food and other more immediate needs for their families, rather than spending it on ineffectual education.

As we move into yet another UPE phase these issues should be foremost on our agenda. As the government casts its nets wide amongst development partners and the community for support in this venture, the sustainability of the staggering efforts should not be far removed from our thoughts and planning processes. It would be folly for us not to learn from history, particularly, when such history is still so recent.

The review of Tanzania experience with UPE implementation suggests that a complex of factors may have influenced and affected differently the UPE direction and magnitude. As pointed out earlier, a holistic approach to implementation may be the quickest route to high achievements. To what extent can this Tanzania experience contribute to future policy initiatives? This experience points to policy directions in the following areas:

- **National Commitment**: The national social-economic policy context and its wider government commitment appear to be a pre-condition for UPE success. Countries need to re-examine their visionary leadership on this matter; which by actions fosters self-confidence in the determination of UPE and general education destiny by taking opportunity to bring about effective systems that: promote macro-economic growth equilibrium, increase revenue generation through a reasonable tax-take relative to GDP, appropriately manage education supply and demand; control negative demographic and HIV/AIDS impacts; and promote local and community based initiatives.

- **Casting Wider the Partnership net in provision**: The national leadership needs to recognize the need for an adequately provided and funded pluralistic UPE system that benefits from greater involvement of households, students, private sector, non-governmental organizations and complementary development partners' investment.

- **Community Contributions/Cost-sharing**: While it is clear that the philosophy of a completely free UPE provision could no longer be sustained, community cost-sharing should replace individual household contributions; and these should be additional and not a substitute for government spending on UPE. The additional community contributions should be translated into improved quality.

- **The Limits of Structural Adjustment Programs**: In the process of implementing structural adjustment programs, the limits of the process and their negative impact on incomes and poverty eradication must be evaluated against their orthodox objectives. The orthodox objectives of structural adjustment programs are not sufficient conditions for poverty reduction initiatives.
• Indebtedness and Debt Service: The Tanzania UPE drive was affected by high indebtedness forcing allocation of scarce resources to loan repayment rather than to education and other social sectors. Thus properly prioritized and well managed debt service/relief initiatives are needed so as to free up funding for UPE (education) initiatives.

• Transfomative UPE: UPE should be results oriented and in particular be appropriate, relevant and transformative with regard to people’s lives and work. The gap between the assumed social benefits and the people’s perceived private benefits needs to be narrowed. The signals in this direction are: promotion of labor market employment opportunities; allowing for un-limited post-primary schooling, and ensuring rural and life skills relevance. UPE has to be seen as being externally efficient in both micro and macro contexts.

• Qualitative UPE: In an environment of low enrollment rates and poor infrastructure, improving quality of existing schools might be just as effective at improving enrollment and retention rates as simply opening up more schools. The goal should not be merely to have children formally enrolled in schools but to ensure that they actually learn what they are supposed to learn (quantity and quality must be addressed simultaneously).

• Criteria for Sharing UPE Costs.: Grants from central government should seek to adjust the flow of funds to the recipient district under two broad criteria: the needs of the district to spend money on UPE services and the ability of the district to meet these needs from its own fiscal resources. A general lack of appropriate strategy for district allocation of investment (non-equalization) continues to starve schools of resources. This has to be done within a strengthened institutional arrangement relating to implementation so as to optimise use of human, material and financial resources.

• The implementation and sustainability of UPE is to a large extent affected by the quality of inputs (i.e. teachers, textbooks, teaching materials, basic infrastructure, leadership). However, these inputs can be effective in strengthened institutional arrangements that promote decentralization, pluralism, democratic provision, transparency, effective resource flow and accountability. The success of the Community Education Fund (CEF) and School Mapping initiatives at district level suggests that there is a significant relationship between village level social capital of which trust is a major determinant, parental participation in school related activities and school outcome improvement. This calls for a strict demarcation between the sphere of the “Education Officials” and that of the “funding availability through a variety of stakeholders”. That is officials must establish a distance between themselves and interest groups seeking to extract concessions as questions of patronage and corruption will deter UPE productivity and sustainability.
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Introduction: “Going to scale”

Start small but think big. That is an attractive approach to innovation and reform for education in Africa, where available resources often cannot meet expanding demand, schools are under-equipped, well prepared teachers and effective instructional materials are in short supply, and quality remains uneven across the country and among different segments of the population. Begin with an initial effort in a particular school or district. Prepare the ground well, with careful planning, extensive communication among those involved, and adequate funding. Monitor and assess the results. Modify the practice to respond to local settings and in light of preliminary outcomes. Then, as it becomes clearer what has worked and what has not, expand the pilot to other settings. “Go to scale.” Eventually the entire education system becomes the site for the reform.

Go to scale. That approach has strong support within the development community as it has become increasingly critical of a long history of development strategies characterized as top-down and government-centered. That orientation seemed only rarely to meet its stated objectives. Even when it did, the outcomes were projects and programs that had shallow local roots, that could be sustained only with external expertise, funding, and pressure, and that did little to reinforce or extend local knowledge and capacities. Several additional factors favor a more locally-focused orientation. Local sources for investment and continued funding became increasingly important during the economic and financial crises of the 1980s. That coincided with critiques of the capacities and integrity of national governments. Combined, the search for local funding and the critiques of government supported calls for decentralization of authority and responsibility. As well, especially since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the world socialist bloc, the dominant global ideology strongly supports privatization and reduced government role. By the 1990s a somewhat revised development model was emerging, again recognizing the importance of a strong government role, but now situating government as a coordinating agency, responsible
for creating a supportive environment for community, organizational, and individual initiatives. This evolution of thinking about development more generally has reinforced the notion that effective reform must begin small with a pilot that is well supported locally and that when shown to be effective can be scaled up.

In some countries, local circumstances have also fostered a scaling up approach to education reform. Apartheid in South Africa, for example, had no room for adult education programs that addressed the root causes of community problems, or that sought to promote community empowerment, or that linked literacy to citizen participation. In that setting, numerous local organizations, some with external funding, created many small adult education programs with limited regional or national coordination. With the achievement of majority rule came the demand to enlarge the scale of the most effective of those programs. Similarly, in other countries where war, or flood, drought, or other catastrophe, or national politics precludes effective national programming, small initiatives that are created, funded, and led locally may nonetheless flourish. Once the national crisis has passed, they too become candidates for going to scale.

“Going to scale” has thus been the advice and the injunction in African education for several decades, both within and outside the continent. For national educators, enlarging an effective small scale innovation is an attractive strategy for broader reform. Beginning with a pilot focuses attention and energy, provides a controlled testing ground for trials and assessment, limits the risk should an initiative prove unviable, and establishes the pattern that can subsequently be replicated throughout the country. In an early and influential paper, Myers (1984) explained why going to scale had become of interest to international agencies. Those agencies, Myers argued, had committed themselves and thus their public image, to nationwide programs that reached the poorest of the citizenry and were frustrated that the small scale demonstration or pilot projects they funded seemed to have limited impact on education policy and programming, “often despite their successful outcomes” (p. 2). The challenge, therefore, was to scale up. That thinking persists. Nearly two decades later, a United Nations panel on girls education included among the critical next steps “understanding the importance of scaling up.”

That challenge has proved difficult to achieve. As we shall see, there are few documented cases of pilot education reforms in Africa that have been effectively scaled up to become nation-wide programs. Indeed, some very promising initiatives proved difficult or impossible to sustain, even at their

small scale, after the departure of their initial leaders or the end of their initial funding.

Evidence is problematic here. Anecdotes abound. But determining success requires both reliable evidence and time. Until an initiative has survived the departure of its initiators and perhaps a change of government, it cannot reasonably be judged successful. Accessible systematic empirical research on scaling up promising education initiatives in Africa is unfortunately quite limited. Uvin and Miller point to the paucity of empirical research on scaling up more generally. Most of the literature, they argue, is normative and anecdotal. One result is that contemporary discussions of scaling up are eerily repetitive, with little apparent attention to why more than two decades of insistence on the importance of scaling up has not led to more and more effective scaling up.

Much of the current debate on going-to-scale turns out to be a repetition of earlier, readily available information, without reference to lessons learnt in the first round of replication efforts more than a decade ago (van Oudenhoven Nico and Wazir Rekha, année?)

As well, some initiatives may be viable precisely because they are small. Responsive to local needs and demands, well adapted to a local setting, and guided, managed and perhaps funded by the local community, reforms of that sort flourish where they are nourished and wither where they are not. Attempting to enlarge their scale would be like scattering seeds on sun-baked hard unyielding soil that has not been loosened by rain and plow or planting a crop that requires strong sun in the perpetual shade of a hillside forest.

It is timely, therefore, to review efforts to enlarge the scale of education initiatives and reforms in Africa. Our primary concern in this review is not to suggest a right path or correct course of action but rather to contribute to resolving the many contested issues of education reform and scaling up by reporting findings, highlighting major themes, and framing issues for discussion and negotiation. We begin with an overview of the general literature on “going-to-scale” and a clarification of the key constructs and ideas. Next, we consider recent African experiences and what they suggest for this approach—start small, think big—to reform in African education. We turn then to the links and tensions among different development objectives, including going-to-scale, participatory development, and local ownership and to other dimensions of development that provide the context for efforts to enlarge scale. We conclude with attention to the challenges of nurturing innovation and with the understanding that like “appropriate technology,” “appropriate scale” in education may be large, small, or somewhere in between.

2. That is the premise of their instructive overview, which they characterize as “a first scientific look at scaling up.” See Peter Uvin and David Miller, 1994.
Perspectives on “Going to scale”

Our first task is to clarify the terminology. Definitions and typologies abound. The profusion of terms and categories reflects both different meanings and, more important, different perspectives on scaling up. Let us review some important distinctions.

“Going to scale” is of course not the only approach to innovation and reform in education. Some reforms begin not as small pilots but as nation-wide initiatives. The education ministry, for example, may adopt a new curriculum at all teacher education institutions throughout the country, or modify the examination system in ways that affect all learners in particular courses of study, or alter the constitution and responsibilities of school boards or committees at all schools. Initiatives of that sort, which may be an effective strategy for expanding and improving education, generally have a guiding philosophy and management structure that differs sharply from reforms begun as limited pilots in selected locations. Since we are concerned with the challenges of enlarging scale, simultaneous nation-wide initiatives are not our primary focus here, except to the extent that they are informed by prior, smaller scale experiences.

“Scale” has multiple senses and uses in this literature. Harrington and White point out that scale may refer to the level at which a reform is undertaken (village, district, region), to the analytic perspective from which reforms are assessed (a nation-wide reform may be assessed from the perspective of the village), to the investment strategy (small vs. large investments), to the breadth of the impact of a reform (a reform begun in a village may have an impact throughout a district, while a nation-wide reform may in practice have an impact in only a few villages or may affect particular segments of the population), or to the extent of community involvement (a village-level initiative may have limited or broad community participation) (Harrington, Larry, and Jeff White, 2001). Even for a single organization or institution, “going to scale” can have several meanings, including expanding the number of people affected (what some authors term organizational scaling) and expanding the number of activities (functional scaling). Some authors understand “going to scale” to involve changing the focus of a reform, from project replication (undertaking the same activity at multiple sites) to building grassroots movements and community organizations to influencing the policy process. Accordingly, the ostensibly very simple question, What is the scale of that reform?, can in practice be several different questions. A reform focused at the village level, for example, can have large scale investment. That same reform could have large or small scale participation by the local community and could have larger or smaller impact on the society, whatever its primary locus.
In his early paper, Myers developed a typology of scaling up that is widely used and that he has subsequently refined (Myers Robert, 2000). One strategy for increasing scale Myers termed scale by expansion: starting small, increasing gradually, and building on success. Often termed replication, this has become the most common model for enlarging scale. Drawing on Korten (1980), Myers associates this strategy with a learning process approach. From that orientation, scale by expansion begins with learning to be effective (efficiency and coverage are initially low and problems and mistakes high), proceeds to learning to be efficient (reducing the input requirements per unit of output), and then progresses to learning to expand (recognizing the importance of local fit and pacing the expansion to match organizational capabilities).

A second strategy for increasing scale is scale by explosion. In this approach, the reform bypasses the pilot stage and instead develops a model to serve the entire country simultaneously. Modifications and adaptations to accommodate diverse local settings generally follow rather than precede the initial implementation. The underlying premises of this approach are that it is possible to mobilize substantial energy, resources, and individual involvement through a high profile national reform and that stimulating demand will fuel and fund subsequent expansion. With the visible and forceful support of the national leadership, the reform is communicated widely. Local leaders quickly understand that their own status and influence are dependent on supporting and implementing the reform. As the momentum builds, the elements of the reform are institutionalized, thereby increasing the likelihood that they will be sustained once national attention turns to other issues. Generally successful literacy programs in Cuba and Nicaragua were organized in this way. Several African countries have pursued this strategy, for example mounting national literacy drives and campaigns to reach or accelerate universal primary enrollment. Myers is more critical of this approach in his recent analysis, highlighting its lack of firm local roots. At the same time, efforts to address HIV/AIDS seem to reflect a renewed use of this strategy.

A third strategy is scale by association. This approach seeks to combine several distinct though not necessarily coordinated efforts, each responding to a particular local setting. In practice, the association may be more a function of chance than planning. The introduction of teacher support centers in one district may be linked through practice with a modified curriculum in particular teacher education institutions and with new teacher recruitment patterns in another district to constitute a more general reform of teacher
preparation that can be implemented more widely. Similarly, experiences in one setting may influence conceptions and practices in other settings, thereby enlarging the scale of the reform. In contrast with replication, this approach can be more readily responsive to the needs and demands of diverse local settings.

Rather than asking how scaling up is accomplished, Uvin and Miller characterize what is scaled up (Uvin and Miller, 1994). In their typology, scaling up may focus on structure: organizations expand in size or constituencies (quantitative scaling up); on programs: organizations expand the number and type of their activities (functional scaling up); on strategy: organizations move beyond service delivery towards empowerment and change in the structural causes of underdevelopment, including its contextual factors and its socio-political-economic environment (political scaling up); or on the resource base: organizations increase their financial and institutional base (organizational scaling up). These are of course not exclusive categories. Quantitative scaling up, for example, may rest on effective functional and organizational scaling up.

They note that quantitative scaling up, the dimension that corresponds most closely with the common use of “going to scale,” can have several paths. Effective local initiatives may spread to new sites. The national government or other organizations may seek to replicate a promising initiative in other settings. This path, they argue, is particularly attractive to governments and non-governmental organizations. It offers the possibility of testing a pilot and permits a combination of community-based activity and rapid expansion, since the managing agency need not wait for the development of strong community organizations in all prospective sites. Governments or other organizations may stimulate expansion by using incentives and rewards to nurture promising initiatives on an increasingly large scale. Another path is aggregation: separate organizations combine their resources to expand their activities. Along this path there seem to be few cases of organizational fusion. More common are cooperation, collaboration, joint representation, and joint programs. Still another path is integration: small programs are incorporated into existing structures and systems. Most common on this path is the government’s assumption of responsibility for schools or successful community initiatives. This path is especially attractive to both governments and external funding and technical assistance agencies because it promises both rapid expansion and sustainability.

Let us now ground these typologies by exploring efforts to enlarge the scale of innovations and reforms in education in Africa.
Innovation and reform in African education: Enlarging scale

As we have noted, there have been many imaginative, exciting, and sometimes dramatic innovations in education in Africa. But apparently relatively few of these reforms have been successfully expanded into national programs. Indeed, many have not survived beyond their enthusiastic initiation or beyond their initial, often externally provided, funding or beyond the departure of the initial leader.

We sought, therefore, to survey the literature on education reform in Africa, concentrating on empirical research on scaling up education reform. That turned out to be a far more difficult task than we had anticipated and itself a problem for scaling up education reform in Africa. Broad and energetic searches of several sorts, including databases developed by UNESCO, the International Institute for Educational Planning, the World Bank, and the Educational Resources Information Center identified few empirical studies explicitly focused on enlarging scale in education in Africa. There have of course been numerous studies and evaluations of education reform in Africa. The World Bank maintains a Global Education Reform web site, though enlarging scale is neither a Key Issue nor a Type of Reform. There have also been reviews of education sector studies and similar documents for Africa and for particular countries. Some, perhaps many, of those studies and evaluations, which are often difficult to secure, address enlarging scale, more or less systematically. In practice, however, researchers find it difficult to determine which of the many studies address “going to scale” empirically and critically. That search is even more challenging for the many studies of education reform commissioned and undertaken by African researchers


5. URL: http://www1.worldbank.org/education/globaleducationreform/ [2001.08.22].

that circulate locally and often remain unpublished. Where it is so difficult to find relevant research and to compare experiences in different settings, there can be little productive link between research and policy.

As Maclure points out, even where research, or more often evaluations, focus on activities that are intended to be scaled up, the study or assessment concentrates largely on the pilot phase, with little or no attention to the process of enlarging scale.

*Regardless of variation on the relative success or failure of reform efforts, evaluations tend to focus mainly on the pilot phases of reform programs.* (Maclure, 1997)

Many of the innovative education programs and projects in Africa have been lauded as success stories. Relevant cases have been collected, for example within UNESCO’s Cooperative Action Strategies in Basic Education in Africa (CASE AFRICA) project. In 1999 the Association for the Development of Education in Africa solicited national reports and studies in its Prospective Stock-Taking Review of Education in Africa, with special reference to breakthroughs in relation to access, quality and capacity building (ADEA, 2001). One would expect that all or most of these reform efforts have been taken to scale. That does not seem to have been the case. While some indicate plans to do so, others do not.

**The challenge of evaluating outcomes in education**

Evaluating human activities is always a daunting challenge. People and institutions simply refuse to hold still. Nor should we expect them to. We value adaptation and accommodation, flexibility and responsiveness, self-reflection and self-critique, and the ability to use experience to modify conception, structure, content, and practice.

That flux is often in tension with the standard evaluation model, which presumes a reasonably orderly progression from initial assumptions to goals and objectives to indicators to measures to observations to findings to recommendations, relying generally on the manipulation and analysis of quantitative data. Distinguishing independent from dependent variables, that approach seeks to identify the factors (inputs) of greatest consequence for observed behaviors (outputs). To the extent possible it does so in a natural

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(as contrasted with a laboratory) setting, by isolating the elements of primary interest, separating them from confounding influences—other factors, environmental characteristics, and the evaluators’ own role. Although a clean dissection is not always possible, that is the goal.

For education that is particularly problematic. Education is at its core contextual. Learning is the result of connections, interactions, responses, shared experiences, and empathy, not clinical detachment. Consider, for example, curriculum development. There can be no good curriculum independent of the context in which it is used, just as neither a pencil nor a computer is intrinsically good. The best curriculum emerges from an interactive process that involves people with different sorts of expertise and experience (from specialized curriculum developers to teachers to students), that considers, shapes, tests, and then modifies a wide range of content and ways to use it, and that continues to evolve as it is implemented. It is this understanding of education as process, much more than the revision of prior knowledge and the appearance of new textbooks, that requires that the curriculum be continually rewritten and that each subsequent revision not be too tightly bound to its predecessor. The wisdom that is embedded in curriculum is not created by the orderly accumulation of bits of knowledge, like collecting sea shells along the beach, but rather generated by the confrontation of perspectives, experiences, and preferences. Not scientific consensus but unresolved disagreements—about what are the core ideas, about how learners can effectively engage those ideas, about the appropriate roles for instructors, students, and materials, even about the learning process—are the stuff of curriculum development.

Let us pursue the curriculum example. Logically, it is possible to conceive of studying curriculum development by isolating it from confounding influences, exploring principal inputs and outputs, and testing hypothesized relationships. One might, for example, through observation construct a list of the two, or five, or ten factors that seem to contribute most to effective curriculum development and that can be influenced by policy decisions. That list might include curriculum developers’ level of education, the length of their prior experience, the extent and forms of teachers’ (and perhaps students’) participation, the locus of decision making authority, the availability of resources, and more. Having established that list, one might then create or locate curriculum development settings that were similar in most respects but different in one or more of the factors assumed to be important. And so on. Studies of that sort are undertaken regularly. Yet, collectively they prove dissatisfying and do not offer a clear guide to appropriate policy. That is so for several reasons.

First, the ground rules change frequently and unexpectedly. That is, a decision by higher authority about who is responsible for which sort of curriculum
development changes the curriculum development terrain, making findings in one setting not readily comparable to those in another. Each situation becomes unique. Second, there are too many factors to track simultaneously. Simplifying assumptions about what matters may exclude from consideration what turn out to be determining influences. In many countries, for example, the interests and preferences of foreign assistance agencies—what they are and are not willing to fund—may have important direct and indirect influence on curriculum development. Third, what initially seem to be small differences may have large consequences. Initial differences that escape observation can have profound impacts. Note that better measurement techniques cannot solve this problem, since there will always be differences that the measuring instruments cannot detect.

As well, education reform commonly has long time horizons, while assessment generally has a much shorter term time frame. A reform that is deemed successful shortly after its initiation may prove not to be sustainable. The early assessment, or other short-period assessments, may come to very different conclusions from a longer-term evaluation.

Those involved in education reform, as well as the broader education community and national policy makers, often have widely different understandings of appropriate evaluation measures and indicators of success. ADEA’s prospective stock-taking, for example, emphasized quality, access and capacity building. Different indicators might well have been chosen. Presumably, the choice of indicators is based on what we perceive to be the state of education in Africa and what measures are necessary to move it forward. Countries also differ in their priorities. For instance, those countries that achieved Universal Primary Education some time ago will not find access as important as in countries like, say, South Africa, where apartheid effectively denied access to education for black majority.

Since education outcomes always have multiple origins and causes, it is difficult to determine whether scaling helped, hurt, or made no difference. While the effort to increase scale can itself have direct and indirect consequences, to isolate and declare categorically that scaling up has been responsible for an observed outcome is potentially very misleading, since other factors could have played a part as well. As we have suggested, causality is difficult to establish in education reform, especially over a long period where observed outcomes are likely to have multiple causes.

These caveats are important to our effort to explore attempts to enlarge the scale of education reforms. They caution us that the determination of “what works” and what is “successful” is in part, perhaps a very large part, contextual and contingent. Consequently, we must be careful not to generalize beyond the reach of the empirical analyzes of scaling up and to recognize that the
generalizations that seem well grounded must be interpreted in the context of specific initiatives and settings.

Observations from the cases reviewed

What do we learn from a review of the few studies that link innovation and reform with enlarging scale? The proliferation of innovations in education policy and practice in Africa may make it difficult to monitor programs and projects, and their implementation strategies (Sebatane, 1999). Injecting too many innovations into the education systems leads to a phenomenon commonly termed as “innovation overload.” (Hopkins, 1994, p. 12). When a reform initiative does not seem to produce desired results immediately, the tendency is to introduce a new change, often without adequate implementation and monitoring of the previous initiative. There are also pressures to come up with quick rather than long-term solutions to education problems, a situation sometimes encouraged by demands of the funding agencies. As Shaeffer (1992) puts it,

“Such pressure can make it difficult to adapt to local circumstances and therefore tempt a ministry to finish a project, declare it a success, and move to yet another rather than reinforcing the operations, maintenance, and sustainability of the first.”

(Shaeffer, 1992, p. 16)

In this scenario, the indicators of success of the education system are sometimes determined by the number of projects completed and the funds invested. This leads to short-lived programs. The impact of some educational activities is delayed while for others it is relatively immediate (Nieuwenhuis, 1997). Reform is a process that takes time and needs to be internalized by those it is intended to affect. It is therefore necessary to take stock regularly, through systematic monitoring and evaluation, of the performance of innovative strategies. More important for this consideration of “going to scale,” that stock taking should facilitate understanding better what works and what does not work. Those understandings could in turn be used in scaling up the activities, should that seem appropriate and desirable. It should be stressed here that monitoring and evaluation should be built into the implementation plan, and should involve local expertise as much as possible in order to ensure popular participation (Samoff, 1993). It may further be argued that sometimes reform measures in education in Africa are put in place primarily because it is fashionable or politically expedient to do so. Politicians and policy makers may use the innovations to win the hearts (or at least votes) of the electorate. There are often complaints that politicians impose these initiatives on the education systems, particularly schools that are already under-resourced or overburdened with other activities. All too frequently, teachers and others learn of major changes on the radio news or by word of mouth from colleagues at the school house door. Obanya notes that poli-
cies and intentions are often regarded as successes because of the failure to monitor the implementation of the systems (Obanya, 1989). He argues that this is one of the causes of the failure of educational reforms.

Some educators suggest that before locally based initiatives are expanded, they should be reconceptualized. This was the case, for example with the experience gained from one adult basic education program of the University of Natal in South Africa. The program dealt with the training of literacy teachers and development of teaching materials for English as a second language (Lyster, 1991).

The issue of prohibitive costs constitutes one of the main barriers in attempts to expand innovative initiatives in education in Africa. Cobbe addressed this issue in relation to a South African based interactive audio instructional program, “English in Action.” (Cobbe, 1995). The author looked at various factors involved in running such a program, including costs for taking it to scale. Of relevance here is the fact that prediction of costs will have to incorporate both economic and political conditions.

As we have noted, it often proves difficult or impossible for African countries to sustain programs originally funded externally. Commonly there are no in-built mechanisms to ensure sustainability, including capacity building. One example cited by Jenkins is the in-service teacher training program at the William Pitcher College in Swaziland in the 1970s (Jenkins, 1989). Once the specified number of teachers had completed the program, it was terminated. Although this initiative had generated substantial interest and enthusiasm for other potential trainees, the country was unable to continue the program following the phasing out of external funding.

Another example was Burkina Faso’s introduction in the late 1990s of results-based management in schools on a national scale, perhaps an example of Myers’ notion of expansion by explosion. In contrast to the existing inspection system, this new approach called for using data on school achievement to improve quality, supporting teachers in ways that acknowledge their importance and motivate them to pursue their efforts to improve quality. To this end, two instruments were developed, one for Chefs de circonscription (district officers) for supervising and supporting whole schools and the other for pedagogical advisors for supporting individual teachers. School heads and teachers were seen as key actors in this approach, expected to lead the design and implementation of school and classroom improvement action plans. In this case, the approach to implementing education change appears to have been rather administrative and bureaucratic to the extent that making the instruments available to schools and teachers eclipsed attention to soliciting the input of those involved and providing them adequate training. In the event, despite some encouraging outcomes, after three years of
Implementation results-based school management seems not yet to have taken strong root.

Some of the reasons for limited or ineffective efforts to enlarge scale, particularly in the context of distance education, include the lack of imaginative adaptation of the strategies and resources of the original program, the costs involved, and the lack of commitment on the part of politicians. Other distance education initiatives fail to expand or to be sustained because they constitute isolated events without an institutional base as well as follow up efforts at the local level (Dodds, 1994, p.321-327).

**Analysis and implications**

What do we learn from these experiences and from efforts elsewhere to enlarge the scale of innovations and reforms in education and other spheres of development? As we ask that question, we must be cautious and critical in addressing what are commonly termed “lessons learned” and “best practices.” As we have noted above, assessing outcomes in education is an extraordinarily difficult challenge. Relating outcomes to a specific innovation or reform is even more difficult.

That education is inherently contextual has several implications. First, evaluating education reforms demands approaches sensitive to education’s fundamentally contextual nature and to education as process as well as outcome. Educators quickly become uneasy with notions like “best practices,” since what makes a particular practice effective in one setting is a function of both the practice and the setting. As well, from this perspective, educators find frustrating the inclination to dissect education from its context in order to study and evaluate it. In the mode of a formal experimental method, that dissection regards interaction as a source of confusion rather than understanding interaction as the appropriate focus for analytic attention.

Secondly, for similar reasons, we must be very cautious in searching for “lessons learned.” Lessons shorn from their context are not lessons at all. Of course it is possible to learn from experiences in disparate settings. Indeed, that is the driving dynamic of this paper. But what we learn must always be understood in its context. There are many examples of context-free “lessons” that become stultifying straight jackets rather than useful guides to action. For some time, for example, many funding and technical assistance agencies active in Africa have asserted that within specified limits, education quality is affected more by the availability of textbooks than by class size and that in-service teacher education is far more cost-effective than pre-service teacher education. Simultaneously, a large volume of education research in the United States indicates that the investments with the greatest impact on education quality are those that improve teacher education and that
reduce class size. Perhaps all of those apparently inconsistent conclusions are correct. Perhaps not. But their juxtaposition highlights the situational specificity of “lessons learned” and the risks of attempting to decontextualize findings and apply them in very different settings. Even crossing the border to a neighboring country may be too far.

Third, simplifying findings (“lessons learned”) in order to generalize may lead to stating the obvious rather than developing useful guides to action. For example, systematic comparative assessment may find in the reforms studied that principals or head teachers have played a key role. Drawing the lesson that “leadership matters” loses the insights gained from understanding the settings in which the original studies were done, ignores the conditions in which the finding may be deemed valid, and does not progress much beyond common sense as a guide for practice elsewhere.

Fourth, much of what matters in education—that is, that affects access, learning outcomes, and management—is continually negotiated and renegotiated. Decentralization of responsibility for education provides an important example. For a time, decentralization was promoted as a near universal remedy to many of the problems of education in poor countries. In part on their own initiative and in part with external pressure and encouragement, some education systems have significantly decentralized. Systematic study suggests that decentralization (ignoring for the moment those settings where decentralization has remained rhetoric, not practice) accomplishes different things in different places, often in very different forms. Put positively, the appropriate balance between central direction and local autonomy is specific to particular places and times and is likely to change as circumstances change. Consequently, effective decentralization reflects on-going negotiations, sometimes among changing actors, about where authority and responsibility for specific activities should lie. An effective decentralization scheme in one setting may, or may not, be applicable in another setting.

The specification of “what works” and “what is effective” are similarly contextual and renegotiated. For example, a reform that is associated with improved examination results but that does not reduce, and may indeed entrench, gender or racial inequalities, may be deemed very effective by some (education quality has to do with achievement outcomes; inequalities are important and must be addressed, but in themselves are not a measure of quality) and very ineffective by others (inequality is a measure of quality; schools with high-scoring boys and low-scoring girls are not providing high quality education). Note too that since what differs here are situationally specific values and expectations, those differences cannot be resolved by advances in research methodology.
Fifth, comparing strategies for enlarging scale must avoid asserting strong conclusions on the basis of relatively short time horizon data. Education initiatives and reforms may require years for their outcomes to be reliably measured and assessed. Consider, for example, support to improving teacher education. If that support is effective, newly prepared teachers will be more competent than their predecessors. If so, then students in their classes are likely to learn more or more effectively or more quickly than learners in the classes of teachers prepared in the previous (unimproved) teacher education system. If so, then the students of the more competent teachers can be expected to score higher on appropriate achievement measures. From the time of the initial investment in improved teacher education, however, to the time when higher achievement scores become visible is likely to be several years, perhaps a decade.

Sixth, the links between a particular innovation or reform and education outcomes, especially those not visible until years after the initiation of the reform, may be difficult or impossible to establish. To pursue the example above, since many factors influence achievement scores, only very rarely can improved examination results be systematically and reliably attributed to improved teacher education (or another reform) begun several years previously.

 Accordingly, as we consider what can be learned from studies, implementation reports, and evaluations of efforts to enlarge the scale of innovations and reforms in education in Africa, we must be very attentive to the situational and conditional character of our observations and conclusions and of their implications for future action.

**Successful scaling up**

In their critical overview of support to education reform, Healey and DeStefano argue that most school reform initiatives are in one way or another demonstrations or pilots or models (Healey and DeStefano, 1997). They point out that pockets of good educational practice can be found almost anywhere, suggesting that what is deemed good education is not primarily a function of esoteric knowledge (Healey and DeStefano, p. 2, 1997). Rather, innovative teachers, initiative-taking and perhaps politically influential parents, risk-taking and non-conformist headmasters, and progressive communities can all be sources for effective innovations in education. Imaginative reforms can thus be found throughout the world, often amidst poverty and other very trying circumstances. At the same time, good educational practices cannot be found everywhere. Indeed, reform initiatives are pilots precisely because the mix of ingredients that lead to school improvement varies in time and
place and because notwithstanding years of research and analysis, the most effective learning results from creative interactions among teachers and learners, that is, more from interactive process than from prior planning.

... if school reformers really did know how to create good schools, the scale-up problem probably would not exist...there are no magic bullets (Healey and DeStefano, p. 7, 1997).

The pilot character of education reform is particularly clear in Africa, where it has become heavily dependent on external assistance. Since that assistance is predominantly focused on technical improvements (including teacher education, curriculum development, materials design and production, examination reform, assessment, education planning), and since external agencies certainly cannot provide enough capital to solve all the problems of education in perpetuity, nearly all projects are pilot or demonstration or experimental by their nature. Unfortunately, Healey and DeStefano report, evaluations indicate that at best half, or perhaps as few as one out of ten, reform initiatives have been sustained.

With that sobering statistic, let us consider what seems to work. As we have noted, success in enlarging small scale innovations and reforms may be due to elements specific to a particular setting and time and may not be readily generalized to other times and places. The common wisdom in many studies is that three factors are critical to enlarging the scale of an education reform: a charismatic leader dedicated to the reform and committed to its expansion, strong interest and demand in the communities at the sites targeted for expansion, and sufficient funding, which may in practice be limited funding that is dependent on local sources. Many observers have concluded that in the absence of one of those factors, scaling up is far less likely to succeed.

It is useful here to extend that list by summarizing the factors that seem to be associated with successful scaling up. For that, we combine the findings of a wide range of studies, both primary and secondary, and our own observations on the cases reviewed. Note that since unsuccessful reforms are poor candidates for scaling up, there is necessarily some overlap between factors associated with effective reform and factors associated with successful scaling up. Note as well that since the lists below are drawn from multiple sources, they include elements that may be, and sometimes are, incompatible with each other. That, too, reflects the diversity of experience and assessments.

The extended lists below are thus composites from multiple sources, intended to facilitate discussion, assessment, and future research. Constituted
of findings from different sources, those lists are unweighted and unruly. Several categorizations are possible. Unfortunately, the listed factors do not correspond neatly with any of the typologies we have reviewed. The original sources differ on their relative importance and in the absence of a more solid empirical foundation, assigning weights would serve only to detach them further from their contexts. An alternative approach would be to identify the listed factors as either inputs or process. We find that approach attractive, since it might help to shift the weight of analytic attention from inputs to process. At the same time, that categorization risks further confusing the issues, and the relative roles of different factors, since any particular factor, say leadership or funding, can be an input or part of the process. Rather, we find it fruitful to address all of these factors as part of the process of enlarging the scale of education reforms. Accordingly for the purpose of this review, we group the factors culled from the literature by their proximity to the education reform—first those that are directly associated with the reform itself and then those that have to do with the general context.

**Factors associated with the education reform that is to be scaled up**

1. Committed, dedicated, and seemingly untiring leadership, often a charismatic individual, whose persistence and stubbornness are generally assets though at times liabilities.
2. Clear and sustained local demand for the reform.
3. Local ownership of the specific elements of the reform; that is most likely when those elements are locally developed.
4. Clear and perhaps narrow focus on a single goal or service, with extension and diversification at a subsequent stage.
5. Sufficient, though perhaps very modest, funding, often from local sources. Competitive funding or challenge grants may increase the likelihood that only the most promising initiatives are supported.
6. Strong direct involvement, especially of the local community but also of others with important roles in the reform (including facilitators, animators, trainers, and other support staff whose participation may determine the feasible rate of expansion), coupled with effective participatory training for those involved and forums and other mechanisms for sharing experiences.
7. Understanding pilots as learning experiences, with room for revision and modification of the initiative and with continuing attention to the longer term and broader implications of the process of its implementation.
8. Flexible, iterative planning.
9. Competent technical analysis, including sound assessment of the feasibility of implementation.
10. Clear standards of practice and accomplishment, with appropriate and reliable monitoring and reporting results.
11. Clear accountability for the results.
General supporting factors and conditions

1. The ability of the leadership to re-focus attention to expansion and its requisites.
2. Significant and sustained local involvement in decision making as well as implementation, especially parents; informed and democratic deliberation.
3. Clear, explicit, visible, and reiterated political commitment, important at both local and national levels. That is often difficult to achieve, since reforms may challenge or may be perceived as threatening to important vested interests.
4. Important intangible commitments, including belief in the value and importance of the reform; belief that teachers and other professional staff can assume greater responsibilities, notwithstanding the limitations of their education and preparation; confidence that others can do what they have not done previously or have seemed incapable of doing; commitment to proceeding, even when resources are insufficient, other tasks demand attention, and personal circumstances are distracting; willingness to select and reward staff based on reasoned judgments about competence and accomplishments; willingness to risk what has already been accomplished in order to extend the reform to other areas; recognition that no one will be completely satisfied with the results without permitting that recognition to halt or stall further progress.
5. Scaling up is most likely to be successful when it was envisaged from the outset.
6. Effective integration of pilots and community initiatives into national education programs. (Note, however, that some commentators point to effective reforms that began outside the formal education system and argue that they flourished because of that external location and its explicitly or implicitly critical posture.)
7. A strong network that links community and other organizations and that provides a supportive framework both for the initial reform and enlarging its scale. That network must be organized around a collaborative culture, notwithstanding the different goals and styles of the organizations involved.
8. Simple information systems that are likely to provide more rapid, more focused, and more useful feedback than more complex information systems that are vulnerable to breakdown and disruption and that require more extensive resources and staff to maintain.
9. Ways and moments for those involved in the reform to reflect and to celebrate accomplishments as they scale up.
10. A stable supporting infrastructure, which in practice means not only formal institutional support but also individuals and groups who work to assure that the reform occurs and is maintained.
Why scaling up fails

As we have noted, Healey and DeStefano estimate that at most half, or perhaps only one out of ten, education reform initiatives have been sustained. Scaling up apparently has a similar record. Why is that?

Seeking to explain unsuccessful efforts to enlarge scale, nearly all commentators point to the absence of one or more of the three major factors we identified earlier: leadership, local interest and demand, and funding. The common stories are that while particular activities could be replicated in new sites, the dynamic leadership that made those activities effective in the pilots was not available and could not be replicated in the new sites, that the perceived local need that mobilized and energized participation in the pilots did not emerge in the new sites, and that funding, often available for the pilots from external sources, was not sufficient to sustain the expansion. That is, the energy, intensity, and resources focused on the initial setting are not accompanied by corresponding attention to efforts to expand the successes to new sites.

None of the research reports covered in the ERNWACA papers provides any indication of fundamental reforms that have been disseminated and institutionalized effectively in national education systems. Instead, educational reform appears as a parade of piecemeal innovations that often create a flurry of activity for short periods of time in a limited number of schools within fairly restricted geographical areas. Unfortunately, as the ERNWACA documents attest, without strong institutional and resources bases, efforts to reform and innovate are usually abandoned or relegated to perpetual pilot status (Maclure, p. 102, 1997).

That may well be a function of the combination of the reliance on external funding to support education reform and the preference of external agencies for pilot programs. That in turn is a reflection of the relatively short time horizons of their funding cycles and their policy that their role is to provide seed money but not to support the continuing expenditures of the education system.

It is important to note that in dealing with unsuccessful reform and scaling, research and evaluations tend to focus on antecedents and inputs, with much less attention to the process of implementation and almost none to the longer term effects, whether positive or negative, of the efforts to innovate and enlarge scale. As Maclure notes in his synthesis and review of education research in west and central Africa,

In terms of content, ERNWACA research has focused heavily on the antecedents and conceptual weaknesses of reform policies and on the contingencies that result in less-than-expected outcomes. Yet there is little analysis of the process of implementation. Likewise, there appears to be little understanding of the impact that educational innovations and reforms have on the key actors charged with
implementing them, and on the school populations and local communities that are the targeted beneficiaries of educational change. The residual effects of efforts to generate positive change, and perceptions of relative success or failure at different levels of educational bureaucracies and in local communities, still remain largely undisclosed (Maclure, p. 105, 1997).

Some observers go farther, arguing that scaling up, especially in the form of efforts to replicate or reproduce effective reforms in multiple settings, is an inherently flawed approach. Malvicini and Jackson develop that critique forcefully. First, they address the specific experiences of the Swedish Working Life Fund:

The Swedish Working Life Fund (SWLF) invested more than one billion US Dollars in over 25,000 local projects. Between 1990 and 1995 these projects touched over half the country’s workforce supporting significant changes toward popular empowerment and increased productivity. Surprisingly, no blueprint approach was applied here—just the opposite. The theory underlying the effort refuted the effectiveness of replicating pilot projects, successful models, or what Gustavsen et al. (1996) call star-cases. . . . The role of the fund’s staff was to support the projects (organizations) internal “infrastructure of change,” opening up space, an environment where people create their own change. . . . It was only after the project began that the key idea of learning networks emerged. [original emphasis]

They then address scaling up more generally: (Malvicini and Jackson, 2000).

Pilots rarely go to scale. While designers hope that government or local people will replicate successful model programs, scaling up remains rhetoric particularly in large donor-funded initiatives, where there is little budget or interest after the donor withdraws. Why? Communities with thriving pilots usually have a great measure of social capital invested and created by program processes. There are high degrees of local creativity, enthusiasm, pride, and trust present in the process of designing and implementing innovative programs. After the “awards are given” or the “book is published” or the “conference held” to celebrate the accomplishments of the pilot, it is perhaps less likely to be replicated. [original emphasis]

We need not adopt such a despairing view. Still, we need to explore why efforts to enlarge scale fail. Like successful efforts, failed attempts to enlarge small scale innovations and reforms may be largely due to elements specific to a particular setting and time. Here too, however, it is useful to summarize factors that seem to be associated with unsuccessful scaling up.

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For that, as above we combine the findings of a wide range of studies and our own observations on the cases reviewed. Note that since unsuccessful reforms are poor candidates for scaling up, there is necessarily some overlap between factors associated with ineffective reform and factors associated with unsuccessful efforts to enlarge scale.

1. The demand for the services to be provided by the reform is weak. Correspondingly, there is little or no public engagement with the reform.
2. Resources are insufficient, even with significant local voluntary contributions and very efficient management of limited resources.
3. Political commitment is insufficient at local and/or higher levels.
4. Programs may be hijacked, or commandeered, or redirected by local or national governments or other institutions.
5. Organizational, management, and implementation problems undermine the initial reform and/or impede or block extending it further. Laws, statutes, regulations, and contracts can function to constrain or impede reform.
6. Communication, cooperation, and collaboration among organizations and communities are insufficient or inadequate.
7. Relevant knowledge—about education, about education reform, and about the details of specific reforms—is inadequate.
8. Citizens’ expectations of how education should function, commonly based on their own experiences, become obstacles to reforms that envision dramatic changes; educators’ own expectations may play a similar role.
9. Policy and decision making focuses on immediate crises at the expense of attention to longer term consequences, is oriented around distributive politics at the expense of education and learning, and is more concerned with regulating behavior than encouraging change.
10. Attention to results is inadequate; often there is little or no accountability for outcomes.
11. Standards embedded in the reform do not correspond to widely used assessment systems (for example, examinations).

**Observations on efforts to enlarge scale**

Let us summarize. With the caveats about locally specific factors and the risks of generalizing noted above, we combine the findings of a wide range of studies and our own observations on the cases reviewed. Here too there is necessarily some overlap between factors associated with the initial innovation or reform and factors associated with efforts to enlarge scale.

10. Sources are included in the list of references at end of chapter.
There is no general blueprint. Success depends on responsiveness to the local setting and strong local organization.

Successful transition from project to program is associated with a learning process. That requires organizations that embrace error, plan with the local community, and link knowledge building with action.

Some education reforms are much more amenable to national initiation and management than others. Reforms that are seen as largely technical and that do not threaten local interests (for example, modifying the curriculum and pedagogy for teaching basic science) can be more readily led by education officials than reforms perceived as potentially destabilizing and threatening to the local community (for example, increased access for girls or religious or ethnic minorities), which may be initiated by national officials but are ultimately more dependent on local leadership and community involvement.

Scaling up is most effective where the roles of planner, administrator, evaluator, and researcher are combined in a single individual or closely-knit team.

Scaling up is most effective when the organizational capacity developed in pilot projects is preserved and used as expansion occurs.

Resolving the tension between teacher autonomy and close-to-school assistance is not achieved once and for all.

Decentralized management has a dual edge. On the one hand, local management and control may be essential for a reform to take root and expand. On the other hand, local management and control risk strengthening the influence of local opponents to the reform, encouraging programs in particular areas to lose sight of the larger goals of the reform, and permitting orientations in different settings to diverge so widely that they overwhelm central management and support capacities.

Scaling up, especially in the form of replication, may be, and perhaps often is, in tension with participatory development and local ownership of development initiatives and programs. (We return to this point below.)

When is scaling up inappropriate or likely to be unviable

We began with the notion that scaling up—start small, think big—is an effective strategy for experimenting with new ideas and extending the reach of education reforms. In some circumstances, that is surely so, though perhaps far less often than has been anticipated. In other circumstances, however, scaling up is inappropriate or likely to be unviable.

Scaling up may so increase costs or reduce revenue that the reform becomes unsustainable. It is often assumed that enlarging effective pilot programs will be associated with economies of scale. Yet, the evidence on that is unclear.
While many planners ‘intuitively feel’ that economies of scale exist with respect to their particular projects, there is no conclusive evidence on this topic (Gaspari, p. 12, 1980).

Initial economies of scale may be superseded by rising unit costs as expansion includes those who are more difficult to reach. As well, the communities involved in the pilot efforts may be unwilling to fund activities elsewhere, while at the new sites there may be insufficient local support or involvement to generate needed funding. Consequently, exploring the longer term cost implications of scaling up, and thus the sustainability of the reform, must occur early and must be based on sound cost projections.

Scaling up risks distracting key leadership and spreading managerial and other capacities so widely that they can no longer cope. A strong and persisting thread of the education reform literature is the importance of leadership. School heads who are effective in mobilizing their communities and energizing their staffs will not necessarily do equally well with district, regional, or national responsibilities. Indeed, some of the attributes and behaviors that made them effective—ability to take the initiative in initially unsupportive circumstances, willingness to challenge authority, persistence in the face of criticism and adversity—will be unwelcome in the national education system and may be severely curtailed or sanctioned. Similarly, managerial and administrative systems appropriate to a province or a country are not simply large versions of village level oversight. Those who are competent in supervising and paying, say, ten teachers may be overwhelmed if they are expected to supervise and pay ten thousand teachers. At the same time, national managerial and administrative systems may not be sufficiently sensitive to the content and the form of the reform to sustain the initiative developed at the pilot sites.

Scaling up risks undermining the initial reform. Whether by distracting its leadership, or overwhelming its managerial and administrative capacities, or severing its ties to its local communities, or reducing its revenue base, or exposing it to new political controls, efforts to enlarge the scale of the initial reform may instead kill it. While some of those risks can be mitigated or managed, decision makers will need to assess carefully whether the promises of going to scale outweigh the risks to the initial reform.

Scaling up may outpace the expansion of the needed support infrastructure. Enlarging the scale of pilot programs requires enlarging their support infrastructure, including the knowledge and skills not available in local communities. Where that infrastructure is not available, or cannot cope with the demand, scaling up may collapse in a disorderly heap, discouraging all involved and perhaps depleting the fertility of the education soil for further reforms.

Scaling up may generate new and ultimately fatal political opposition. Precisely because education is so central to contemporary society, efforts to change it
often challenge vested interests. The national political system may be able to accommodate those challenges when they remain localized and limited in number. Scaling up risks, indeed may require, generalizing those challenges. Feeling threatened, political elites and organizations may shift from cautious tolerance of the reform to implacable opposition. If so, then rather than extending the reach of the reform, scaling up may terminate it.

The conditions conducive to reform may be specific to its initial setting and absent elsewhere. Consider an analogy in another domain, power generation. Historically, power generation has been a story of “going to scale”: developing new ways to produce power (from small scale wood or dung burning to larger scale coal-burning steam and power generation [whose scale keeps increasing] to large hydroelectric dams, to nuclear power) and then increasing their capacity. With that history, imagine the development of a very effective strategy for producing power that has emerged in one corner of the country. Evaluation finds that strategy to be cost-effective (modest investment, low unit cost), sustainable (recurring costs can be met; limited or no negative environmental impact), and a boost to the local economy (generates jobs, encourages people to learn new skills and upgrade them, increases the demand for ancillary products and services). There would seem to be a clear argument for “going to scale,” that is, replicating that power generating strategy to other parts of the country. But suppose that the innovative power generating strategy turned out to be windmills, which require a particular sort of local setting (regular strong winds) in order to be viable, let alone cost effective, sustainable, and economy boosting? “Going to scale” might then be a very poor idea. The original innovation worked precisely because it was locally appropriate, carefully tuned to the circumstances of its setting. That very promising innovation will fail elsewhere because it will not have those local conditions. The general point here is that the enabling conditions of effective reforms are often not universal or universally reproducible. Indeed, an effort to spread windmills over the entire country might kill that approach entirely—failures elsewhere will drain resources and expertise, lead decision makers to reject the strategy, and lead investors (both local and foreign) to refuse to risk further investments in that technology. The diseconomies of scale could be enormous. Instead of windmills, our example could have used solar power, or power produced from the methane generated by decomposition in large refuse dumps, or other examples of innovations in power generation that require particular local conditions. Specialists in power generation refer to the importance of micropower generation—not solely or even primarily more and larger power plants to serve a large power grid, but also and especially small scale, local power generation that requires modest investment, that is well suited to local needs, that can respond quickly to changing local circumstances, and that can be managed locally. The most useful scale may be the smallest scale. So too in education.
Resolving tensions among conflicting goals

This review of the factors associated with successful and unsuccessful efforts to enlarge the scale of education reforms in Africa leads us to a series of related issues and more generally to the links and tensions between “going to scale” on the one hand and development objectives and strategies on the other. Extended analysis of those interconnections is beyond the scope of this paper. We note them briefly here, therefore, both to highlight them and to help to frame discussing them.

“Going to scale” and participatory local development

The same experiences and analysis that nurtured the notion “going to scale” have also emphasized the importance of local participation in and ownership of development activities. Put sharply, programs without significant local participation cannot be maintained or sustained, however imaginative their conception and however well funded their initiation. The development landscape is littered with withered vines and rusting hulks—good ideas and promising beginnings that did not survive the departure of their initial leaders and the conclusion of their initial funding. Similarly, externally driven initiatives often undermine progress toward development objectives over the longer term, since their effect is incapacitating rather than capacity building, since they will at best be poorly integrated into national development strategies, and since they are unlikely to secure the political support necessary to see them through challenge and adversity. At least rhetorically, participatory local development has become the development community’s order of the day.

How are these two orientations—reform by scaling up pilots or small initiatives and participatory local development—related?

How can a development initiative move beyond the local level and make a larger impact while continuing to foster participation? Can a participatory, bottom-up program, or the organization managing it, scale up while avoiding the problem of cumbersome and overstaffed organizations, detached from their grassroots bases, becoming mere sub-contractors of the foreign aid system or of the state, unaccountable to the communities who they claim to represent? (Uvin and Miller, p. 3, 2001).

The near universal affirmation of the importance of local participation masks the multiple meanings assigned to that term. Insisting that there are many different sorts of “participation” and that it is essential to distinguish among them, Uvin and Miller propose a hierarchy of participation: a participation by the target population as beneficiaries
b organizations seeking constituent participation in the costs and work of their programs (in Uvin’s and Miller’s view, this is the most common form of participation sought and supported by development institutions and by many national governments)

c popular participation in education and training activities that permits the transfer of organizational, managerial, and technical capacity to the community

d community groups participate in the management of development programs

e direct participation in policy-making

f ownership by the community and its organizations of the resources of the program or activity

In their view, participatory rural development requires at least the three top levels of this hierarchy (at a minimum, community groups must participate in management):

The defining criterion for bottom-up development is not that there is no external funding or expertise, but rather that the people concerned are engaged in the decision-making concerning these resources (Uvin and Miller, p. 4, 2001).

That highlights an important tension between replication, the most common form of scaling up, on the one hand and participatory rural development and local ownership of development activities on the other. In its usual meaning “going to scale” is a strategy for replicating at larger scale and/or in more places a reform or innovation deemed particularly effective. That replication process is expected to involve planning and careful management and to produce economies of scale. Most often, there is a central coordinating institution, which may be the government or a non-governmental organization. Participatory local development and local ownership, however, assume a locally generated dynamic, which may differ from place to place and which is likely to be, at least in some places, a very slow process. Going to scale, which emphasizes planning, coordination, and management, and participatory local development, which emphasizes flexibility, responsiveness, and adaptability, may thus be two very different modes of fostering innovation and promoting development. While each has advantages and disadvantages, each may also undermine and impede the other.

Indeed, some of the programs widely regarded as effective education reforms and successful scaling up began outside the national formal education system (among the most commonly cited are the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, Lok Jumbish [India] and Escuela Nueva [Colombia]). Their founding mission was to address gaps in that system or to challenge its premises and practices. At their inception education officials were inclined to regard those programs as problems, not solutions. They were participatory.
They met local needs. They had local support and over time local funding. They survived, in large part because they remained so local and resisted central control and direction. Poor candidates for replication, their organic connections with local communities, including strong local participation in management, enabled them to spread.

It is important to note here that just as much of the writing about going to scale is uncritical of its own core idea, so indeed a good deal of the writing about participatory local development is similarly only infrequently self-critical. Local communities are often portrayed in romantic terms as always and fully aware of their needs and very clear on how best to meet them, less affected, distracted, and confused by poverty, politics, and personality than people elsewhere. In a recent paper Abraham and Platteau challenge the current passion of the development community for participatory development and community-driven-development (Abraham and Platteau, 2001). That orientation is popular, they argue, because game theory predicts and (naive) anthropologists claim that communities are the most effective agency for allocating resources, enforcing rules, and targeting the poor and because funding agencies assign high priority to disbursing large amounts of money quickly in ways that distinguish their current activities from the now discredited past of large development projects. Yet, Abraham and Platteau argue, success is rarely attained on these terms. Local communities are dominated by rent-seeking, self-aggrandizing, unaccountable local elites who can invoke a host of sharing norms and other redistributive mechanisms to ensure that their status is not challenged. Their conservative political base is protected by the shortage of change agents to work with communities over the long term, thereby thwarting efforts to bring about lasting transformations in local organizing structures and procedures, and by the general inclination of funding agencies to judge their own success by the size and rapidity of funds disbursed, not lasting organizational change.

Clearly, there are important roles for outsiders in education reform and enlarging its scale. The infusion of new ideas and analytic tools may both fuel and sustain reform. Since closeness with practice can not only enhance understanding but can also constrain perspective and limit alternatives, informed and committed outsiders can help to analyze, critique, and thereby improve practice.

While local communities must be the anchors for scaling up and the points of reference for development more generally, it is essential to understand that they too can become obstacles to reform and scaling up. Indeed, this exploration of the potential tensions between scaling up and participatory local development also shows that in addition to undermining each other, both enlarging scale and participation can themselves be obstacles to change.
Roles of the national government

What are the appropriate roles of the national government in efforts to scale up education reforms? It is tempting to respond to that question in a linear and technical manner. Education reform requires planning, organization, management, and monitoring. Education reform requires knowledge and expertise. Education reform requires funding and a supporting infrastructure. Education reforms must be integrated into the national education system. Scaling up requires all of those as well as communication, coordination, and evaluation. The government can and should assume most or all of those responsibilities. After all, expanding access to education and improving its quality have clear benefits for the government. Spread throughout the country, education can be the most visible public service and therefore the clearest manifestation of what the government is doing for the populace. But a response of that sort ignores the disorderly nature of reform initiatives and their political character and adopts an understanding of reform as outcome rather than process.

The challenge for the national government is to provide direction and support without impeding progress in a process that must have strong local roots and participation. As we have noted, that challenge may prove difficult for governments to meet.

Consider, for example, a national initiative on an issue for which there may not have yet emerged strong local demand. In many countries, efforts to improve girls’ access to high quality, non-discriminatory education encounter hesitant support or explicit opposition locally. Over time, however, success in that initiative requires not only expanding access but also developing the local roots that will support and sustain the campaign. This suggests that enlarging scale involves far more than replicating in new sites specific measures designed to expand access. Scaling up also requires reproducing, or more likely nurturing the spread of, the enabling conditions for those measures and the roots that support them.

The literature and experiences we have reviewed suggest that the appropriate roles for the national government in enlarging the scale of education reforms are:

1. specifying broad objectives and providing resources;
2. bringing program planning and implementation together—establishing appropriate institutions, appointing key personnel, and then providing discretion to leaders;
3. participating in monitoring progress and performance;
4. providing stability (at the national level continuity and commitment may be more important than charisma); and
5. curbing the power of local elites, especially through institutionalizing
We must not be naive. Education reform, and therefore scaling up, is as much as or more a political process than a technical process. However brilliant the idea, its implementation requires creating and maintaining a supportive political environment. Its advocates will need to build coalitions, nurture allies, and find ways to deal with opponents. Vested interests, perhaps important elements of the education ministry and national government, may feel threatened by education reforms. Indeed, those in power have periodically shown themselves to be more apprehensive about a literate and articulate citizenry than about the incapacities induced by illiteracy and persisting poverty. Governments are unlikely to take actions that jeopardize their security of tenure. There are, it would seem, two important implications here. First, the general commitment to democratic deliberation, participation, and accountability, including the enabling conditions that permit all citizens to influence policy and decisions, are important for education reform at smaller and larger scales. Second, a government genuinely committed to education reform must create space for it. That includes tolerating creative deviance and periodically sharp criticism. Societies that cannot tolerate citizens who stand up and say (often in a loud voice and unpleasant tone) “The old way is wrong. Here is a better way.” cannot learn or develop.

Roles of the external funding and technical assistance agencies

What are the appropriate roles of the external funding and technical assistance agencies in efforts to enlarge the scale of education reforms? As we have noted, education in Africa has become heavily dependent on external finance, education reform even more so. In some African countries external funds provide most or nearly all of the development budget; in some there is direct or indirect support for recurrent expenditures. While everyone agrees on the importance of self-reliance and sustainability, both in tension with continued dependence on external funding, it would be naive to assume that in the near future African countries will forego foreign support to education.

In view of the disabilities of dependence and the persisting demand for foreign funding, it is tempting to assert that the appropriate role for the ex-

ternal agencies is to provide the funds and step aside. But that, too, would be naive and short sighted. It would be naive because the external agencies and the organizations and governments to which they are responsible have their own interests and agendas. International cooperation and development partnership require that all partners recognize and respect the interests of the others. It would be short sighted because even when locally rooted, and perhaps especially so, education reform benefits from external inputs of several sorts.

The challenge for the external funding and technical assistance agencies, therefore, is to provide financial and other support without dominating the policy agenda or becoming the arbiter for acceptable practice and thereby stymying local initiative and impeding national ownership and management. That challenge may prove difficult for external agencies to meet, a function primarily of their structural roles and organizational values and styles, not of the imagination, or good will, or dedication of their staffs.

The literature and experiences we have reviewed suggest that:

1. since their funding carries political influence and leverage, the major challenge for agencies is to determine when it is appropriate and productive to exercise leadership and when doing so is likely to dominate or block local initiatives;
2. agencies should view pilot projects as venture capital investments in which all are expected to succeed but in practice only 10-20% (or even fewer) are likely to do so and to be funded for the next level of support;
3. pilots are likely to be staff-intensive and should not require large sums;
4. agencies must permit flexibility in order to avoid preempting learning;
5. in addition to supporting education programs and sectors, agencies should also orient some funding around imaginative individuals with leadership abilities;
6. agencies must be far more patient before disbursing funds (for example, willing to wait years while communities, perhaps assisted by external change agents, debate and deliberate, revise rules and procedures, decide on objectives, and adopt reform strategies);
7. agencies should explicitly and energetically support democratic and participatory decision making and insist on transparency and accountability to the local community;
8. agencies should be more concerned with developing individual and institutional capacities and with education reform as a process than

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12. We do not address here external organizations whose explicit goal is to influence directions and priorities in the development of education in Africa. Their funding has explicit expectations and often formal conditions. Africa’s education communities (and national decision makers) must decide whether or not the value of their advice, technical assistance, and funds exceeds the cost of their influence and authority.
with specific outcomes, though of course outcomes may be a very useful measure of that process;
9 different funding organizations might play different roles at each stage; and
10 agencies must find creative ways to deal with large numbers of small scale activities (both block grants to intermediary organizations that disburse funds more widely and small grant programs have proved effective).

While we believe there is a continuing role for external agencies in the process of scaling up education reform, we do not accept uncritically some agencies’ claims that their development expertise and advice is more important than their funding and that their primary role should be that of a development advisory service (see also our discussion below on expanding the knowledge base). Indeed, we think there is a strong case to be made for separating the funding role from the advisory role and for locating the advisory role outside the funding institutions. Developing that case, however, is beyond the scope of the discussion here.

**Locus of authority and responsibility**

Everyone (or nearly everyone) is in favor of alleviating the consequences of poverty and reducing and eliminating poverty entirely. Everyone—national governments, funding and technical assistance agencies, NGO, local community organizations—claims to be the most effective advocate for the poor, not infrequently as against the others. It is not uncommon for external agencies to insist that they protect the interests of the poor and disadvantaged more effectively than their own governments. So do some NGOs. Those governments of course disagree. While it is often asserted that “the poor know best”—a claim that at its core is quite reasonable but in specific circumstances may be technically incorrect and may romanticize poverty—often the non-poor who make that assertion are unwilling to accept its implications. In some circumstances, each of those claims is accurate. But in other circumstances, each of the advocates may do more to perpetuate than alleviate poverty. The point is that there is no “right answer” about where direction and control should lie. In some circumstances, central government (or even foreign agencies) can protect the disadvantaged against interests, pressures, and authorities in their own local setting, while in other circumstances central government and foreign agencies are the problem, not the solution.\(^{13}\)

\(^{13}\) Note the example of the era of the civil rights struggle in the U.S. For some communities—say, the rural south—the principal enforcers of segregation were local governments and police, and national government intervention was more likely to be on the side of integration. Local activists thus sought outside intervention. For other communities—say, school districts in poor New York neighborhoods—the central leadership (in this case, city and state) was the obstacle to integration and the solution was locally controlled school boards. Local activists thus opposed outside intervention. Hence, whether more or less local control was preferable was a function of the situation and circumstance, not an absolute “good” or “correct.”
With everyone claiming to be the most effective advocate for the disadvantaged and at the same time insisting on local initiation and local ownership, where should the locus of authority and responsibility lie? That is an especially daunting question for efforts to enlarge the scale of education reforms, since scaling up clearly requires inputs and active participation at multiple levels. Several themes have emerged from our analysis.

The appropriate balance between central direction and local autonomy is likely to vary over time and circumstances, perhaps even within the same setting. Many years of discussion about decentralization make this point. For a time, decentralization was promoted as a near universal remedy to many of the problems of education in poor countries. In part on their own initiative and in part with external pressure and encouragement, some education systems have significantly decentralized. Systematic study suggests that decentralization (ignoring for the moment those settings where decentralization has remained rhetoric, not practice) accomplishes different things in different places, often in very different forms. Put positively, the appropriate balance between central direction and local autonomy is specific to particular places and times and is likely to change as circumstances change.

Notwithstanding laws and regulations, the location of authority and responsibility are often negotiated. That is especially important where the reform objective is social transformation and where the mode of reform incorporates a learning process. Like decentralization, effective scaling up reflects on-going negotiations, sometimes among changing actors, about where authority and responsibility for specific activities should lie. An approach to scaling up that is successful in one setting may, or may not, be applicable in another setting. More generally, effective scaling up is likely to require multiple poles of activity with inclusive deliberations and periodic modifications that determine how responsibility and authority will be organized, rather unvarying adherence to a prior formal plan.

Like education reform, scaling up is necessarily a political process. At its most effective, it is also a learning process. While the documents that describe education reform initiatives and plans to enlarge their scale generally focus on inputs, systems, responsibilities, categories of participants, and expected outcomes, the practice is far more fluid. Reform advocates must construct supporting coalitions, both locally and nationally. Assembling alliances inside and outside the education system requires negotiation and compromise. Responsiveness and adaptability are requisites for learning. When reform and scaling up are understood and implemented primarily as a technical or mechanical process—gather relevant expertise, specify the necessary activities and sequences, and then take each step in its turn, with little room for deliberation, learning, and revision—they are unlikely to proceed much beyond their infancy. As we make this point, we do not romanticize local participation.
As we have noted, local communities can be serious obstacles to change, and there are certainly circumstances where strong central leadership is required to initiate and scale up a reform. But that too is a matter of politics and learning. Even in circumstances where strong external intervention seems warranted, it is most likely to be effective and its accomplishments are most likely to be sustained when it understands reform and scaling up as a process that rests on dialogue, negotiation, and learning.

While detailed prior plans and clearly specified lines of authority are attractive to national governments and external agencies, they may in practice impede education reform and efforts to enlarge its scale. Governments and external agencies are reasonably concerned with allocations and their uses and with the locus of responsibility. Planning can be organized as an opportunity for local engagement and participation. Required transparency and accountability can strengthen local participation. Clear guidelines and externally set standards and assessment measures may assure conformity to national objectives and consistency of evaluation. At the same time, planning and management of the sort commonly required by governments and externally agencies can easily become so constraining that they undermine the reform or prevent enlarging its scale. They also can so overwhelm local capacities that only outsiders are deemed capable of understanding and leading the reform. When that occurs, the reform becomes unsustainable and certainly not scalable. The challenges here are to organize each stage in the reform and scaling as a process that engages those who must bear responsibility for it over time and to enable them to be the reformers rather than the subjects or recipients of the reform.

Non-governmental organizations can clearly play important roles in education reform and enlarging its scale. They cannot, however, replace government, external funding and technical assistance agencies, or local communities. In recent years there has been increasing attention to the roles and responsibilities of non-governmental organizations of all sorts, often termed “civil society.” Democratic participation depends on a healthy and active organizational infrastructure. Some external agencies have sought to nurture that infrastructure and at the same time have attempted to reduce the burden of managing assistance to a large number of small recipients by relying on selected non-governmental organizations to receive, redistribute, and manage funds. In some settings that has proved effective and efficient. But the expanded NGO role does not and cannot replace the important roles of either government or the external agencies and certainly cannot substitute for direct participation by local communities.

14. To simplify and focus the discussion, we use the term «non-governmental organization» literally, that is to include all groups and organizations that are not formally part of the government—small and large, local and foreign, nationally based and community based, multi-issue and single-issue, formal and informal.
Cumulatively, these themes emphasize the importance of understanding both education reform and scaling up as processes rather than events or outcomes. Indeed, the most important outcome of education reform is a learning process, both within and outside schools.

**What now?**

As we have reviewed reports on enlarging the scale of education reforms in Africa and elsewhere, three important themes have emerged that frame an agenda for future action. The weakness of the knowledge base is problematic. Scaling up promising reforms requires a holistic approach and vibrant social networks. The major challenge is to nurture innovation.

**Improving the knowledge base**

Research on education reform in Africa is both rich and poor. It is rich in that it is voluminous, often imaginative and insightful, and continuing. It is poor in that once completed, research on education in Africa tends to disappear from view. Consequently, even though many people in many places, both African and non-African, are involved in studying education in Africa, it is difficult for anyone anywhere to develop a clear broad picture of that research. It is even more difficult to focus on a particular cross-cutting issue like scaling up. As Maclure notes

> This underscores a common thread that links almost all of the research highlighted in the ERNWACA documents—namely, that the dissemination of African educational research, in whatever form it has been presented, has been exceedingly limited and is thus generally unknown or quickly discounted as lacking credibility (Maclure, p. 117, 1997).

The conditions associated with effective education reforms and with successful efforts to enlarge their scale are especially poorly documented.

Note that we are concerned here with systematic and thorough empirical research. While reports and commentaries prepared by those most involved in education reforms do indeed provide important insights and understandings, they cannot play the same role as more detached comparative and critical analyzes. Equally important, since our review suggests that initial efforts often seem quite successful, careful assessment requires attention to reforms and efforts to enlarge scale after the initial bubble of enthusiasm has passed, and perhaps after the launching leadership has been succeeded and national education officials have changed.

Note too that the very effort to enlarge scale may itself obscure or devalue systematic study. Our review suggests that it is not uncommon for those...
involved in scaling up to be so enmeshed in their efforts and so excited by
the apparent progress that they do not document carefully what is happening
and cannot subsequently explain fully how they achieved their objectives. As
well, national officials may move so quickly to enlarge apparently successful
pilots that they ignore evaluations and other studies in progress.

If much of the empirical research quickly becomes invisible and inacces-
sible, there can be little productive link between research and policy. At
the large scale, this suggests the importance of strengthening education
research capacity in Africa, including the institutional framework for storing,
retrieving, and sharing studies, findings, and recommendations. Among the
strategies for addressing this problem are creating and maintaining relevant
databases of studies of education in Africa, including not only published
work but also significant unpublished papers and student theses, commis-
sioning periodic state-of-the-work critical reviews, convening regional and
continental seminars, workshops, and conferences to permit sharing experi-
ences and critical analysis of empirical research, increasing collaboration
among national education research institutions, and facilitating exchanges
and study visits for education researchers. While knowledge and commu-
nication are global, the location of the development of knowledge and its
communication do matter. While exchange is and will remain important,
Africans are and must continue to be creators of knowledge and determiners
of its global value. Currently, the institutional infrastructure for education
research does not provide adequate support for that process. In this context,
ADEA may have an important role to play as it fosters partnerships among
Africa’s education officials, funding and technical assistance agencies, and
other organizations.

We are less optimistic about the initiatives of external agencies to establish,
maintain, and disseminate development knowledge databases and electronic
exchanges of development expertise. To date, the process of those initiatives
has been fundamentally disempowering. While a fuller discussion is beyond
the scope of this paper, it is useful to list several of the most important prob-
lems with this approach: (i) What is deemed valid and legitimate knowledge
is likely to become increasingly centralized in the North; (ii) The information
that is collected in the South will be shaped and framed by its interpreters;
(iii) That powerful role in determining what is and what is not knowledge will
be obscured by the mystique of science and scientific method. The recogni-

15. For a recent overview of what seems problematic in this orientation, see Joel Samoff and Nelly P. Stromquist, "Managing Knowledge
of the recently inaugurated Development Gateway. A current research project at the Centre for African Studies, University of Edinburgh,
ofers a more positive assessment of progress to date. The concept paper, Kenneth King and Simon McGrath. Learning to Make Policy:
Development Cooperation Agencies and Knowledge Management. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, Centre for African Studies, 2000),
and other papers can be found on the project web site, <http://www.ed.ac.uk/centas/fgpapers.html> [2001.08.26].
tion that generating knowledge is inherently a contested political process will be rejected in favor of the claim that knowledge generation and collection are primarily technical matters, governed by the rules of science, not politics; (iv) With the rules of science as the ultimate measure and with those rules largely set and maintained by a small elite in the affluent countries, valid knowledge production will become an increasingly expensive endeavor, an effort beyond the reach of most people, including scholars, in poor countries; (v) The centralization of the determination of what is knowledge entrenches the roles of the elite education and research institutions in the world, nearly all located in the most affluent countries. A few scholars and institutions in poor countries will be integrated into official development knowledge generation and management, but with few exceptions, they will remain junior partners in this effort, observers, commentators, and as requested, interpreters, but very rarely themselves creators or managers; (vi) It is far from clear that public policy will benefit from development knowledge databases or gateways in the manner envisioned, since the claims for those databases and gateways rest on an unrealistic and sharply depoliticized depiction of how public policy is made; (vii) These databases and gateways assume that the knowledge that matters most is technical, which for the foreseeable future will continue to be created in the North; (viii) This approach to information also reinforces global power relations. Control over relevant information, or even the claim that the initiating agencies are the major repository for and distributor of knowledge about development, entrenches and enhances their influence. For a poor community in the South, entrusting its knowledge to a remote computer in the North and its largely invisible managers is surely not a strategy for promoting either democratic participation and accountability or self-reliance.

**Communication, coordination, and networks**

Clearly, education reform and scaling up are processes that require a holistic approach, effective and timely communication, and a coordinating strategy that does not strangle local initiatives. As we have suggested, that must be a shared responsibility. Local communities, central and local government, non-governmental organizations, external funding and technical assistance agencies, and others have important roles to play. Since local circumstances vary and since reform is best understood as a process, those roles will differ from place to place and time to time and will likely change over time within a particular setting.

Effective communications and networks have multiple facets and levels. Linking one village to its neighbors permits sharing experiences and coordinating efforts to solve problems. Though they may both be called networking, the strategy for achieving that may differ sharply from the strategy...
that is effective in linking, say, teacher educators in rural Africa with their counterparts in rural Europe. As both sorts of linkage are development, it is essential to confront the ways in which access to communications and networks—increasingly involving computers and the internet—can itself promote differentiation, inequality, and ultimately conflict between communities and organizations within Africa.

Those inclined to see education reforms as emanating solely or primarily from the education ministry or other national education officials are also inclined to emphasize communications from the ministry to local officials, teachers, students, and parents. Teachers should not be surprised by reforms or unprepared to implement them. Communities should be informed about reforms and their expected consequences. Communication of that sort is certainly important and its challenges and obstacles should not be underestimated. Yet education innovations and reforms, both smaller and larger scale, can and do have local roots. They may germinate and sprout far from the education ministry. Not infrequently, initiatives of that sort include challenges to current education policy or practice. From this perspective, teachers and community organizations can and should initiate reforms and not simply learn of them from education ministry circulars. Regardless of the starting point, to the extent that teachers, learners, and communities are involved in implementing, supporting, and shaping education change, they initiate and do not simply receive communications. Effective communications and networking, therefore, must incorporate exchange and not simply dissemination and must flow in multiple directions simultaneously.

Though widely advocated, improved communications and networking may be difficult to accomplish. Large institutions and their decision makers prefer certainties to ambiguities. Clear and consistent plans are often deemed more important than responsiveness to local needs and flexibility. Effective networks of interconnections that link organizations, people, and activities are difficult to establish and maintain, especially in settings where war, drought, flood, and illness (HIV/AIDS is a particularly striking example) are corrosive of shared values and cooperative practices. Effective scaling up therefore requires systematic and sustained attention to developing and nurturing those networks and the appropriate supporting infrastructure.

What is to be scaled up

Scaling up in education is intended to expand access and improve quality for more people over a wider geographical area, and to do so in ways that are efficient, equitable, and sustainable. Since education is central to development (let us use Julius Nyerere’s shorthand: the elimination of poverty, ignorance, and disease), the strategies adopted to promote reform by enlarging the scale of effective pilots must address the broader development objectives of empowerment, equity, social transformation, and sustainable change.

Both the general literature and the studies of African experiences emphasize that scaling up success stories rests on both systemic and specifically local elements. The initial reform addresses a well-understood local need and responds to significant local demand. The reform itself is largely locally derived and is led, nurtured, and often protected by leaders who are charismatic, forceful, inventive, and able to build political coalitions to support and shelter the reform. The reform is adequately financed, which means either a long-term commitment by government or other agency or, more often, significant continuing local funding. Most important, there is significant local ownership of the reform.

National initiatives are also important tools of education reform. The national coherence of the education system is surely a reasonable objective. Local communities and their leaders, however, as well as teachers, students, and parents, can and do oppose change. Thus, for national initiatives to survive, they must develop local advocates and supporting constituencies. Only in the most authoritarian settings can external agents sustain reforms that find no local support.

The importance of the local roots of this process suggest that mechanically replicating the specific elements of the reform in other settings will only rarely lead to a viable and sustainable outcome.

BASICS thinking about scaling up its community programs should go beyond the identification of specific programs that can be replicated; rather, the focus should be on institutionalizing a system for supporting community programs at a scale appropriate for given target groups and settings. The goal then is to implement a coordinated package of complementary strategies to achieve maximum impact on a broad scale (U.S.A.I.D., Chapter 3, p. 12, 2001).

Attempting to replicate the reform itself (i.e., take it to scale) inevitably violates some of the very conditions that render certain innovations successful in the first place. The fact is that people’s educational aspirations, needs, and contexts differ from place to place. Accordingly, what works in one location won’t necessarily work in another. And even in those instances where an ‘outside’ innovation addresses some of the specific needs and aspirations of a particular location, its fate is still precarious, for unless there is widespread ownership of the innovation (a factor...
largely engendered through the development of local solutions), chances are that it will not become a permanent feature of that location’s educational landscape (Healey and DeStefano, p. 11, 1997).

Accordingly, rather than replicating the specific elements of the reform, what must be scaled up are the conditions that permitted the initial reform to be successful and the local roots that can sustain it. That challenge involves finding ways to generate widespread and locally rooted demand for the reform and to support an informed and inclusive locally-based deliberation over the content and form of the reform. That challenge also requires finding ways to make political space for the reform and to protect it from vested interests who perceive it as a threat and a bureaucracy whose efforts to routinize change often smother it. At the same time, those directly involved in the reform must understand reform as a continuing process rather than a specific outcome and must structure it to embed learning at its core.

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ADEA Prospective Stock-Taking: Reports reviewed


Using Job Descriptions for Monitoring Primary Education in Senegal
by Pape Momar SOW

Such is the power of method and organization that they allow ordinary mortals to accomplish extraordinary things.

Introduction

The desire to build a modern educational system that would be more equitable, more effective, and, above all, more capable of serving the development and aspirations of all citizens has fostered many initiatives throughout Africa. This faith in the development of human resources has taken a particular turn under the influence of several forceful ideas: i) education is the best way to promote individual development and constitutes a country’s greatest wealth; ii) education remains one of the most profitable investments a country can make; iii) schooling is one of the most effective ways to achieve social justice and guarantee each person’s chances of success; education is the basis of social mobility; iv) a good education allows each citizen to stay better informed, to make informed decisions about important local issues, and thus to become a better citizen. For these reasons, education is considered one of the pillars of any true democracy.

Strongly convinced of this, Senegal has for several years now been committed to improving the level of general education and has devoted great effort to building an educational system of quality. Numerous reforms have been carried out in order to respond to a constantly changing environment.

Nevertheless, some obstacles have been encountered: political will that was more theoretical than real, institutional instability, insufficient resources, and resistance to change. Without doubt, the most difficult problems to eliminate were those of improving quality. Problems of quality were exacerbated by massive enrollment and the economic crisis of the 1970s, which brought a decline in working conditions and weakness of educational leadership.
As a result, the decline in results over several years (high rates of class repeaters, high rates of failure on end-of-term exams), and an accompanying series of problems have been correctly labeled by specialists as a “system-wide crisis in education.”

Faced with this regression, the government, with support from technical and funding agencies, responded by providing more infrastructure, equipment, and supplies. However, these costly investments gave only temporary relief, because perceptions of the nature of the problem were often too restricted.

Beginning in 1996, however, the year that decentralization policies were instituted, an interesting initiative was launched to steer primary education in a new direction, by means of “job descriptions.” The main idea was to use forceful methods and strong organization to achieve extraordinary results.

Leaders of the change followed seven principles:
- Solidarity between the different links in the educational chain and a firm partnership among all actors along that chain, particularly teachers, school principals, and inspectors;
- Involvement of actors in all phases of planning, implementing, and evaluating programs;
- Accountability by all actors;
- Transparent and efficient management of available resources;
- Active support for all actors as part of a dynamic program of development and reform;
- Training and qualification of actors;
- Action-oriented research.

We can conclude from this experience, first, that competition and individual goal-setting, especially if reported by the media, motivate actors to succeed, and, second, that follow-up mechanisms and effective monitoring make better planning and assessment possible.

Another important point that we shall come back to: external funding was not necessary for implementing the program. In fact, the challenge was to make better use of existing resources by influencing the behavior of the different actors.

Finally, the program was based on “benchmarking” principles, which meant building behavioral models drawn from examples of good practice in the sector.

We describe here the principles, mechanisms, processes, instruments, and results that characterize this initiative. There are three reasons for doing so. First, it allows us to document an application of an innovative program in education. Second, it moves towards the notion of lifelong education—so
prized by development agencies—which is founded on the idea of sharing of responsibility and a more methodical management of knowledge about innovative practices. Finally, it enriches the store of successful examples of partnerships that can improve the process of and capacity for social change.

The national context

The education system in Senegal went through a bad phase between 1990 and 1995. This was the only period in the history of the country since Independence when indicators showed that basic education was slipping. The rate of primary enrollment, which had increased throughout the first three decades after Independence (1960-1990), moved from 58% to 54%. At the same time, literacy, which was estimated in 1988—the year of the last census—to have reached 73%, stagnated, despite vigorous efforts to promote clear and effective policies in primary education. The continuing and persistent disparity in illiteracy rates between men (61%) and women (83%) was deemed unacceptable at a time marked by the Jomtien World Conference on Education for All.

Access to professional training programs was similarly blocked during this period. The country’s educational facilities had not readjusted their capacities and could only accommodate 5% of those who had been to school.

Preschool education, which was not a government priority, also stagnated at minimal levels: the access rate, which was 2.3% in 1990, remained at nearly the same level (2.4%) in 1994-95.

In the majority of Senegalese schools, teaching and learning conditions were not stimulating. The over-enrollment in urban areas (more than 100 students per class), the absence of teaching materials (one reading book for four pupils and one mathematics book for ten pupils), weak management and organization, the absence of water and sanitation, the long distance traveled by children from rural areas (estimated to be an average of 3 km between home and school), malnutrition and health problems, the poverty and illiteracy of parents—all these things played a role in compromising the efforts to make schools more effective. The result was a 13% repetition rate for the first five years of primary school and a worrying 5% dropout rate. The average pass rate for end of primary schooling between 1990 and 1995 was estimated at 29%, one of the lowest for the entire sub-region, for which the average rate was 57%.

Monitoring and support of teachers was completely inadequate. Few teachers or principals were inspected each year, a situation aggravated by the high ratio of 235 teachers to one inspector.
Lacking an effective program or even an invitation to become involved, there was little participation by the community in school operations. Since parents were only approached when it was time to pay up, they sat by, powerless to do anything but observe the drifting and general ineffectiveness of their schools. Nevertheless, Parent-Teacher Associations grew apace; between 1990 and 1995 more than 340 new associations were formed, suggesting a widespread will to participate.

Insensitive to these signals, state-employed teachers held on to the authority to make decisions. The school-community units that had been formed in hopes of improving the situation were unable to affect more than a handful of schools.

We cannot conclude this brief overview of education at the time the new framework was put into place without mentioning the volunteer teachers. The Ministry of Education, particularly the Minister of Basic Education, was quick to realize that a lack of teachers was the main cause for the drop in enrollment. While respecting the macro-economic commitments of the country, the Ministry decided nonetheless to use volunteer teachers to help fill the gaps left by traditional recruiting methods. Volunteers were subject to the same restrictive measures governing staff and salaries, which had been imposed as part of economic structural adjustment in the country. The massive recruitment of volunteers was not followed up with a parallel recruitment or training of inspectors, and conditions deteriorated even further.

Finally, teacher unions, worried that the new recruiting strategies would undermine their position, were very disruptive between 1995 and 1997.

This, then, was the general context in which the initiative came to pass in Senegal.

**How the initiative began**

A number of factors facilitated implementation of the initiative:

- The arrival of a new Minister for Basic Education and new Director of Preschool and Primary education offered the opportunity to take stock of these sectors. An inventory and study of exam results from the final year of primary school revealed that:
  - For the country as a whole, the average pass rate over the previous five years was about 29%;
  - Enormous disparities in results were revealed: ranging from 44% to 18% by region, 52% to 14% by district, and 100% to 2% by school;
  - Factors supposed to contribute to good performance (class size, availability of textbooks, teacher experience, percentage of girls) did not correlate with actual results.
Using Job Descriptions for Monitoring Primary Education in Senegal

- Decentralization: Law 96-06, of March 22, 1996, granted financial autonomy to incorporated rural communities. They were permitted to manage matters in which they had competence through elected administrators. This transfer of power and resources created a new governance framework, increasing responsibility of basic education actors from the bottom up.

- An analysis of performance and an annual report based on inspections of teachers, school principals, leadership, and training of teachers also led to certain conclusions about monitoring teachers:
  - Despite new and costly procedures put in place in 1994 to develop human resources and an increased budget for inspections and transportation, the number of teachers and school principals inspected was decreasing from year to year. During 1995-96 only 780 teachers out of 15,000 countrywide were able to benefit from close supervision by inspectors, and only five out of 4,325 school principals benefited from inspection and counseling.
  - Enormous disparities were encountered between inspectors in the same zone, ranging from 0 to 80 inspections, and between different regions, ranging from 8 to 184 inspections.

- Education authorities were determined to have standards and norms available for measuring primary school performance and that of the major actors;
- They saw the need to communicate results through the media, in order to motivate actors and institutions;
- They noted the absence of any incentives and role models for actors and institutions.

Faced with this evidence, the authorities were compelled to establish the monitoring initiative. If the purpose of education is to form a competent, responsible individual, who is capable of self-fulfillment and contribution to community welfare, then what kind of organizations and what tasks should be allocated to various actors in order to achieve these goals?

Led by the principle that good methods and good organization can produce extraordinary results, the team in charge of preschool and primary education set out to identify, both in public and private schools, methods of work and organization that achieved winning results in classrooms, schools, and districts.

The initiative focused on three sets of actors: teachers, school principals, and inspectors.
- **Teachers**: A group of professional teachers, selected for their competence, met for several days to define the tasks and actions required to achieve good results in the classroom. Their advice was to formulate teachers’ responsibilities simply and clearly by using action verbs. The verb “to do,” for example, is used to test learning (which is done three times a
day) and to record results. Other verbs, such as “organize,” “post,” “verify,” “watch out for,” “meet,” and “install”—all define the behaviors expected of these strategic actors.

- **School principals**: The same process was used to determine what behaviors and standards enable principals to achieve acceptable performance.
- **Inspectors**: A smaller group of professionals collected examples of positive behaviors of inspectors. Using a calendar of 150 school days a year, they drew up lists of inspection and supervision duties, pedagogical training, planning, administration, assessment, and social responsibilities, all defined by action verbs. The group prioritized these duties and concluded that the role of inspection and supervision, considered of prime importance, should take one-fifth of an inspector’s time (30 days, backed up by 30 inspection reports).

Thus defined by professional practitioners and evaluators, the tasks were compiled in the form of job descriptions. Through the network of inspectors and schools, each teacher, principal, and inspector received his or her job description, as well as those of the other actors. Their immediate superiors were asked to supervise and report on how well these tasks were carried out.

**Description of the initiative**

**Purpose**

The idea of reform using job descriptions is based on the following objectives:

- Improve results by bringing the national pass rate up to a minimum of 50%;
- Improve schools and inspectorates through better planning and identification of expected results;
- Mobilize education professionals, the community, the media and other partners to achieve results and to recognize the fundamental factors that determine success;
- Enhance professionalism by applying a more formal cycle of standard-setting, planning work, implementing work, and evaluating performance, always with the aim of improving quality of service;
- Give more substance to the concept of responsibility by clearly identifying those actions and results for which actors are accountable to their superiors and to the community;
- Improve monitoring by producing tools that are better measures of the educational results expected.
The seven principles

Seven principles guided the initiative and methods used to bring about the desired changes:

- **Partnership**: Change would be carried out by building solidarity between the different links in the education system, coupled with close cooperation with actors outside the system. This meant creating a sense of interdependency among the suppliers of technical, financial, social, and political resources.

- **Participation of the community**: To solve problems related to the community, the community itself must be involved. This entails community participation in all phases of planning, implementation, and assessment of school operations.

- **Accountability**: The program pays particular attention to decision-making, both identifying alternatives and developing options. School actors should be at the heart of reform and should be accountable for results.

- **Transparent and effective management**: Alongside accountability should come a sense of duty to achieve results, to report to the community, and to manage resources in a transparent and effective manner. The ultimate impact of education's success should be measured both in terms of satisfaction of learners and of the community.

- **Leadership**: The ability to keep education actors alert, supervise their development, support their apprenticeship, encourage and empower their capacity to change the school environment is needed to give the program a dynamic sense of development.

- **Training and imparting skills**: To give teachers, principals, and inspectors more responsibility requires strengthening their skills. They must be encouraged to explore, analyze, negotiate, plan, manage, communicate, and evaluate. They must have all these critical skills to act responsibly.

- **Action-oriented research**: Social change is a complex exercise. For it to occur, one must both devise careful plans of action and know how to learn from them. While models of work must be scrupulously well prepared, managers of reform must keep an open mind in order to respond and adjust to change, document the paths traveled, highlight successes, and point out difficulties and risks.

The component parts

The new initiative was organized around four component parts:

- Job descriptions
- Stock-taking seminars
- Basic Education Week
- Publication of school performances in the press.
Job descriptions

The job descriptions are tools for guiding the intervention of inspectors, school principals, and teachers. They show the direction that those responsible for primary education should follow, both individually and collectively, in order to build credible and successful schools.

Legislative and regulatory texts reveal a range of responsibilities that have fallen upon the various actors. Some of these directives have been motivated by unique situations in managing particular institutions.

By mining this whole range of documents, along with initiatives taken by individual inspectors, principals, and teachers, it was possible to compile the disparate material concerning school management. Most tasks and duties were derived from traditional administrative evaluation tools, especially administrative records, inspection records of teachers and principals, along with elements concerning classroom space.

The school is relying on a more efficient deployment of available human capital to improve quality, which has been a major challenge. Through consultations with actors in the education community, it has set standards for quality and criteria for obtaining the results agreed upon.

These, then, were the considerations guiding the process of drawing up job descriptions. The job descriptions are provided in detail in Annex 1 (Job descriptions for inspectors, school principals and teachers).

How a job description should be applied was left to the actor to decide, in consultation with his or her superior. Most schools have adopted a process like the one described here, involving:

- **Annual seminars to exchange views with the school principal**: In many regions seminars are organized at the beginning of the year to help school principals learn about the new instruments and how to apply them.
- **Reminders of duties and monitoring of job descriptions at the beginning of each school year**: Inspectors for primary education are expected to publish a bulletin reminding everyone what job descriptions apply and how they would be monitored.
- **Integration of job descriptions into posted regulations**: Schools are reminded to post job descriptions and other official documents in the classrooms and in the principal’s office.
- **Spin-off seminars at schools at the beginning of the school year**: The seminar for school principals is repeated in each school to ensure the same level of understanding by teachers. This is the proper moment to explain the terms of the contract and how tasks are divided and shared. Reading aloud the duties of the school principal and the teachers often makes it easier to accept monitoring and supervision by one’s superiors.
Using Job Descriptions for Monitoring Primary Education in Senegal

- **Mobilization of partners (PTAs, associations, NGOs active in the district):** The school seminars have proven to be a good opportunity to plan how to mobilize school partners and make the actors accountable in “marketing” the school to the community.

- **Establishment of the internal monitoring:** When tasks are defined, it is useful to determine which ones get implemented and measured immediately and which ones require some preparation (such as calculating the ratio of students to textbooks, or mobilizing parents and community support). Determining these matters has given rise to lively in-depth discussions in several schools.

**Stock-taking seminars**
The education authorities decided to organize annual stock-taking exercises along the following lines in order to ensure that the job descriptions were applied and monitored:

- **Stock-taking at the school level:** As the supervisor of the initiative, it is the principal’s responsibility to organize the initial stock-taking meeting. This exercise, which brings all teachers together no later than the end of June, must be documented by a detailed report covering individual and school performance. It is the time to discuss any major problems encountered during the year and to outline the challenges and prospects of the upcoming year. Brochures are distributed to all schools in order to guide these meetings and make them effective (see Annex 3: Monitoring tools). The procedures that emerged from lessons learned from the first stock-taking exercise serve to formalize the objectives and process of these meetings. Some schools even bring in PTAs, NGOs, the mayor’s office, or other partners, who play an important role in monitoring actions on the school’s behalf.

- **Stock-taking at the district level:** Based on school reports, district inspectors draft a preliminary report on their school inspections during the year. This synthesis, which highlights performance trends, is discussed by inspectors and school principals at their stock-taking meeting. Once the observations and recommendations of participants have been collected, the draft report is finalized and sent to the regional inspectorate.

- **Stock-taking seminar of the regional inspectorate:** The regional inspectorate, a group of district inspectorates, also takes its turn in meeting to consider the performance reports and other information in its area. It examines broader issues, such as school coverage, internal efficiency, and questions concerning staff, infrastructure, examinations, and decentralization. This report is sent to the ministry in charge, in early August at the latest.

- **National stock-taking seminar:** This is the only time when all the actors (inspectors, trainers, development partners, technical support staff) involved in primary education get together to examine the state of affairs. Each inspectorate presents a brief summary of its annual report, which is
distributed to participants in advance. A short discussion on accomplishments and problems follows. The quantified performance report at the national seminar, detailing the work of different actors, elicited a lively debate. But finally, after much discussion, based on an excerpt from an article by C. Garin in *Le Monde* of January 14, 1993, there was consensus about upholding the practice.

The annual stock-taking seminars at the end of August and September have become an opportunity to delve more deeply into the cross-cutting themes that arise from the previous year’s reports. The head office for primary education has assigned a special team with responsibility for preparing these important meetings well in advance.

Scheduled to last five days, the stock-taking seminars have taken place in the École Normale Supérieure, where they bring together about 150 people and cost nearly SUS 5,000. Each day a different example of a successful experience is presented to the participants. The experience might concern a pedagogical practice or tool, organization, partnerships, resource mobilization, for strengthening motivation or resolving problems. Monitoring tools are drawn for each level of responsibility on the basis of discussion among the different actors. Lessons learned from the exercise provide a framework for maintaining the initiative’s momentum.

**Basic Education Week**

In addition to the monitoring initiative, the government declared a Basic Education Week to honor teachers, principals, and inspectors, as well as the mayors, elected officials, and PTAs that had done the most to improve school results. The seriousness of the initiative was underlined when the President of the Republic, at the request of his Minister for Basic Education, mentioned Basic Education Week in his speech of April 3, 1997 on the eve of National Independence Day celebrations.

The goals, organization, activities and other aspects of Basic Education Week are described more fully in Annex 2 (Basic Education Week).

**Publishing primary school results in the newspapers**

Based on the principle of accountability and duty to report regularly, the job descriptions prescribe how to formalize and communicate results by school, district, and region.

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1. Here is the text: «Once cold, jealously guarding it secrets and its shadowy areas, stingy with results and suspicious of numbers, silenced by the horror of honor rolls, bristling at the idea that one might compare, within a district or a city, the examination results of different schools, public education has undergone a small revolution these last years. Under pressure from clients, who are no longer fooled by the myth of equality among all students in the melting-pot of education, and pressured also by elected leaders who have signed on for better or for worse, but who sulk about having to pay without seeing, public education has gradually learned to put its cards on the table.»
The steps taken to publish in the national press the names of top schools, along with the performance rankings of regions and districts, was a very successful move.

- **Choice of daily newspaper:** For a number of years many of the country’s newspapers have disseminated news widely, so it was not easy to decide which should be asked to publish annual results. An exclusivity arrangement was one of the conditions posed by the press for publishing the information free of charge. Four papers were pre-selected, and after their circulation and national coverage were examined, the daily *Le Soleil* was chosen.

- **Publication:** Following a working session of education authorities and journalists from *Le Soleil*, the publication took the following form: i) a table of the best schools in Senegal; ii) a table of the best regions; iii) a table of performance by district; iv) a table of performance by region. Readers’ appetites were whetted by an announcement on the eve of publication, and this exceptional issue sold like hotcakes. As a result of its great commercial success, the Ministry’s report will continue to be published by the oldest daily in the country.

- **Public reaction:** Public reaction toward the publication of examination results was generally favorable. The schools, districts, and regions that distinguished themselves received letters of congratulation and certificates of merit from the Ministry of Education, which did not wait for Basic Education Week. During the Minister’s annual tour of the country, the whole issue of results—whether good or bad—was the subject of much discussion and encouraged partners and administrative officials alike to renew their efforts to improve school performance and rise to the top.

**Resources**

Putting the monitoring initiative and job descriptions in place did not require external financing. No additional resources were needed. From the beginning the challenge was to improve the functioning of primary education using locally available resources to change attitudes and behavior. The resource issue was addressed by first identifying resource needs, then identifying strategies for attracting voluntary contributions, and finally identifying ways to mobilize local funding.

**Resource needs:** Resources were needed most at the beginning of the initiative to draft the conceptual framework, discuss and agree upon it with major actors, disseminate and promote the working tools, and plan to monitor and evaluate. These processes had to be followed for the four core components of the exercise: job descriptions, stock-taking seminars, Basic Education Week, and publication of schools’ performance. The analysis distinguished centralized from decentralized needs, took account of existing resources, and assumed their efficient use would be maximized. However, it is useful
to remember that the main locomotive for change was the daily behavior of the various actors, both individually and collectively.

**Funding strategies:** Fund-raising was often done on a voluntary basis. Initial strategies were outlined by quality circles, which included teachers and principals. A working group was set up to broaden the base of consultation to more practitioners. Funds from the Ministry were used for everything connected with printing: these constraints determined the format of the job description.

For Basic Education Week, which cost more to organize, all groups were asked to work with local partners to help raise funds. The success of the first event, which was launched by the head of state, has now assured that an annual budget of US$15,000 will be set aside for regional and district ceremonies.

Savings were made by holding the national stock-taking seminar at the École Normale Supérieure. Only transportation and food had to be paid for. The interim stock-taking exercises did not require any particular financing. For the past few years such events have been grouped with others so that costs could be shared among different partners.

As already described, the various national media were extremely interested in the prospect of announcing school results. They are still jockeying to win the right to do so.

**Mobilizing complementary local resources:** A brochure entitled “The school and its partners: exchanging services” was produced to help groups organize funding. Encouraging schools and their communities “to give and to receive,” the brochure gave examples of successful fund-raising activities. Thus, alongside other inspirations of the project, there were many suggestions for services that schools might offer to generous partners (children’s drawings and decoration, articles bearing the label “sponsor,” thank you letters and articles in the newspaper, recognition ceremonies). Basic Education Week is the prime time for such activities.

**Achievements**

**School results**

School results can be judged by various measures: exam scores at the end of primary school, the repetition (pass/fail) rate; enrollment rates for girls and supervision of teachers.

Exam scores at the end of primary school (ESCE): Table 13 below shows the change in results since the job descriptions were introduced:
The job descriptions set a goal of 50% pass rate to be gradually achieved by each school. Even if not all schools succeeded, primary education made remarkable progress during the four-year period (national average scores rose 18.73 points). The same indicator is reflected at regional and district levels. In 1999-2000 four regions (as opposed to none in 1996) had attained or surpassed their goals of 50%. These were Diorbel, Louga, Saint Louis, and Thies. Fifteen district circumscriptions (in contrast to two in 1996) also reached or surpassed the goal: Dakar city, Dakar outskirts, Guediawaye, Bambeye, Diorbel, Louga, Kebemer, Saint Louis 1, Dagana Podor, Matam, Tambacounda, Thies City, Tivaouane and Mbour. At the school level, some 44% achieved the 50% rate, compared with only 12% in 1996. Scores in the ten best schools in each region ranged between 85% and 100%.

Repetition rate: Table 14 shows the change in repetition rates for the same period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Repeat rate (all classes)</th>
<th>1995/96</th>
<th>96/97</th>
<th>97/98</th>
<th>98/99</th>
<th>99/2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Repeaters rate (except final year)</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The job descriptions required the number of students repeating each year to drop to 10% between the first and fourth levels (CM1). This was to be accomplished using only pedagogical tools. One can see that the small degree of progress shown at the beginning was not maintained over time. A survey of teachers and principals suggests that existing strategies for remedial work with children having learning difficulties were not sufficient. In particular they cited the extra time required by teachers and principals alike to make significant changes.

Enrollment rates for girls: The job descriptions, without specifying a quantifiable goal, required teachers, principals, and inspectors to promote enrollment of girls. Basic Education Week provides an excellent opportunity for special appeals and campaigns. Table 15 below presents the impressive results: 37.1 points gained between 1995/96 and 1999/2000. Other factors that contributed to this outstanding result are mentioned in a subsequent section.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Direction de l’éducation préscolaire et de l’enseignement élémentaire, Ministry of Education.

Supervision and inspection of teachers: the job description required that 25 teachers and five directors be inspected each year by each inspector. This goal allowed for advance planning based on numbers of teachers and inspectors. For a long time supervisors had complained of transportation difficulties, so each inspection unit was provided with cars. The following Table 16 shows the inspection results:


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>95/96</th>
<th>96/97</th>
<th>97/98</th>
<th>98/99</th>
<th>99/2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principals</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Teachers</strong></td>
<td>780</td>
<td>1740</td>
<td>3601</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>1416</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Direction de l’éducation préscolaire et de l’enseignement élémentaire, Ministry of Education.

During the first few years of the initiative, supervision of teachers was especially attentive. In only two years the number of teachers inspected quadrupled and the number of principals inspected was multiplied by 13. Performance during 1997-98 was very satisfactory with regard to teachers (the norm required the 111 inspectors to supervise 2875 teachers). Nonetheless, supervision of principals was the weak link in the chain and has remained unchanged over time (with an average of 575 principals to be inspected each year).

**School organization**

With the new monitoring instruments and achievement-oriented approaches, school organization has been changing. Improvements have been made in teaching personnel, school projects, partnerships, and opening up the school to a broader environment.

**School projects:** Everyone in education agreed that schools needed to change. In most cases, change came about by designing well-structured projects on the basis of a global analysis of problems confronting school development and drawing up realistic action plans. The job descriptions required that each school work together with the community to establish its development goals. In most of the schools visited (28 out of 33) a project document had been drawn up in cooperation with the teaching staff. Occasionally, the document was prepared in collaboration with the community. However, a
lack of resources and the ambitious nature of many goals often slowed their implementation.

**Pedagogical teams:** The idea of “pedagogical teams,” which had limited currency in Senegal’s schools, suddenly got a boost when the job descriptions introduced the notion of achievement-oriented results. It became clear that any one teacher or principal could not achieve results alone but required a coordinated effort by all. A sense of school spirit began to develop and, in many cases, a desire to share and work together to make improvements also emerged. Teacher groups (cellules d’animation pédagogique) and other professional exchange groups have become more active and involved with quality circles in certain districts and schools.

**Partnerships:** In keeping with the recommendations in the job descriptions, various partnership initiatives were undertaken to increase resources and apply them more efficiently to school development. A new sense of cooperation, consultation, and information sharing began to appear, which is still spreading throughout schools and districts. Thus, alongside non-governmental organizations, parent-teacher associations, sports and cultural organizations, schools are receiving support from local associations through their city halls and rural communities. Contracts that make each member of the partnership accountable to the others are allowing joint projects to be put in place. In March 1997, a federal association was inaugurated as a result of a concerted national effort. Some 20 partners at the operations level continue to meet each month for stimulating exchanges about how best to support their schools.

**Opening the school to the community:** After Basic Education Week was established, the process of opening schools to the community accelerated rapidly. Open house activities, welcoming community members into management committees, and involving school alumni—these kinds of marketing initiatives created more dynamic exchanges between communities and schools. Thanks to the implementation of observable and measurable activities, described in user-friendly terms, and the involvement of local people in planning and implementation, communities discovered that school doors were finally open to them.

The call for active involvement of community partners helped raise their awareness of the contextual factors that influence student performance. It also allowed communities to participate more effectively in furnishing and maintaining their schools and improving working conditions. Groups supporting the advancement of women made an exceptional contribution to increasing enrollment of girls.
**Professionalism of the actors**

Monitoring by using job descriptions helped strengthen the professionalism of teachers, principals, and inspectors. By encouraging debate on basic principles and ways of achieving the goals inherent in each job category, the initiative also created an innovative spirit in managing classes, schools, and school districts. These forward-looking attitudes, combined with the measures in place at all levels, reinforced the emerging sense of professionalism among teachers and other school personnel, which, if it is maintained, could radically change the face of primary school education in the near future.

In the hope of sustaining these changes teacher training colleges and the École Normale Supérieure, which trains inspectors, have integrated a module on job descriptions into their syllabi. Newly-appointed school principals benefit from short-term training opportunities, while those already in posts benefit from the on-site teacher groups. Both reinforce the vision and professionalism of actors in education. The stock-taking seminars offer inspectors a special opportunity for exchanging ideas and learning from each other.

By emphasizing reflection on practice, offering tools for action, developing a common language, and transforming experience into knowledge, the monitoring measures have led to the creation of regular cooperation and a new basis for professionalism.

**Assuming responsibility**

Contrary to common practice in the past, when nobody assumed responsibility for their actions, monitoring by job descriptions creates a sense of individual accountability at the same time it rewards collective responsibility. In fact, the whole notion of responsibility has bounded ahead in primary education because of each organization’s obligation to achieve results and report back, regardless of its place in the chain of command.

Just because each actor can refer to a model of behavior and is aware of the need to take stock and achieve results does not mean that new behaviors have become standardized. On the contrary, the actors have greater freedom to define the actions they feel are most appropriate and effective for achieving desired outcomes.

**Producing tools and instruments**

The introduction of monitoring through job descriptions has encouraged development of many tools that are easy to pass along to larger groups. Annex 3 describes these tools and others discovered during school visits.
and inspections. The latter were developed to answer specific needs, usually after close examination of job requirements. For example, NGOs like the Paul Gerin Lajoie Foundation, Aid and Action, and Proares have drawn up action plans and monitoring guidelines. These documents have inspired teacher training institutions to draw up their own classroom and school observation tools to help improve teacher training.

**Constraints**

Implementation of the monitoring measures meant overcoming a number of obstacles and constraints.

*Conservatism of the teaching corps resistance, and unions:* The education system is often viewed as a conservative and intractable bureaucracy. This makes innovation difficult, and the introduction of the monitoring measures was no exception. Despite a participatory approach to planning, organizing, and implementing, teachers’ unions engaged in heated debate about the underlying values of the initiative (some leftist unions claimed it was inspired by liberalism and questioned its relevance to civil service). They questioned the outcomes sought (some claimed it was an underhanded way of removing non-achieving staff), the means of implementation (union objections were not responded to), and consequences for teachers (exploitation of workers and strengthening of hierarchical control). The unions were especially anxious about the fate of actors whose performance might be judged inadequate, although paradoxically they had always presented themselves as the defenders of quality education. In the beginning, several unions that had not read the background documents carefully orchestrated a denunciation campaign. Without seeking a confrontation, the Ministry took the time to explain the values and spirit of the reforms, while putting the accent on “standards of behavior” that would improve school management. This approach helped to quiet things down enough to be able to promote the reform on the basis of reciprocal engagement and a personal and voluntary commitment to change. Education authorities in the regions and districts took charge of building awareness and explaining the details of the reform at the grass roots level.

*Weakness of local level staff’s negotiating skills:* Prudent use of local level staff (inspectors and principals) to ensure that the reform messages were communicated at ground level gave mixed results. Education is a field in which professionals have a great deal of autonomy and are not subject to strict control in their daily activities. Efforts to disseminate information about reform measures had mixed results. Some individuals used ideological arguments to justify their resistance to change (often the militant unionists); others were simply not motivated to change, but most important, reform
efforts were hampered by the weak negotiating skills of and lack of preparation by inspectors and principals.

In some places this weakness thwarted the active participation of communities and partners in the collective effort to improve school outcomes and develop successful projects.

**Lack of training for managing by outcomes:** The implementation of reforms relied more on making information available than on short-term training. Putting their faith in the belief that innovation would occur in a flexible and non-linear manner through will alone, reform organizers underestimated the complexity of the changes they were requesting. Without giving adequate attention to promoting the values, principles, methods, and processes that lay beneath expected outcomes, it was not always possible to ensure the desired changes.

**Lack of communication and awareness.** Even though a great effort was made, using flyers and circulars from the Director of Preschool and Primary Education, to explain the duties of each actor, these offices paid insufficient attention to communication and awareness-building. Today most people acknowledge that change is not brought about simply by a decree from the top; yet the limitations of what high-level officials can do is not a justification for those in charge or their agents to sit back and wait for things to happen once the path forward has been identified. The presence of mid-level staff could have been better used to inform and sensitize people during the first year of the reform. Also, training programs could have been planned with more attention to helping reticent or neutral actors understand the issues, to join up, and to act.

**Difficulties in promoting measures to motivate teachers:** Teachers, like school principals, play a central role in transforming and improving education. But one must also consider their working conditions, other pressures, and attitude when asking them to change. Asking them to abandon—or even modify—their daily routines and to give up tried and true practices meant asking them to contribute even more effort and attention than before. The incentives for these changes were inadequate and, indeed, elitist. Even if organizing a Basic Education Week can shake things up, it is not in itself capable of creating a critical mass of sustained will for change. Oddly enough, it was the publication of results in the press that whipped many actors into shape by hurting their pride. As a result they were moved to act so as to avoid being fingered by the national community as being among the poor performers.

**Inadequate logistical support:** Good organization is necessary to provide rigorous and methodical monitoring in all schools across the country. Most of all, one needs logistical tools for collecting information, correcting deviations from the plan, and responding quickly to calls for help. As it was, the resources available for organizing capacity-building seminars to implement the job
descriptions, build awareness, and develop a culture of self-assessment in guiding quality learning were often pitiful in comparison to the announced intentions. How, for example, is it possible to meet the supervisory needs of teachers when there is only one inspector for 235 teachers? It takes a rich imagination to figure this out.

Institutional instability and weak measures for maintaining reform: The successive departures in 1998 of the Minister of Basic Education and the Director of Preschool and Primary Education, both of whom had been advocates for change, created a pause in the initiative. For one thing, the new authorities did not adopt the reform measures. For another, there had not been enough time to produce advocates who persevere and keep up the pressure. Results stagnated and even declined in some instances. Certainly the stock-taking seminars are still going on, and a Basic Education Week is organized each year with ever more pomp (it has a larger budget and more partners to support it). Nonetheless, the spirit of innovation is gradually running out of steam, having been reduced to the most banal of festive occasions. The stock-taking seminars, which were supposed to help maintain the reform, instead have become debates on topics that do not allow reflection on the implementation and improvement of the monitoring measures that might have helped the education system of Senegal to continue to improve.

Lessons learned and keys to success

Senegal’s experience with this initiative has much to teach us. The lessons developed here could be useful when transferring our experience to other environments.

Political will: The implementation of education reform requires an inspired monitoring strategy, effective measures to manage and operate the program, fluid maintenance mechanisms (for regulating and reactivating the system), plus measures for interacting and communicating with the communities, other systems, and relatively dynamic interest groups. All these elements must be organized around a core of strong political will. Those at the highest level play a symbolic role that marries the different stakeholders to the idea of change and creates the values and energy that keep the fire alive. Both the message from the President of the Republic and the personal follow-up by the Minister of Basic Education were determining factors in implementing the reform.

Institutional stability: Major changes take place over time and under stable conditions. This assertion is true everywhere and often explains the frequent inertia and returning to zero that has occurred in many African systems of education, where political and bureaucratic stability is not always the norm. However, unless there is a miraculous end to numerous staff rotations, au-
Authorities must decide how best to carry on, even after the departure of key people. Most planning assumes that political and strategic resources will be stable, and gives little attention to alternate ways of minimizing the dependence of reform measures on one person or a group of people.

The importance of developing a network: One response to the need for stability over time would be to broaden the base of the pyramid through decentralization and to provide extensive training of local-level actors. It is difficult to generalize or sustain innovation without having a well-organized network. The network can be envisioned as a tree with multiple branches. Horizontally the branches represent specializations, such as management and operations, engineering, training, monitoring and assessment; vertically, the trunk would be filled out with organizational forms that allow horizontal branching to extend from the bottom to top in an effective and coherent way.

Minimum resources and economics: Reform requires at least a minimum level of resources. Change has a cost, which must be assessed throughout the entire process, from conception, production, and distribution of tools, to training, awareness-raising, monitoring, and evaluation. If existing resources have been wisely allocated and used, then accommodating new needs should be no problem. If the will to change exists, initiative and creativity are the greatest forces for producing results; a lack of means should never become an alibi for not undertaking reform.

Motivational measures: The critical importance of motivating actors requires that all those engaged in the reform understand the opportunities for personal and professional development that it engenders. Although rarely highlighted, such incentives as professional mobility, career development, and eventual promotion should be used to motivate the actors.

Negotiations to broaden the base of actors: Reform must be negotiated at every stage. Points of resistance must be identified and compromises made that will ease the acceptance of reform by all actors. This preliminary effort plays an important role in getting reform going and establishing the responsibilities of the various actors. The stock-taking and exchange events often allow people to change their minds about something that was not acceptable at first.

Media coverage: The use of the media to communicate results is an effective way to engage actors and brings about individual and collective commitment. Clearly, the desire to maintain a good image is common to most people.

Monitoring and assessment to point the way toward success: For the reform to move ahead, the process must be structured and energized. This scripted activity must take place within a framework of well-defined indicators of progress, their means of verification, a timetable and specification of responsibilities, reports on progress, and means of using these reports to influence future
actions. The exercise must happen at all levels. It should, for greater effect, have some oversight by an external body. This triangular process helps to ensure that objectives are grounded in the perceptions of a range of actors on results and the factors determining them.

The culture of evaluation and self-evaluation must be implanted everywhere if an education system is to respond effectively to a constantly changing environment that increasingly demands high-quality school outcomes and transparency in the process that leads to them.

Other factors of success: A number of other lessons can be drawn from the experience of the initiative:

• Building up a capacity for strategic planning that has adequate autonomy and solid management experience;
• Everyday actions that motivate and promote accountability, involvement, interaction, and action-based research;
• Formalized and identifiable measures for monitoring, sustaining, disseminating and assessing the state of the reform;
• A local environment endowed with opportunities to overcome constraints using internal resources and innovative initiatives for motivating all the actors.

Conclusions

Structural and organizational reforms will be neither effective nor efficient unless they are immersed in an atmosphere of individual and collective determination to succeed, which alone is capable of creating the synergy needed to promote the best education for all, that is, education that ensures progress, freedom, justice, and solidarity. The measures for monitoring schools through job descriptions should be seen in this light. They rely as a last resort on the shock value of “the image effect” (l’effet image), that is, they seek to advertise, both internally and externally, innovations, achievements, positive developments and role models, which, when they change, lead the actors to change their behavior.

A positive image of schools can and should be cultivated, for this plays a decisive role in the institution’s future. If neglected, schools deteriorate and destabilize society. If cultivated, they help support development. For this reason everyone associated with the education community should try to restore the image of schools, which today is so tarnished. But to be effective all stakeholders must feel involved.

A sense of participation can only result from dialogue that is truly constructive and responsive. It must be informed by a clear and determined vision of a school system that demands quality and transparency and that channels
its human resources (teachers and school principals) towards a school of achievement for all.

Contrary to those who would promote the use of complex tools for regulating situations that are complex, the initiative of monitoring basic education through job descriptions chose to enter into complexity with tools that are simple but that have become more refined as time goes by.

Having gathered all these elements together, we felt the experience of Senegal is exemplary and that it should be examined and shared with other specialists in education.

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Annexes

Annex 1. Job descriptions for inspectors, teachers and school principals

Described here in fairly detailed form are the job descriptions that were drawn up in collegial fashion for inspectors, school principals, and teachers. These documents were meant to be summaries, easily read, with their content organized around action verbs indicating the tasks to be performed by each of the three sets of actors. Also, because the professional duties of the actors overlap, the job descriptions are linked to each other both logically and functionally. One person’s tasks feed naturally into the others’ tasks, and with them the need to cultivate a spirit of cooperation, communication, and partnership.

Job description for inspectors in public education

Managing and developing education within a new context of regionalization and decentralization requires that the traditional mission of the national inspection unit (IDEN) be strengthened with regard to supervision, training, organization, planning, coordination, motivation, and assessment. This is all directed towards attaining two main objectives:

- Increased access to school (thus contributing to the achievement of universal education)
- Improved quality and effectiveness of education.

Inspection and supervision

As part of their inspection visits and supervisory role, each public education inspector is expected to:

- Conduct 30 inspections per year, of which 25 are visits to teachers and five are visits to principals
- Make use of the class visit reports drawn up by school principals
- Produce at the beginning of each school year a schedule of visits to teachers
- Produce an inspection and monitoring work plan for the year
- Produce a yearly training schedule for school principals and teachers.

Training, leading, and research

In order to strengthen teaching effectiveness, improve school results, reduce dropout and repetition rates, and increase participation in training activities, public education inspectors must conduct:

- Two training seminars a year
- Two pedagogical meetings (discussion around a topic) a year
• Two study days (to develop or present research results) or one conference a year
• Three visits per quarter to cultural and pedagogical study groups
• A training activity for any teacher who scores less than 9/20
• One research activity every two years related to educational issues, with the purpose of producing something new or making adjustments to an existing program
• Three classes to prepare candidates taking professional exams.

**Organization**
Inspectors are expected to carry out the following duties:
• Define priorities of the district inspectorate (IDEN) and assign tasks among members in accordance with the calendar due-dates
• Organize measures for monitoring all parties (school principles, IDEN, teachers) by planning school and class visits, meetings, assessment and administrative follow-up
• Organize tests and competitive examinations.

**Planning**
The following tasks will be carried out:
• Draw up a five-year district development plan
• Make an annual plan of all activities in the coverage area (time and location)
• Count the number of pupils in school and estimate the numbers who should be enrolled (by town, rural area and neighborhood)
• Help increase school enrollment rates and draw up a five-year prospective table (showing number of classrooms to be constructed or renovated, numbers of teachers and inspectors necessary, furniture and equipment needed).

**Rational deployment of resources**
Inspectors should watch out that human and other resources at their disposal are used in a rational way:
• Teaching personnel
• Credits for the IDEN (inspectorates), primary and elementary school.

**Monitoring**
Inspectors are also responsible for seeing that:
• Registration and administrative document are kept up to date
• Preventive and required maintenance of buildings and furniture is done.

**Social mobilization and sources of funding**
The following activities should be implemented in order to build a partnership and involve the local community:
• Draw up an annual communication plan
• Identify and organize available sources of funding among various social and development partners
• Encourage community participation in the educational effort
• Seek out supplementary financing to meet school needs
• Develop strategies to encourage school enrollment
• Strengthen advocacy for enrolling and keeping girls in school.

**Coordination and motivation**

In creating synergy and convergence of actions, the inspection staff should:

• Coordinate all school benefits
• Organize meetings with school principals, local administrators, and social and development partners
• Promote pedagogical and structural innovation
• Draw up strategies for promoting all activities of benefit to the school
• Promote and supervise school-related activities.

**Evaluation**

Inspectors are responsible for evaluating the smooth functioning and implementation of all internal activities:

• School operations (rate of implementation of training and supervision, social mobilization)
• Performance by inspectors, principals, teachers, and partners
• Effectiveness of implementation of school projects
• Outcomes of district development plans for education
• Student performance, as measured by improved pass rate of primary school certificate exams and repeat rate reduced (down to 10%).

**Job description for school principals**

The principal is the most important link in revitalizing schools: therefore the principal should:

**Watch that...**

• School facilities are functional and welcoming
• Quality goals have been defined
• Administrative documents (attendance record, inventories, class visits, medical visits, teacher counseling records) are kept up to date
• Material and human resources are used efficiently and effectively
• Statistics for the previous five years on gender, promotion, repetition, drop-out, exams, and enrollment are available and usable
• Archives are safe and secure
• Teachers, students, and the community remain fully committed
• Teacher solidarity is reinforced
• Order and discipline are maintained
• Class schedules are maintained
• Punctuality is observed by students and teachers alike
• Information circulates
• School reports are submitted to superiors
• Working conditions are improved
• School premises are furnished and secure
• School-related activities are well organized.

Establish…
• An active pedagogical team
• A Teachers Group for teaching and cultural events
• A management committee that gets the community involved
• Measures for preventive maintenance of facilities, furniture and equipment.

Organize…
• Every two weeks a teaching and cultural event
• Twice a term a meeting with the community to discuss school problems and student performance
• Frequent exchanges among teachers at the same and different levels
• Ways of promoting the school and opening it up to the outside
• Training, supervision, and follow-up activities to support education and learning
• Monthly meetings of the pedagogical team to review student performance and strategies for improving it.

Implement…
• Progressively with the pedagogical team those conditions that will help achieve a 50% pass rate on primary certificate exams
• Measures to reduce the failure rate to 10% at most
• Ten hours of supervision per week for teachers; visiting at least two teachers per week
• A space reserved for discussion about teaching and learning methods.

Post…
• Class schedules
• The staff list
• Lists of students and school equipment
• The Principal’s schedule
• The Principal’s job description.
Participate in…
- Training sessions for school principals
- Making the whole school cooperative function smoothly.

Contribute to…
- Social mobilization and organization of Basic Education Week
- Strengthening advocacy of enrolling and maintaining girls in school
- Developing, implementing, and evaluating the school plan
- Helping local people obtain family identify papers by registering new births in time.

Monitor and sign…
- Class preparation notebooks at least one day in advance
- Class rotation schedules at least once a week
- Monthly records
- Lesson plans for each class each week
- Writing composition notebooks.

Propose…
A system of staff merits and demerits.

Job description for teachers
It is the teacher’s role to provide instruction and knowledge. The teacher’s mission is to train tomorrow’s citizens and, in particular, to supervise learning activities and initiate the student in cultural and civic values. Even though he or she cannot control all resources, the teacher is expected to help students have:
- Their own reading book
- An arithmetic book shared with one other pupil
- Four notebooks at least (homework, lessons, composition, writing)
- A slate
- Suitable individual material.

In addition, in order to achieve what the school has every right to expect, the teacher has a duty

To participate in
- Teaching and cultural sessions
- Teacher training sessions
- School related activities
- Developing and operating school cooperatives.
To see that students
• are involved in school-related activities
• respect school rules
• participate in the beautification and functioning of the school.

To do the following
• Ask students to do at least three written exercises a day in French, mathematics, and an elective subject
• Require a revision of work in each discipline at least once every two weeks
• Have pupils write an essay at least every two months
• Have weaker students do supplementary exercises
• Assign homework
• Correct and return homework on a regular basis
• Prepare written class outlines and submit them at least a day in advance.

To keep up to date
• A class assignment notebook
• A class record
• A counseling notebook
• A visitor’s notebook
• A teaching notebook
• A roll-call record
• An evaluation notebook
• A research notebook (for recording pedagogical experiments and new teaching tools).

To post
• Class schedules
• Activities schedules
• A list of students and statistics (broken down by age, gender, years of schooling)
• The monthly attendance record
• An organization and maintenance roster and list of tasks assigned to students
• A list of songs and recitations
• Class records detailing numbers of students, furniture, teaching materials
• School rules and regulations
• The teacher’s job description.
To contribute to

- Reducing the failure rate to a minimum of 10%
- Improving the school ambiance
- Order and discipline at school
- Making school healthier and more hygienic
- Improving performance by students and teachers
- Reducing absenteeism and tardiness
- Respecting student work time
- Promoting relations with the local community
- Increasing access to school for girls.

Annex 2. Basic Education Week

The philosophy, goals and organization of Basic Education Week are described here.

Objectives of the week

- Create a sense of identity in each school
- Consolidate relations between the school and the community
- Acknowledge those who have distinguished themselves by their work and achievements
- Promote grass-roots annual school development programs
- Open schools to the broader community by organizing cultural, sports, and academic events
- Mobilize resources to improve the school environment and student performance through construction projects, painting, renovating desks and classrooms, installing libraries
- Strengthen demand for education in order to increase enrollment.

How it is organized

- The focus is on decentralization and accountability
- Each school organizes its own events
- District and regional structures are expected to lend support and follow local activities
- Each year one region is selected as a national showcase: it receives a lot of media support
- The various partners (NGOs, unions, PTAs, cultural and athletic associations, women’s groups) are closely involved in all phases of organizing Basic Education Week.
Activities

- Each school sets up a committee to decide on activities. The activities listed below appeared in a number of different school reports:
- A discussion forum on a school-related topic
- Exhibition of student work and school achievements
- Open house
- Competitions and sporting events
- Sharing the school development plan.

Participation

The list of participants in Basic Education Week includes:
- The pedagogical team
- Students
- Sports clubs and cultural associations
- Unions
- PTAs
- Women’s groups
- NGOs
- Municipal and local groups
- Alumni associations.

Participation takes many forms: physical, intellectual, material, and financial. Resources are managed in collegial fashion and in most cases are turned over to a management committee.

Resources

Identification of needs depends on the organization and activities of each school. Raising funds is usually one of the first tasks of the management committee, which is set up three months before the event. It is the committee’s responsibility to explore potential sources of support from outside. Low-cost events and activities are generally favored.

A representative planning calendar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Setting up of the activities planning committee</td>
<td>15 February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparations</td>
<td>15 February – 15 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Education Week</td>
<td>21 – 27 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>01 – 10 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report on activities</td>
<td>10 – 20 June</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Partnerships

Partnership is a pillar of Basic Education Week. All partners can contribute to innovation and become involved in activities, especially awareness raising, technical, logistical, material, or financial support.

Communication and advocacy

Each region, each district, and each school should draw up a communication plan. It should identify the goals, strategies, information channels and persons in charge of delivering the information. Regional radio networks and local media are expected to pitch in.

Follow-up and supervision

The district inspectorates are the lynchpin of Basic Education Week in terms of motivating people, guiding activities, monitoring, and supervising. They are expected to help schools implement their programs.

A table of statistics is installed in each establishment so that the impact of the Week can be measured from year to year.

At the regional level, it is the academic inspectors who are responsible for coordinating and monitoring the school week activities.

Annex 3. Monitoring Tools

Here is a list of the various monitoring tools created:

• A flyer on the teacher's job description
• A flyer on the principal's job description
• A flyer on the inspector's job description
• A flyer on how to open schools
• A flyer on how to close schools
• A checklist for the teacher's job description
• A checklist for the principal's job description
• A checklist for the inspector's job description
• A flyer on how to organize Basic Education Week
• A flyer on the school and its partners: elements for discussion
• A flyer on social mobilization for good citizenship in aid of education
• A guide for drawing up a school plan
• A new inspection slip for teachers and school principals.

Other monitoring tools were discovered during inspections and school visits:

• A model letter for awarding merits and demerits
• A grid showing operational status of job descriptions
• A slip for class visits
• A slip for visits by the principal
• A grid showing overall performance by teachers and principals.

Annex 4. Organizations and people met

Academy inspectors
Diourbel
District inspectors
Kédémer
Thiès district
Greater Dakar
Guédiawaye
School principals
École de Lalane
Liberté VI A
Cheikh I. Faye
Parcelles assainies 9
Teachers
6 female teachers (Thiès, Kaolack, Louga)
6 male teachers (Dakar, Saint Louis, Kolda)
Parent-Teacher Associations
Liberté VI A
Lalane
Cheikh I. Faye
NGOs
Paul Gérin Lajoie
Aide et Action
Proares
Communication for Education and Development: Enhancing Stakeholder Participation and Commitment
by Alfred E. OPUBOR

Introduction: Why communication?

Education has become everyone’s business. Parents, teachers and their unions, students, communities, civil society groups, NGOs, education ministries and government program managers… all have their roles, interests and responsibilities. Increasingly all need to have their say, in an environment in which they may not always have their way. Negotiating the gulf between what each group wants and what it can get from interacting with other groups, is rich soil for communication.

Communication is an inevitable ingredient of the relations among and between education stakeholders. Whether those relations are good or not, constructive or not, will be reflected in how they communicate, just as how they communicate could help in shaping the tone and outcomes of relationships.

Attention to the strategic elements that are involved in communication can help to ensure social relations that are productive, through creating the kinds of environment which favor harmonious development of the education sector.

All partners in education can therefore take deliberate steps to plan and implement communication activities based on an understanding of what promotes, and what impedes, successful collaboration.

This background paper, and the session on Communication for Education to which it contributes are designed to:

• Demonstrate that communication is an essential tool for education policy makers in their quest to go to scale;
• Provide examples of how different forms of communication have been used successfully in enabling dialogue among stakeholders;
• Emphasize the need for a policy and strategic approach to the use of communication to support education in Africa.
Some purposes of communication for education

Communication is about people creating, learning and exchanging meaning.

In the education sector, one of the goals of communication is to assist each stakeholder group to make sense of its roles and responsibilities while seeking to understand and to accept those of others.

Successful partnerships emerge when most of the parties see themselves and the others as moving in the same direction, working for similar interests, sharing the same meanings about educational issues, reforms, programs etc. Mutual trust is a basic requirement and outcome for these relationships. Communication can help build trust.

Awareness of mutual interest, commonalities and building of trust are not ‘givens’; they do not just happen, naturally or spontaneously. They can be the result of planned communication.

Communication can serve many functions in partnerships for education, among them:

- **Information**: providing factual statements and explanations about the common enterprise and how the various stakeholders relate to it. Examples include: (i) how a teacher redeployment program will work, who will be affected, when and where it will be applied; (ii) school enrollments by sex and region; (iii) the performance of schools on national examinations; (iv) pupil unit cost by region; (v) student-teacher ratios by region. Such information levels the playing field when it comes to information used in their dialogue.

- **Dialogue and confidence-building**: ensuring that all the various points of view are expressed, providing clarifications and addressing any hesitations about the issues concerned. For example, what do mothers feel about girls’ going to school all day? Will teachers lose seniority if moved to other locations? Will government’s plan of returning management of primary schools to religious organizations not mean blocking certain groups from attendance? A communication strategy will provide for group meetings, person-to-person discussions, workshops, newsletters, etc. to tackle the various aspects of these kinds of situation, and ensure that major misunderstandings are removed, so that partners can be comfortable with their present and future roles.

- **Consensus**: Once stakeholders are informed and have a chance to express their views, and their worries are addressed adequately, it may be possible to get agreement on lines of action, on schedules, on division of responsibility etc. For example, if targets have been set for girls’ education
in a community, who will ensure that girls actually show up in school? If special resources are required for this, how will they be made available? What is the role of parents and families, of religious groups, of education managers in meeting targets? Will they agree to undertake their roles? If sanctions for non-performance are to be invoked, are they understood and accepted by all? A communication strategy will seek ways of effectively managing these issues. It will keep track through monitoring feedback, of the evolution of understandings and the achievement of commonly-decided objectives.

- **Advocacy:** Influential individuals and institutions may be unwilling to change habits of thinking and reacting, and may be inclined to block new ideas, if they consider them threatening or undesirable. Communication can be a means of engaging centers of power and influence to encourage them to ‘move’ with the times; and to lend their influence to progressive directions. For example, will village traditional rulers and family elders allow girls to continue in school rather than be married off at puberty? How can they be reassured, and thus help to reassure other influential, that continued schooling will not breed ‘irresponsible’ wives and mothers? These are advocacy issues, and some of them can be controversial. There are special communication approaches for advocacy; for enhancing the support of influential individuals and groups for proposed changes, which may be in legislation, policies, regulations, programs, cultural values and behavior.

- **Social mobilization:** How can the large numbers of people at the ‘grassroots’ and periphery be brought into supporting education reforms and programs? For example, how can the EFA ‘movement’ become acceptable and gain majority support in communities across nations, rather than remain only commitments that Ministers of Education made at international conferences, of no relevance to their people? Communication campaigns and structured programs can be created for involving people at different levels of society in decisions about proposed education programs.

### Channels and modes of communication

From the uses of communication sketched above, it can be seen that various individuals or groups can initiate communication, and can also be the recipients in a communication situation. Ministries of education often feel that it is their responsibility and role to initiate ideas and programs about education programs for which they would need the collaboration of the other stakeholders. Similarly parents or teachers or religious groups may react to

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1. See Sylvie Cohen, Partnering: A New Approach to Sexual and Reproductive Health, UNFPA, New York, 2001, which says that “Advocacy is also about addressing controversy”, p. 83. Chapter Five of this text, pp 81-103, is a useful résumé of gender-aware advocacy strategies, practices and experiences, with examples drawn from the reproductive health literature.
curriculum content (e.g. sexuality education modules) and seek to have the Ministry make changes in line with their home and community values.\(^2\)

Participatory communication, which has proved to be effective in building confidence and ownership, involves frequent interchange among people and groups in communication situations. In other words, it is a mode of communicating in which all the parties concerned should feel able to initiate discussion and to respond freely when addressed, rather than be just passive receivers of other peoples’ monologues and commands.

According to Alfonso Dagron: “The main elements that characterize participatory communication are related to its capacity to involve the human subjects of social change in the process of communicating.” (Dagron, pp 34-35, 2001). Dagron goes on to enumerate nine “issues that distinguish participatory communication from other development communication strategies.” Among these are: horizontal vs. vertical, process vs. campaign, long-term vs. short-term, collective vs. individual, with vs. for, specific vs. massive, people’s needs vs. donors’ musts, ownership vs. access, consciousness vs. persuasion. These bi-polar opposite terms each describe various ways of communicating, the first in each pair being more favourable to participatory communication (Dagron, pp 34-35, 2001).

Some communication efforts use mass media: press releases, news-bulletins, programs, announcements on radio and television, etc. Some involve group and interpersonal communication through meetings, parent-pupil-teacher conferences, workshops, seminars, rallies, demonstrations, etc. Other communication modalities use institutional channels such as the political/administrative, the school/educational system, development networks, NGOs. Also used increasingly are traditional or socio-cultural channels of communication, involving local opinion leaders, informal groups, indigenous and popular media, such as theatre and festivals, and places and events where people gather regularly, markets, worksites, marriages, naming ceremonies, wake-keepings etc. Other channels are those used in the commercial system for marketing goods and services, for example, bookstores, neighbourhood stores, kiosks.

The most recent opportunities for mass communication are provided by what have been called the ‘new information and communication technologies’, increasingly in use through e-mail, websites, electronic fora, distance learning and other computer-based applications.

\(^2\) As happened in Kenya with the attempted introduction by the Ministry of Education of a Family Life Education curriculum, containing elements of sexual education, much opposed by a coalition of religious groups and parents, who expressed themselves vocally in newspapers, radio and television and public meetings. The Ministry was obliged to postpone the introduction of the proposed curriculum.
Mass media tend to reach large, undifferentiated audiences, and are useful for information that is of general relevance. In African countries, radio is the mass medium of choice. It is the most widespread, is accessible to most social classes, including the poor and illiterate, as it uses national and local languages and dialects. In many urban areas local and community radios (especially on FM) are creating a new dynamic, focused channel, more targeted to the realities of specific localities. In some communities, these stations have become channels of broad-based dialogue, cutting across social groups and classes, united in their determination to expose and find solutions for local problems and to hold public officials and institutions accountable (Opubor, 1990, pp 42-51; Opubor 2000, pp 11-24; Dagron, op cit; Akin Fatoyinbo, 1998).

More and more these can be programmed through the internet and the world wide web.

Television has been used more in urban areas for reaching policy-makers and the urban and peri-urban elite. It also reaches people in lower socio-economic groups. Video clubs and other viewing opportunities are growing in influence in many urban areas; and their use has been experimented in rural areas for social change programs.  

Depending on what is to be communicated, mass media content may be factual (as in news and documentaries) or oriented towards didactic entertainment, to enable people learn and change, while having a good time. Examples such as ‘Soul City’ show how this can be done in radio and television.

Many African countries have experimented with mass media ‘enter-educate’ or ‘edutainment’ approaches for social change programs involving environment issues, voter’s registration, HIV/AIDS prevention, family planning, instigating urban-rural migration, censuses etc. (Kone and Sy,1995; Naramon, 1993). Some of these have also used drama and popular culture and traditional arts performances to get their ‘message’ across.
Why a communication strategy?

Many discussions of communication tend to focus on channels and messages, perhaps because these are the most visible, most controllable, and generally perceived by most people in authority as the source of their ‘problems’. But channels and messages constitute only two elements of communication. As shown so far, communication involves various sources and receivers, using various channels to convey various messages to achieve various effects or results. It is really the interaction among all of these elements which should interest the serious communicator, since that is what matters in the final outcome.

A communication strategy attempts to deliberately and consciously use what is known about the various key elements of the communication process, as a system, in order to achieve communication objectives. It is this comprehensive, systemic, purpose-driven framework that is often missing in how ministries and other national institutions communicate with their internal audiences and with those outside their structures.

For example, many ministries of education pay a lot of attention to the mass media. They appoint public relations or press officers whose duties consist mostly of press relations, refuting media misrepresentation, and making sure that the ministry is favourably mentioned on radio, television and in newspapers and magazines.

However, a lot of the communication that is required to support education sector issues and programs may involve constituencies which cannot be easily reached by mass media. There may be need to address small groups for which interpersonal communication is more appropriate than radio or press announcements. Many civil society groups such as NGOs and Parent/Teacher Associations, PTAs, carry out a lot of their communication through interpersonal activities, and have developed expertise in these areas. According to ‘lessons learnt’ from the COMED training program, “We need to expand understanding of communication and its role in social development, especially in promoting collaboration among partners in education. This includes looking beyond mass media to interpersonal, group and traditional African channels of communication.” (Opubor, 2000).

Social mobilization campaigns often require that more than one channel of communication be used at the same time, so focusing on the mass media has its place; but it can often be misplaced. In fact research has shown that the

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6. Communication effects can be short-term or longer term, including: learning, attitude change, behavior change, on the part of individuals, groups or institutions.

7. The example of Mali, presented later, which provides a comprehensive strategy for a national education ministry would appear to be one of the exceptions; though with the COMED training program, it is hoped that these strategies will become more common.
most successful communication efforts require multi-media, multi-channel approaches. Specifically, the combination of mass media and interpersonal channels is effective for linking information-giving with the possibility of producing behaviour change. As Cohen, 2000, advises from lessons learned: “Use multiple communication channels to create synergistic effect. Effective… programs use several channels to deliver their messages. Research shows that individuals that are exposed to a message from multiple sources – mass media and community-based media and interpersonal communication – are more likely to take action than those exposed to a message from a single source.” (Cohen, p.108, 2000). [This means that, like several other stakeholder groups, ministries of education should see themselves as managers of multidimensional/multi-media encounters, and therefore include interpersonal communication more explicitly in the job descriptions, and professional development of their Communication Officers].

Communication for supporting education policies in Africa needs to be based on a more strategic approach. It should pay greater attention to the needs, resources and expertise of the various stakeholders, and explore the use of the multiplicity of channels and modes of communication which may prove effective for them, as they seek to promote their relations with other education stakeholders.

To ensure the effectiveness of communication strategies for education, ministries and other education stakeholders may require the collaboration of public and private communication agencies whose expertise is the design and implementation, including the proper costing, of communication strategies.

**Elements of a communication strategy for education**

A communication strategy may derive from a communication policy, which is a statement presenting general objectives, guidelines and standards which should guide the use of communication for achieving the development goals of a state or the strategic goals of an institution.

The communication strategy is a framework that combines the communication interventions which are considered as necessary for achieving the specific changes in knowledge, attitude and behavior on the part of relevant individuals and groups. A communication strategy operates within a time frame, taking into account available material and human resources.

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8. The COMED training workshops in Yaounde and Harare in 2000, took Communication Officers from ministries of education on field visits to advertising/marketing/communication consulting firms, where the work of these firms was presented. There was general appreciation among participants that such private sector firms could make valuable contributions to educational promotion as they had been doing to other government programs in health or election publicity.
The communication strategy development and implementation process may be visualized in Figure 6: (Kone, 2001; Cohen, 1992).

Figure 6. Steps in the strategy development and implementation process

Some African examples of communication for education

There is a growing body of information on recent attempts to employ communication strategies, techniques and processes as conscious elements of interventions in support of educational policies and their implementation. A few examples are described in this section (See Annex 1).

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9. Some of these cases will be more fully presented at the ADEA Biennial Session on Communication for Education.
**Table 17. National communication strategies to support education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interpersonal Communication</th>
<th>Mass Media</th>
<th>Multi-media</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin Parliamentary Dialogue on Education</td>
<td>Ethiopia Mass Media Agency • radio broadcasts • also recorded cassettes for groups</td>
<td>Guinea Deployment of Teachers • interpersonal contacts/ meetings/ discussions • radio(national, regional, rural) • newspaper • newsletters/bulletins</td>
<td>The Guinea and Mali and Nigeria cases are examples of comprehensive, articulated strategies; but perhaps only Mali seems to have enunciated a sectoral communication policy for education. South Africa probably also has such a policy, derived from the general national public-sector policy on communication; but it is not clear if the Ministry/Department of Education communication strategy involves regular use of non-mass media communication. Even though the Tanzania and Ethiopia cases are classified as ‘mass media’, the use of videos in rural ‘clubs’ and schools could also be accompanied by a social process, as is habitual in ‘media discussion forums’; which would make them ‘multi-media’; which is to indicate that these classifications are just for illustration of general approaches. Most action on the ground tends to be multi-media seemingly by default, rather than strategic design.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenyan Parliamentary Dialogue on Education</td>
<td>Kenya Newspapers • weekly pullout education sections, e.g. Blackboard (Daily Nation newspaper)</td>
<td>Mali Ministry of Basic Education Communication Strategy • interpersonal contacts • informational/informal meetings • field visits • workshops • training sessions • radio • television • group video • brochures</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
<td>• press • radio • television • e-mail • internet</td>
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<td>Tanzania Ma-Ma Environment Awareness</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• television series</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• video magazine for rural video clubs and schools</td>
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<td>Uganda News agency dispatches</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• weekly pullout education section e.g. Education Vision (New Vision newspaper)</td>
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<td>Pan African News Agency, PANA</td>
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<td>Inter Press Service, IPS</td>
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<td>News agency dispatches</td>
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<td>• internet</td>
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**Benin: National parliamentary dialogue on education**

Before introducing new legislation on educational reform, the Commission on Education, Culture and Employment, of the Parliament of Benin, decided on a wide-ranging consultative process to obtain the views of the people, in May 2000. Traveling all over the country, they met with communities and
citizens groups and various stakeholders, even in the remotest regions, in the nation’s twelve provinces. According to a field report, “The purpose of the consultation was to raise awareness of the proposed law on the future direction of education, to gather suggestions and reactions, and to elicit the concerns of various actors in education….Representatives of the main actors in the education sector (students, parents, members of the teachers’ unions, university lecturers, NGOs, and others) were invited. The hearings were well attended, with an average of about one hundred people at each”.

The hearings were basically face-to-face group meetings. The media were kept away to avoid politicizing the consultation, and to emphasize the Commission’s heterogeneous membership. What did the process achieve? The report sees the results as going beyond the education sector: “For nearly ten years the country has sought to ground its political life in a spirit of consensus and dialogue… The hearings are a perfect example of what the people and their elected officials have attained. The important issues of education have facilitated the practice of a democratic dialogue among elected officials and participants. Finally, participants’ propositions and suggestions have given new impetus to the understanding of education issues in Benin.” As a communication exercise, the consultations were regarded as ‘a revolution’ in Benin, because it was the first time that Members of Parliament were canvassing public opinion outside election campaigns! The success of this experience has encouraged discussion of possible introduction of the idea to other countries in the region. (Dovoedo, pp 11-12, 2000).

**Guinea: Deployment of teachers** (Sow, ADEA Newsletter, pp 15-16, 2000).

In 1992–93, Guinea redeployed teaching staff and administrators across the country. This move increased enrollments in urban and rural schools, at no additional cost. In support of the exercise, the Ministry of Education included communication as part of its general strategy. The communication objectives were: firstly, to reach all groups to be directly affected by the proposed redeployment, i.e. teachers and administrators; education administrators at the central level, regional inspectors, and directors at prefectural and community levels; community representatives and associations of parents and teachers; and secondly a multi-media public awareness campaign based on already existing initiatives. The communication activities included various types of broadcast programs on national, regional and rural radios, enabling key officials responsible for the exercise to provide information and explanations; publications in the government newspaper, as well as dispatches by the national news agency, which carried stories from the regions.

An important strategic feature was that: “Interpersonal communication was the prime means of official disclosure, directly reaching important groups of
people during official gatherings and allowing opportunities for immediate reaction. Interpersonal communication permitted listening and dialogue among skeptical groups, particularly unions and political parties. It directly engaged opinion leaders in NGOs and Parent-Teacher Associations, who proved to be powerful supporters of the deployment plan.”

Some of the problems encountered included the lack of credibility of certain spokespersons in communities where did not enjoy support; the limited reach of the national broadcast signal (50% of national territory), and the consequent need for extensive personal appearances, which proved more costly. Since evaluation of the communication component had not been foreseen, it was not possible to quantify the impact of the measures undertaken.

But it seems to be generally agreed, among those who organized the process, that partnerships with the media and their mobilization, greatly enhanced the achievement of the goals of the exercise. It would have been especially valuable to have had information on the impact of the massive use of interpersonal communication.

Ethiopia: Education Mass Media Agency, EMMA
To complement in-school education programs, the government of Ethiopia established the Educational Mass Media Agency (EMMA) in 1968. The objectives of EMMA have been:

- to train teachers in radio utilization;
- to introduce innovative teaching methods;
- to extend the coverage of vocational training programs, the literacy campaign, correspondence education and rural development programs to as many as possible;
- to provide qualitative education by multiplying the skills of the limited number of professionals;
- to enrich the progressive cultural and artistic life of the broad masses;
- to teach the official language (Amharic) as well as to utilize and develop the languages of different nationalities; and
- to introduce science and technology to broad masses.

EMMA has gone through several changes. Basically designed to support the literacy program of an earlier period which reached 20 million people, EMMA became a vehicle for adult education, with several national radio transmitters and a channel/network devoted exclusively to education programs and a dozen production studios creating education broadcasts in Amharic and regional languages, on development topics.

The programs of EMMA have filled the educational gap for the out-of-school population. The Education Mass Media Agency operates eleven regional radio transmitting stations whose signals cover more than 90% of the country,
providing parallel broadcasting services to the national network controlled by the Ministry of Information; the one concentrating on educational programs in support of pedagogical efforts, the other concerned mainly with news, information and entertainment broadcasts in support of government programs and the political process. Channel 2 on radio is for Adult Education, including work with extension and development agents, covering topics in health and agriculture etc; it involves also use of audio-cassettes in Community Education Centres constructed by communities.

Radio is the most accessible medium of public communication in Ethiopia, with a national penetration of about 63%. There are between five and seven million radio sets in the country, and a listenership of about 30 to 40 million people. Television services follow the same pattern, with a national government-oriented channel, and an educational service for instructional programming. The distribution of radio and television sets shows an overwhelming urban bias, as well as marked differences in regional ownership. While 78% of urban residents owned radio sets, only 22% of people in rural areas did; and television ownership was an entirely urban phenomenon, with over 100,000 sets concentrated mainly in the Addis Ababa area. (PRSD, 1993).

Nigeria: Social mobilization for basic education and literacy

Forty-eight per cent of Nigeria’s population (of about 120 million) is illiterate. Therefore the nation’s Universal Basic Education (UBE) program, is faced with important challenges. Already there are problems of the high rate of school drop-outs, and the large number of street children; and what to do with the education of nomadic and migrant groups. Girls marry very early in some areas of the country, and they are generally not in school. On the achievement side, about 22.7 million children are expected to be in primary schools throughout Nigeria in 2001, and they are expected to be taught by 585,000 suitably qualified teachers. Advocacy working visits have also been a feature of the grassroots mobilization for UBE. Working visits have been undertaken to numerous states of the country. Each visit involved meetings with communities and working sessions with a variety of stakeholders, press conferences, public lectures, visits to institutions, and the commissioning of new schools.

Policy changes, the mobilization of resources, support from parents, communities, religious, cultural and civic leaders, local and state governments. …all of these and more require constant communication, using different media. The most effective approaches have involved communicating in places where people gather: mosques, churches, markets, etc, involving traditional

10. Information from presentation at COMED Trainers Workshop, Abuja, Nigeria, May, 2001, by Dr. Musa Moda, Federal Director of Social Mobilization for the Universal Basic Education program, UBE.
and religious authorities, chiefs and imams, appealing to cultural values and symbols, in a vast program of social mobilization. It is intended that these approaches which have proved successful in parts of the country for supporting literacy and other education programs in the past, will now be replicated and be scaled up to facilitate achievement of the targets of the UBE program.

**Mali: Communication strategy for the Ministry of Education**

After the civil unrest, and subsequent change of government in Mali, in 1991, the new leadership was determined to democratize not only national institutions but also the whole development process (and especially the development of education), to link them more closely with the wishes of the people. It was felt that the vertical approach to communication had had its day. The fundamental question had become how to encourage participation, debate and exchange of ideas, and what system needed to be put in place to coordinate efforts at all levels.

The national education authorities felt that a national communication policy for the school was a possible solution and regarded its formulation as crucial. Such a strategy would facilitate understanding among the authorities and the people and enable school administrations and their partners – technical, social and financial – to mutually inform one another about their activities and concerns. For a country such as Mali, which was pursuing a democratic path, a communication policy was indispensable for obtaining the participation of the people and of social partners for the identification and implementation of priority education programs.

During a national workshop in October, 1993, discussions focused on the importance of communication, and a decision was made to create a communication unit within the Ministry of Basic Education. In the establishment of the New Foundation School, a working group on “Information and communication” was formed to provide support to the new communication unit. The mission of this working group was to prepare the information and communication strategies for dealing with the partners of the school and of different national entities. Four technical committees support the work of the working group: 1) a Committee on Electronic and Print media, with responsibility for preparing and implementing information, sensitization and training programs in line with the interests of the Ministry of Basic Education; 2) a Committee on Printing, Drawing and Illustration with responsibility for creating graphics and illustrations for messages on basic education, 3) a Committee on Documentation and Archives for collecting.

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preserving and managing the documents of the Ministry; 4) a Committee on Public Relations, in charge of organizing the Ministry’s internal and external communication activities.

**The COMED program**

The Communication for Education and Development program in Africa, COMED, was launched in 1998, with the aim of promoting the use of communication to support national education policies and projects in Africa, by helping to develop communication capacities within Ministries of Education and improving media understanding of education issues.

Under the program, a series of sub-regional and national-level training workshops has been held in which over 100 journalists and communication officers of Ministries of Education from 30 African countries participated. These training workshops were held in Cotonou, for West Africa, (13–18 September 1999); in Harare for East and Southern Africa, (16–26 February, 2000); and in Yaounde, for Central Africa and the Indian Ocean, (28 June–7 July, 2000).

The main objectives of the workshops were to enhance the participants’ professional skills and to encourage the development of working relationships between journalists and ministerial communication officers. Another objective was to encourage the creation of regional networks of education communicators. A needs assessment in September 1998, had indicated that education managers and communication officers in ministries of education were distrustful of journalists and of media reports on education, which they considered generally sensationalist. On their part, journalists considered education ministry officials difficult to access and fond of hoarding information of public interest. They felt ministry communication officers put barriers in their way, and that especially, they shielded ministers and top officials from the press. In view of this atmosphere of mutual suspicion, frustration and hostility, the COMED program decided to train journalists and communication officers together, in order to increase their mutual understanding and build trust.

Other activities undertaken under the COMED program included: (i) a pilot national training workshop in Dakar, Senegal in April 2000 for Senegalese education journalists and communicators; (ii) the sponsorship of journalists to attend events related to education, including the ADEA Biennial Meeting and the EFA sub-Saharan Africa Conference in December 1999, the World Education Forum in Dakar in April 2000, and the Zimbabwe International Book Fair in August 2000; (iii) a sub-regional training course in the use of
educational statistics for journalists from some francophone West African countries, in Dakar, in June, 2001; (iv) technical assistance to the Parliament of Benin during the national consultations prior to introduction of legislation on educational reform; (v) assistance to the Fédération Africaine des Associations des Parents d’Élèves, FAPE, in creating a communication strategy and program for its network.

An evaluation was held in Cotonou, (7–9 December 2000), with key partners, to establish lessons learnt and chart future directions for the COMED program. Among its key findings (See Annex 3):

“Journalists are becoming more conscious of ethical considerations and professional standards in their reporting of education. While this might remove some of the criticism of sensational reporting about education, it may not necessarily eliminate the irritation of education managers, sensitive to close investigative scrutiny or sharp editorial comments.

Countries where education reporters and correspondents are organized in a professional group or network tend also to have more structured and less conflictual relationships with communication officers and education news sources, leading to seemingly more continuous, diversified and better-informed coverage of education issues (e.g. Senegal, Kenya and Nigeria).

The COMED regional workshops, by providing opportunities for journalists and communication officers from the same country to function as a team in preparing certain exercises and reports, and to acquire information about other country situations, seem to have helped to build better mutual appreciation, more collegial and less threatening relationships among them, which hopefully will translate into increased collaboration in communication for education back in their home environment.”

COMED activities have been funded by ADEA, and by the World Bank through the Norwegian Trust Fund for Education in Africa.

In 2001, the program is also consolidating cooperation among African journalists and communication officers in the education sector through the initiation of an electronic network, and an Internet-based discussion forum. The next phase of the capacity development program involves national workshops for diffusing the COMED training curriculum and for strengthening partnerships and networks at the national level. About six of these are to be held in 2001, with workshops for about 20 countries planned for 2002, resources permitting.
Tanzania: Ma-Ma, a video magazine and television series for environment education

"Mazingira yangu; mazingira yetu" [ma-ma]’ is “my environment; our environment”

With the advent of television in Tanzania and the proliferation of video outlets around the country, together with the timely revision of the educational system, an environmental television series which addresses essential environmental concerns and challenges to a Swahili speaking audience, can be a very powerful tool for change through awareness building.

Two 30 minute programs will be produced and aired each month on national television and re-edited for distribution to village video outlets and as audio visual material for educational use in schools. The initial run of the series is 12 months.

The goal of this television series is to educate, inform and entertain the Tanzanian public in issues of real environmental significance, and to stimulate action on all levels. It is to drive for action through awareness. The strategy is to take the patient on-going interactive approach. First a problem is highlighted, revealing it to the viewer on a cognitive level, imbuing it with emotional punch by the correct use of the audio and video elements, returning at a later date to show the results once the problem is tackled successfully, and in due course making a significant change in the attitude of the viewer. The television series lays the cornerstone for the development of a general comprehensive environmental informational and educational campaign. The production of an environmentally concerned series has never been attempted in Tanzania, by a Tanzanian company, in Kiswahili for the Tanzanian audience.

Over the past two years, three privately owned television stations have been inaugurated in Tanzania. They are broadcasting to most of the urban centers in the country and the viewing public is escalating rapidly. Most small villages have video viewing parlors or a video screen at the local church or town-halls of which there are hundreds all over the country. Hundreds of thousands of Tanzanians have access to video viewing whether at home, in a social hall, at the church, in school, on buses or at a video club. A network of over 250 outlets will be developed for monthly distribution of the environment education series.

Both during research process and through the two way Network, viewers will be encouraged to participate in the program identifying issues of local importance and by giving feedback on items already broadcast. This is an

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12. Information provided by M. Beatrix Mugishagwe of Abantu Television, Dar-es-Salaam, series producer.
attempt to establish an active relationship between series’ hosts and the public. This way the subjects researched and included in the line up will reflect the burning issues of our audience; and changes can be made to the style of presentation if the content is not entirely clear and entertaining. This will also be useful in the continual monitoring and evaluation of the series.

**South Africa: Communication policy support for education**

In the context of its programs of political and administrative transformations to support post-apartheid change, the government found it necessary to re-examine its public information machinery, especially in the face of the constitutional requirement that all citizens had a right to information. Consequently, a government communication and information system that would also reach the grassroots was designed, on the recommendations of a Task Force set up by the Office of the Deputy President. Key questions related to strategies for communicating development, especially in the rural areas, improving the competence of government communications, promoting media diversity, and government-media relations. Pursuant to a Cabinet decision, Ministries were required to restructure their Ministerial/Departmental communications, including the appointment of a Head of Communications of senior rank, preferably at Chief Director level. Departments participate in the system-wide communication strategy through the Communication Secretariat in the President’s Office which coordinates the strategy and chairs the meeting of all Heads of Communications Units. The Head of Communication works closely with, and advises both the Minister and the Director-General, and is in charge of all communication, with specific responsibility for strategy development, supervision of media liaison, coordination of speech-writing, planning and supervision of public opinion and related research, including media monitoring; supervision of publications, advertising and liaison with provinces; and is a member of the departmental management meeting. An element of the government communication strategy is emphasis on the importance and use of information technology.

**African news-media for education**

The African media are gradually recognizing that education is a major source of interesting news that can sell newspapers. An increasing number of newspapers are paying special attention to education stories, and giving

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14. Some of this information was contributed in Country Reports by participants attending the COMED training workshop for Southern and Eastern Africa, in Harare, Zimbabwe, in February 2000.
them prominence in headlines. Grouped together periodically, education news and features are now packaged into special sections, supplements or pullouts. This is accompanied with specialized advertising by providers of educational services and materials: booksellers, publishers, manufacturers and retailers of science equipment etc. Indeed media managers are beginning to understand that stories about education can be good business!

In Uganda, New Vision, a daily newspaper, provides perhaps a good case study. New Vision has a policy on education that allows the establishment of an education desk. The education desk produces a weekly four-page pullout published every Monday. Appropriately it has the catchy title, Education Vision, which highlights topical issues on education. There are columns by education specialists; there are opinions and letters and profiles on education matters. Besides that, New Vision also carries supplements on education issues e.g. when children or students are going back to school, it’s common to see a “back to school” supplement. Around graduation time, there is a special supplement on graduation, with articles on what opportunities graduates can expect in various fields. New Vision also carries educational news as a normal item in its daily. For example, when the results of the major primary school examinations were released, the paper carried a lead story.

In Kenya, all the five dailies in the country have educational pull-outs. There are weekly supplements devoted specifically to education. The Nation newspaper has a pullout called “Black Board” which appears every Monday. It is usually five pages, sometimes six pages, and carries news stories as well as commentaries on education. Experts from all over the country are invited to express their views, and there are often letters from lecturers, from parents and donors. The pull-out also carries book reviews. The education desk has a staff of two, the education editor and a reporter. They are in charge of the pullout and are responsible for every educational story, and of writing editorial commentaries on every major education story, if required.

This situation is virtually being repeated in several other countries. In Senegal, the major newspapers, Le Soleil, and Sud-Quotidien, and in Nigeria, the Comet, the Guardian, the Vanguard, as well as the News Agency of Nigeria, NAN, have developed special columns, pages, sections and dispatches on education matters, with specialized desks of editors, reporters and correspondents.

Coverage of education by the African electronic media includes regularly scheduled broadcasts on education topics on radio and TV. In addition there have been special programs and phone-in shows where heads of education departments, program managers, and even Ministers participate and respond to questions from the public. The Nigerian Television Authority, NTA, has a special Development Communication Unit, with studios and production equipment, as well as reporters and crew, covering education news on a regular basis.
Increasingly also, news and features on African education are appearing on
the Internet. This is not only because the major national newspapers men-
tioned earlier, now produce on-line versions, but also because of the activities
of specialized Africa-oriented news agencies with their own web-sites. Promi-
nent among these are the Pan African News Agency, PANA, headquartered
in Dakar; the Inter Press Service, an international third-world development-
oriented alternative news agency, whose African head offices are in Harare,
and the All-African News Network, based in the United States. All of these
organization publish hundreds of stories every week on African issues, and
their education rubric is a veritable goldmine of news and opinion about the
situation of education on the continent. The variability in the quality of the
dispatches, and the scarcity of news from several African countries, present
challenges for organizations such as COMED, charged with responsibility for
ensuring the improvement of media coverage of African education.

The respective web sites are: www.pana.com, www.ips.com, and
www.allafricanews.com

The profiles presented are summarized, in terms of their basic strategic
thrusts, in the following table:

<table>
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<th>Scaling up communication for education: towards national EFA campaigns</th>
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| As the next stage of its capacity development activities, COMED is organizing
national training workshops using its recently-finalized curriculum. One of
the modules of the curriculum is devoted to the design and development
of a national communication strategy to support education. The strategy
can be directed either towards the education sector as a whole, or towards
a specific education issue or theme or event, for example, girls’ education
or the national Education For All campaign. The modules are designed to
be used by different groups of education stakeholders, working together to
define the issues of relevance, and undertaking jointly, the strategy develop-
ment process for the production of a draft strategy. In general such strategies
are comprehensive, involving the eventual participation of different groups
in strategy implementation, and the use of different media and institutional
structures. The suggestions provided in the modules are as follows:

a) Creating a national communication strategy for EFA

Participants in consultations to define national communication strategies
for education should include:
Partners in Education, for example

- Ministries: Education, Planning, Agriculture, Industries, Youth, and Jus-
tice;
- Beneficiaries of Education: pupils, students in secondary, vocational and
apprenticeship institutions; parents, teachers, educational administrators, proprietors;

- Media and communication professionals: journalists, broadcasters, writers, film editors and producers;
- Civil Society: NGOs, associations, trade unions, opinion leaders, religious and denominational entities, national donors;
- Local and community groups;
- Educational technical service providers: research, teacher training and related institutions;
- Communication Technical services providers: communication, advertising, marketing companies which handle the design, execution and evaluation of communication strategies;
- Media support systems: providers of commercial (or otherwise) of space for diffusion, announcements, press releases and different message types;
- Others: organizations which have competence in communication research, training, materials production;
- Consultants (‘freelancers’) providing any of the above services.

b) The role and function of the media

National Media Strategy for the Coverage of Education

The mass media and other communication channels can make significant contribution to the development of education by disseminating information intended to promote awareness and understanding of education issues by the people. This will facilitate dialogue between the authorities and the public and the building of consensus on these issues which, in turn, will lead to popular support for national education objectives and programs.

This can be achieved through continuous, systematic and purposeful coverage of the education sector by the media. Ensuring such coverage requires the development and implementation of a national media strategy on the coverage of education.

The general objective of the strategy will be:
To improve the quantity and quality of information disseminated on education issues by the mass media.

Specific objectives:
1. To promote continuous and systematic coverage of education issues by the media;
2. To promote in-depth treatment of education issues by the media;
3. To strengthen collaboration between the media and the education sector;
4. To create a network on communication for education.
**Activities**

1. a. Media executives take a policy decision to make the education sector one of the areas of coverage;  
   b. Training to promote specialization in education journalism;  
   c. Creation of education desks in the editorial departments of media organizations;  
   d. Institution of regular columns and pages on education in the print media and programs on education in the electronic media;  
   e. Provision of resources to ensure effective and uninterrupted coverage of education;  
   f. Establishment of mechanisms to ensure easier and continuous access to information on education by journalists;

2. a. In-depth reporting of developments in the education sector;  
   b. Writing of feature and other in-depth stories on education issues;  
   c. Interviews with experts on education issues;  
   d. Production of documentaries and other special programs on education by the electronic media;  
   e. Production of discussion programs on education issues.  
   f. Creation of a databank on education information.

3. a. Establishment of a national committee on communication for education, with membership including the ministries of education, information/communication, national planning; media organizations; religious organizations; international partners; and local NGOs;  
   b. Creation of close relations and channels for permanent contact between the communication officers in the ministries of education and education journalists;  
   c. Regular press briefings by the ministries of education on major issues;  
   d. Press conferences on important developments in the education sector.

4. a. Organisation of a workshop to draw up a plan for the setting up of the network, set objectives for it, determine its membership, modus operandi and resources needed, and make arrangements for its launch.  
   b. Launch of the network.

**Expected results**

1. Continuous and systematic coverage of education issues by the media;  
2. In-depth treatment of education issues by the media  
3. Collaboration between the media and the education sector strengthened;  
4. Network on communication for education established.\(^\text{16}\)

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\(^{16}\) See also Annex 1.
From strategy to policy and back

While the design of a communication strategy for education could be undertaken as a ‘pragmatic’ exercise to support programs, it is often the case that communication is seen as a ‘once-in-a-while’ activity. Usually when there is a crisis, when the press reports an unfavorable story about education on the front page, when a community rises up in anger against education managers or policies, Ministers and permanent secretaries push their press officer to try to fight the fire. If they succeed in managing the situation and containing the damage, they breathe a sigh of relief and forget about communication until the next emergency.17

Some governments and private sector institutions have moved beyond this fire-fighting crisis-oriented communication mode. They have found that institutional communication is a management function that should be adequately analyzed and provided for in the structure and resource allocations of their organization. Therefore they have made communication a policy issue and set policy guidelines to regulate the structure and functions of communication in their government departments or enterprises. The government of South Africa has adopted this approach. As indicated earlier, there is in place in that country, a national communication policy, which applies to all government ministries and departments in a uniform manner. From this policy, individual institutions can derive their strategies and operational guidelines for implementing relevant communication programs and activities.

Two of the lessons learnt from the COMED Program so far, may be instructive here:

- Issues of access to information, freedom of expression, the general national policy on information and communication, and specific education sector guidelines on information and communication, influence communication for education. Ministries of Information/Communication are important partners in this regard, since they often determine and manage communication policy.

- Communication has costs: time, expertise, appropriate structures and technologies, including planning and organization. Therefore, communication requires resources: material, human, financial, technical. Many Ministries of Education do not seem to be making investments commensurate with the costs of communication for education, including providing sustainable special units to ensure effective communication with stakeholders and partners (Opubor, 2000).

17. The lack of a credible institutional framework for communication, poor and unspecified funding, indicating lukewarm support by high officials in many education ministries, was cited as cause for frustration and lack of sustained and successful communication effort by Communication Officers attending COMED training workshops.
In its work with information officers of ministries of education, the COMED Program is attempting to institutionalize a systemic and strategic approach to communication, and to encourage the creation of communication policies to support education and development in government departments and ministries (COMED Curriculum, Module 5, 2001). More and more, communication professionals feel that such a strategic approach to communication should be seen as a support system for the national development effort globally.30

It may be that in many countries, a national communication strategy for education will facilitate the creation of a national communication policy in support of development activities. It may also be that a national communication policy, where it exists, will provide the impetus for an education sector communication strategy. Whatever the inspiration or direction, the recognition of communication as a policy and strategic issue is crucial for the development of education in Africa in the decades ahead.
### Annex 1. Media strategy for education

#### Table 18. Media strategy for education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Expected results</th>
<th>Action by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To promote continuous and systematic coverage of education issues by the media</td>
<td>a. Policy decision to make education sector a priority area of coverage.</td>
<td>Immediately</td>
<td></td>
<td>Continuous and systematic coverage of education issues by the media</td>
<td>Media executives</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Training in education journalism;</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>Trainers, training material;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>c. Creation of education desks;</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>Editor, reporters, computers, etc</td>
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<td></td>
<td>d. Regular pages, columns, programs on education;</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>Editors, reporters, program producers, computers, etc</td>
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<td></td>
<td>e. Provision of resources for coverage;</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
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<td></td>
<td>f. Establishment of mechanisms for easier access to information</td>
<td>3 months</td>
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<td></td>
<td>b. Writing of features and in-depth stories;</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of education and media management</td>
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<td></td>
<td>c. Interviews with experts;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>d. Production of documentaries;</td>
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<td>e. Production of discussion programs;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>f. Creation of a databank on education information.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthen collaboration between the media and education sector</td>
<td>a. Establish national committee on communication for education.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Collaboration between the media and education sector strengthened</td>
<td>Ministry of education and media management</td>
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<td></td>
<td>b. Regular press briefings;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>c. Press conferences</td>
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<tr>
<td>To establish a network on communication for education</td>
<td>a. Organise workshop to plan the establishment of the network on communication for education.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Network on communication for education established</td>
<td>Ministry of Education.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>b. Launch the network</td>
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Table 19. Mali communication support for the new basic school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level: Ministry of Basic Education</th>
<th>Operational objectives</th>
<th>Media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 All publics</td>
<td>Sensitization on the nature and objectives of the New School</td>
<td>Television and Radio (drama sketches, discussion programs, talks, demonstrations) in national languages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 National Institutions (National Assembly, Government, Economic, Social and Cultural Council)</td>
<td>Sensitization on the nature and objectives of the New School, and seeking approval and support</td>
<td>Presentations by the Minister and senior officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Institutional partners (trade unions, Parents)</td>
<td>Sensitization on the nature and objectives of the New School, with special reference to their particular interests</td>
<td>Trade union publications, press kits and other feature articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Technical and financial partners</td>
<td>Information, building credibility, advocacy for cooperation</td>
<td>Technical documents, informal meetings, field visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Staff of the Ministry of Basic Education and associated Directorates and offices</td>
<td>Information, acceptance and participation, nature and objectives of the New School, and request to serve as information relays</td>
<td>Information meetings, workshops for senior officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Influentials, local political personalities, opinion leaders</td>
<td>Information, seeking support, acceptance of project, and serving as information relays</td>
<td>Contacts, public relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Teachers</td>
<td>Information, training on the New School</td>
<td>Lectures, training materials and documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Communities and local associations</td>
<td>Sensitization, information</td>
<td>Lectures based on concrete examples and cases, local press and radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Parents and future parents of school children</td>
<td>Sensitization, information</td>
<td>Local radio (drama sketches, interviews, radio plays, regional recording sessions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Teachers</td>
<td>Information, approval, training</td>
<td>Lectures, seminars, group work, training, internships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Parents and future parents of school children</td>
<td>Information, working methods, approval</td>
<td>Meetings, including video, illustrated brochures, local posters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Local partners or NGOs</td>
<td>Information, approval, cooperation</td>
<td>Direct contact, information meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Communities</td>
<td>Information, approval, contracts</td>
<td>Information meetings, videos, brochures, contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 Influentials, religious and cultural leaders</td>
<td>Sensitization, information, building credibility, seeking support</td>
<td>Information meetings, direct contacts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table provided by Dr Djeneba Guindo-Traore, Ministry of Education, Mali
‘Communication’ is a useful handle both conceptually and practically for approaching what the media and ministries do about education-and-development. We need to expand understanding of communication and its role in social development, especially in promoting collaboration among partners in education. This includes looking beyond mass media to interpersonal, group and traditional African channels of communication.

Communication can help build mutual trust and respect, by promoting dialogue, negotiation and building consensus for education policies and programs; but the context or environment of communication is key in determining these outcomes. Issues of access to information, freedom of expression, the general national policy on information and communication, and specific education sector guidelines on information and communication, influence communication for education. Ministries of Information/Communication are important partners in this regard, since they often determine and manage policy.

Communication has costs: time, expertise, appropriate structures and technologies, including planning and organization. Therefore, communication requires resources material, human, financial, technical. Many Ministries of Education do not seem to be making investment commensurate with the costs of communication for education, including sustainable special units to ensure effective communication with stakeholders and partners.

Communication Officers in Ministries of Education have a variety of job descriptions and responsibilities, some of which may conflict with their communication assignment. Largely untrained in communication, and fairly low in the organizational hierarchy, they often feel inadequate to their tasks as institutional image-makers and spokespersons. Specialized training and encouragement to join professional organizations (e.g. Public Relations Association), may enhance their job performance and career development.

Journalists are becoming more conscious of ethical considerations and professional standards in their reporting of education. While this might remove some of the criticism of sensational reporting about education, it may not necessarily eliminate the irritation of education managers, sensitive to close investigative scrutiny or sharp editorial comments. The collaboration of Journalists’ Unions and other professional associations of communicators would be useful in addressing ethical and professional issues, especially at the national level.

Mass media, though effective channels for public communication for development, are not always well organized to deal with communication for...
education. There is not much room for specialization in education reporting or programming. There are however some excellent examples of media focus on education, from Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, South Africa, Zimbabwe: weekly education columns, pages and pullouts, created by assignment editorial staff.

Countries where education reporters and correspondents are organized in a professional group or network tend also to have more structured and less conflictual relationships with communication officers and education news sources, leading to seemingly more continuous, diversified and better-informed coverage of education issues, (e.g. Senegal, Kenya and Nigeria).

The COMED regional workshops, by providing opportunities for journalists and communication officers from the same country to function as a team in preparing certain exercises and reports, and to acquire information about other country situations, seem to have helped to build better mutual appreciation, more collegial and less threatening relationships among them, which hopefully will translate into increased collaboration in communication for education back in their home environment. Participation in the preparation of the workshop publication, Educom News, also seems to have had the same effect on the participants as a whole.

Models from the business sector, (advertising, public relations and communication agencies), can contribute to communication for education by emphasizing strategic and results-oriented institutional communication by Ministries of Education. They can also demonstrate to media managers the vast potential of education as a source of revenue through creating special products which appeal to the education sector and its widespread constituencies, including parents, students, publishers, equipment producers and booksellers. Professional communications organizations need to be included in communication for education efforts.

Many sources of education information are largely untapped because unknown. What is known is generally regarded as inaccessible or uninteresting. Research institutions, their activities and data-bases in education need to become better promoted among journalists and other communicators. Training in the use of educational statistics and other data-related experiences for reporters and correspondents would be necessary, as is the creation of user-friendly Education Management Information Systems (EMIS).

Exposure, through the COMED regional workshops, to information and communication technologies, especially access to the Internet, and its use as a research tool, provides much-appreciated opportunities for professional enhancement for both communication officers and journalists. This should be reinforced and sustained. It will also strengthen the proposed regional network of communication officers and journalists in support of education.
In preparing national workshops, the participation of broadcasters, from national and community radio, should be specifically planned, in view of their acknowledged influence on the public’s information level and attitudes, especially in rural and semi-urban communities.

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Alfonso Gumucio Dagron, op cit;


Kone Hugues and Sy Jacques Habib (eds), 1995 esp pp167-180 La communication pour le développement durable en Afrique, PUCI, Abidjan.


Cohen, S. 2000, p.108. This is also the conclusion of the Guinea profile presented in this paper.

Kone, Hugues, 2001. COMED tool kit slides.


Kone Hugues and Sy Jacques Habib, 1995. La communication pour le développement durable en Afrique, PUCI.
In this paper we examine the meaning, relevance and development of network arrangements for education policy development in Africa. Interest in networks has been on the increase in recent years. Recent experience in several areas of development cooperation has demonstrated the effectiveness of networks in moving agendas forward. Our concern for taking this systematic look at networks their utility, their comparative advantages, how they are structured, and how they behave is somewhat introspective. After all, ADEA is a network, some of its working groups are networks, themselves, and it works with other networks. Also, much of this interest in networks is derived from the perception that they provide a significant value added that the more traditional organizational structures. All the more reason to take a close, analytical look at how they function, in general, and how they are working for the development of education in Africa, in particular.

The vision, emergence, persistence and utility of networks

Networks are all the rage these days. They are viewed, inter alia, as the basic social structure of the information age (Castells 1996), as the future of the United Nations system (Reinicke & Deng 2000), as a most effective way of optimizing resources and strengthening capacities (Bernard 1996), and as a viable structure for developing education policy research in developing countries (McGinn 1996). Indeed, networks are increasingly seen as particularly effective forms of social organization in this age characterized by globalization, massive information flows and easier access to information, the rise of “civil society”, reformed structures of governance, flattened hierarchies, decentralization, and the democratization of technologies for communication and information.

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1 Also, see the web site of the Global Public Policy Research Group at http://www.gppresearch.org/.
2 Gladwell (1999) even goes so far as to attempt a demonstration of how “networkers rule the world”. Writing about the North American context, he concludes: “Poverty is not deprivation. It is isolation.” Börzel (1998:253) points out that “microbiologists describe cells as information networks, ecologists conceptualize the living environment as network systems, computer scientists develop neuronal networks with self-organizing and self-learning capacities.”
This said, networks are nothing new. They have always been with us in a variety of forms, such as: primary family networks that live and work and protect themselves, together, over generations; business/industrial networks of producers, suppliers, distributors and financiers that ensure and promote, together, their prosperity; scientists working in the same or overlapping fields who meet and communicate on a regular basis in order promote their individual and collective endeavors. One observer refers to networking as “a fancy word for the construction and use of relatively stable patterns of communication” (McGinn 1996b:23). Another observer points out that “networking is ubiquitous, networks are not” (Prewitt 1998).

**Network structures and the “globalized” world**

Much of the recent interest in networks has been expressed by social scientists concerned with understanding the rise and development of globalization, the flows and communication of information, and the role of information communication technologies (ICT) in all of this. A landmark analysis of this «new order» is the three-volume study of Manuel Castells (1996) on the economy, society and culture of the information age. The first volume of this study is devoted to networks, which the author claims “are the fundamental stuff of which new organizations are and will be made. And they are able to form and expand all over the main streets and back alleys of the global economy because of their reliance on the information power provided by the new technological paradigm.” (Castells, 1996, p.168).

Although networks have «existed in other times and spaces», Castells argues that «the new information technology paradigm provides the material basis for its pervasive expansion throughout the entire social structure.» The resulting historical trend is that “dominant functions and processes in the information age are increasingly organized around networks.” (Castells, 1996, p. 469).

Castells is mainly concerned with the evolution of business and industrial organizations, enterprises and firms. However, his analysis is relevant to networks beyond the spheres of economics and industry. He defines a network as “a set of interconnected nodes.” His analysis is founded on an “information technology paradigm”, characterized by five features. First, information is the raw material on which the technologies act. Secondly, “because information is an integral part of all human activity, all processes of our individual and collective existence are directly shaped (although certainly not determined) by the new technological medium.” Thirdly, “the morphol-

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ogy of the network seems to be well adapted to the increasing complexity of interaction to unpredictable patterns of development arising from the creative power of such interaction.” This implies that a “networking logic is needed to structure the unstructured while preserving flexibility, since the unstructured is the driving force of innovation in human activity.” Flexibility is a related feature of this paradigm. “Not only processes are reversible, but organizations and institutions can be modified, and even fundamentally altered, by rearranging their components.” Convergence is the fifth feature of this paradigm. (Castells, 1996, pp. 61-62).

What emerges from all of this is a new organizational form Castells calls the “network enterprise”. It is the result of “the interaction between organizational crisis and change and new information technologies” in the “informational/global economy”. He defines this network enterprise as

“that specific form of enterprise whose system of means is constituted by the intersection of segments of autonomous systems of goals. Thus, the components of the network are both autonomous and dependent vis-à-vis the network, and may be a part of other networks, and therefore of other systems of means aimed at other goals. The performance of a given network will then depend on two fundamental attributes of the network: its connectedness, that is its structural ability to facilitate noise-free communication between its components; its consistency, that is the extent to which there is sharing of interests between the network’s goals and the goals of its components.” (Castells, 1996, p. 171).

Networks, individuals, trust and the formation of social capital

Theoretical explorations of networks focus largely on small groups (such as friendships, family, etc.) and policy networks. James Coleman (1988) explored how small group networks develop trust among its participants by promoting obligations and expectations, information-flow capabilities and social norms with mutually understood sanctions. This trust builds social capital, an asset for all participants, collectively. Friendship networks are seen as having an impact on the “diffusion of influence and information, mobility opportunity and community organization” (Granovetter 1973:1360). The development of such networks are seen as contributing to greater levels of trust among participants and, thereby, contributing to the development of their social capital. Through heightened trust among members of a group, or of a polity, social capital contributes to development by lowering transaction costs (Fukuyama 1995:27-28), be it as one looks for a job, searches and exchanges information, or develops reliable business relationships. Indeed,

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4. For a broad overview of the subject, see Dasgupta & Serageldin (2000). Putnam’s (1993) work on the role of social capital in the development of Italy remains the classic reference.
the old intuition that “what you know depends on who you know and how you are positioned” appears to be valid, especially for advocacy activities (Carpenter, Esterling, et al. 1998: 417-418).

Social capital is a theoretical construct that is most appealing these days. With some empirical evidence this theory focuses on the central role of communities of people colleagues and collaborators and producers and clients and partners and neighbors or all sorts working together over sustained periods of time. Community members learn to know one another and, thereby, develop trust between them. Such trust motivates people to work together in a spirit of collegiality and frank and direct exchanges, minimally encumbered by formalities and other protective mechanisms. By reducing transaction costs, such trust can have powerful economic benefits.

Research associations and other professional societies are a well-known example of networks that succeed in developing and maintaining a sense of community, shared scientific values and norms, and a degree of trust among their members. Participation or membership is voluntary, generally based on shared affinities focused on the need to communicate scientific approaches and findings. To a large extent, this communication is a foundation of the accelerated scientific progress we have seen in recent decades.

**Networks for international development cooperation**

The emergence of networks in international development cooperation appears to coincide with a growing existential crisis in the institutions of development cooperation. In the early 1990s, agnosticism began to invade the certainties and formulae of preceding decades of development cooperation. We began to realize that we did not know as much about development what it looks like, how it comes about as we thought we knew 10-20-30 years ago. We’re not even sure about our indicators. Is development recognized by GDP per capita or by the coefficients of the United Nations’ Human Development Index? Is Education For All about gross enrollment rates or primary school completion rates?

5. Community also seems to be powerful business asset in the computer world. Talking about «Linux», the free, open-source operating system, which is becoming a serious threat to Microsoft’s “Windows” monopoly, Steve Balmer, the Chief Executive Officer of Microsoft says, “Linux is not about free software, it is about community” (http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1104-959839.html). There are similarities here to Putnam’s (1993) explanation for the development of Northern Italy compared to the southern part of that country.

6. Well before then, networks for research had been promoted by groups such as the Research Review and Advisory Group (the precursor or the present NORRAG) and the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) established in 1971. Also, see McGinn (1996a).
Also in the early 1990s, a major, in-depth World Bank report (Wapenhans, et al. 1992) ascertained an alarming rate of non-performing projects. A major finding of this analysis was that beneficiary countries of World Bank loans/projects had little sense of “ownership” of the development project whose conception and elaboration was often determined by World Bank staff more concerned with the logic of their institution (and its “approval culture”, according to that report) than by that of the country (the “borrower”). This resulted in heightened concern for projects and policies that are “country-driven” and owned.

At about the same time, there was a realization that the problems related to lack of country ownership of externally financed projects was compounded by lack of coordination (if not rivalry) between development cooperation institutions (bilateral and multilateral agencies). All too often, each agency appeared to be pursuing its own agenda in a given country. In other words, in addition to the ownership deficit, there was a deficit of coordination between the developing countries’ external financing and technical partners. This led to considerable efforts aimed at improved “donor coordination”, often focused on developing common analyzes and understandings of the policy issues and alternatives.

In the middle-late 1990s, “civil society” entered into the development discourse, along with the private sector. This was associated with a sharp increase of democratic forms of governance throughout the developing world, more open means of communication, the emergence of NGOs in the North that focused on issues of international development, peace and justice, and the increasing importance of world and national markets. The World Bank and the United Nations made informal efforts to include civil society and the private sector in their work. However, according to Reinicke, Deng, et al. (2000), “the formal governance structures of intergovernmental institutions have not changed at all” (p. 23). In this context, they conclude that there is a “participatory gap that undermines the legitimacy of existing governance mechanisms: the state and the multilateral system” (p. 9).

7. Wapenhans was a vice-president of the World Bank. In an interview conducted on August 8, 1993 for the World Bank’s Oral History Program, he states, “There is a declining trend in project performance, highly concentrated in IDA countries and the Bank is contributing to it because of the presence of an approval culture. To remain the leading and preeminent institution that it is, it needs to reverse, and it can reverse to its earlier emphasis on performance. It should not resort to more bureaucracy, to a further invitation to promote compliance. It should not invite its staff, including its managers, to protect their rear. Such an emphasis would further foster risk aversion, not only of staff but also of managers. If not contained, it could retard development.” (See: http://web.worldbank.org/WEBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0,,pagePK:34991~theSitePK:29506~contentMDK:20042044,00.html.)

8. For example, see IWGE (1995); Sack (1995); & Magnen (1994). According to King (1996), improving communication among donors was one of the main reasons for establishing the Research Review and Advisory Group – one of the first networks for donor coordination.
The development discourse became characterized by agnosticism on how to attain development, concern for a lack of “beneficiary” or “client” ownership and a lack of “donor” coordination (not to mention the end of the Cold War that motivated many donor countries’ “investments” in development cooperation). We would not be the first to qualify this cocktail as a crisis in development cooperation.9 And, interestingly, this is a time (beginning in the late 1980s) when networks for development cooperation, often initiated to improve donor coordination, begin to develop.10

In 1988 a milestone document by the World Bank on education sub-Saharan Africa articulated the need for improved “donor coordination” in the education sector (World Bank 1988). One outcome of this document, and the processes that surrounded it, was the founding of “Donors for African Education” (DAE), established as a donors’ club designed to promote improved coordination between the agencies active in that group. Coordinating sector policies the agencies’ own, those they advocated and advised to their “client” countries was the focus of DAE. Founded in 1988, DAE became fully operational, with a quasi-autonomous status, in 1992; it then evolved from a donors’ club to full partnership between agencies and African Ministers of Education and changed its name to the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA). As it developed, it became increasingly clear to all concerned that it was operating as a network, incorporating several components its Steering Committee (composed of education ministers and agency representatives), autonomous working groups (focused on professional, technical issues) and a secretariat (the “network server”).

It turns out that similar exercises—networks focused on policy coordination were emerging in other sectors, such as water (the Global Water Partnership, established in 1992; and the World Commission on Dams, started in 1998), wearing apparel (the Apparel Industry Partnership, established in 1996), health (the Roll Back Malaria Initiative, established in 1998), development in Sahelian West Africa (the Club du Sahel, established in 1978), environment (the Global Environment Facility, founded in 1991), urban management (the Urban Management Program, initiated in 1986).11

The network response to the crisis in development cooperation may appear paradoxical. On the one hand, the crisis is, partly, the result of fragmentation of knowledge and its application (i.e., theory and practice), of policies and actions that are uncoordinated between the development cooperation

9. Sagasti & Alcalde (1999) provide a succinct overview of this situation.
10. Castells (1996) points out that “through the interaction between organizational crisis and change and new information technologies a new organization form has emerged as characteristic of the informational/global economy: the network enterprise.” (p. 171, his emphasis)
11. Reinicke, Deng, et al. (2000) provide a useful overview of these networks. They estimate that there are around 50-60 of such networks in existence.
agencies, and between them and their counterparts (mostly ministries) with and for whom they were working. On the other hand, the network response is one of organizational fragmentation. Sector and issue specific networks are sprouting up all over the institutional landscape, with life spans that may be open-ended or limited and membership that includes various combinations of the usual institutional actors (development agencies, ministries, governments, etc.), plus some new ones (NGOs). The terms of membership may be rather loose, and relatively unfettered, with easy entrance and low exit costs. Characteristic of this is the conclusion of one review of policy networks that “there is no one single policy network approach in public policy” (Thatcher 1998: 390).

Why this paradox? What is it that these loosely formed networks are doing that the older institutions, more formal organizations aren’t? What needs and demand are they responding to that have not been satisfied? This is where we need to switch gears and think about the processes of development cooperation. And this is where it becomes appropriate to delve into the role of trust and social capital.

Reinicke, Deng, et al. (2000) provide an answer to these questions that merits consideration.

“By initiating a transnational policy discourse, Global Public Policy networks respond to the participatory gap in international decision-making. Successful GPP networks facilitate social interaction among people and organizations that in many cases had almost exclusively been working against each other. To use Robert Putnam’s terminology, networks of “civic engagement” allow dilemmas of collective action to be resolved by fostering norms of generalized reciprocity and the emergence of trust, building what one might call global social capital. The notion of global social capital points to the possibility that GPP networks may, at least in the medium or long term, help in creating such trust across national boundaries. In so doing they would facilitate the formation of social capital, not only within societies and single sectors, but also across societies, which is critical for constituting a global public space” (p. 62).

Our working hypothesis is that these networks are cost-effective mechanisms for reducing the barriers between the various institutional actors, North (between development agencies, and between them and civil society players) and South (between the agencies and governments, between governments and nongovernmental actors, including researchers, and between governments of different countries). The transaction costs of developing shared understandings even if is to agree to disagree are lowered by this trust between individuals, some of whom are technical, others political, and others “bureaucrats”. They work together in a relatively focused setting, with shared ownership and common stakeholdership. They get to know what to expect of the others. They come to have some idea of the logics (institutional,
political, even epistemological) that motivate and drive their partners (i.e., the proverbial “other”). The cognitive and non-cognitive learning gained by individuals, and the knowledge that comes from it, can then be factored back into their respective institution’s behavior and specific in-house logic(s). If this is the case, then networks may well be better equipped to promote cooperation, ownership, coordination, and partnership than stand-alone institutions working hard, and with great human, financial and technical resources, to promote their institutional agendas. How else to understand the emergence and growth of Global Public Policy Networks and the role some claim they will play in the in the processes of global governance?

**Identifying characteristics and operational trends of global policy networks**

Given the apparent fragmentation of network structures and the lack of a single approach, one might wonder if there is sufficient room for a structured discussion of definitions, identifying characteristics, operational modalities and the like. Paradoxically (again), this is where the literature on the subject of is at its richest, with definitions and identifying characteristics aplenty. Out of respect for this paradox, therefore, we focus on the characteristics of global public policy networks for development and present a brief overview of how they are seen by several observers. This approach seems more appropriate than attempting a well-structured presentation of what networks are and how they operate.

The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) has long been involved in the promotion of networks for research and international development. Between 1985-1995 it allocated approximately 30% of its budget to networks, especially those focused on scientific research and technological adaptation. In 1996 its evaluation unit undertook a comprehensive review of the (mostly research) networks with which it had been involved (Bernard 1996). Here, in outline form, is an overview of their findings.

12. The 1997 ADEA Biennale, whose theme was «Partnerships for Capacity Building and Quality Improvements in Education», explored the importance of this in the development of fruitful partnerships for development. See Association for the Development of Education in Africa (1999) & the ADEA Newsletter of October-December 1997 (9:4).
13. “Paradoxes are a welcome antidote to theories which explain everything all too neatly.” (Granovetter 1973:1378).
14. This literature, however, is mostly concerned with national policy networks in developed countries, mainly in Europe and the United States. See, for example, the October 1998 the special issue of the Journal of Theoretical Politics (10:4) devoted to the modeling of policy networks, and the Summer 1998 issue of Public Administration (76) that focuses on networks in public administration.
15. Börzel (1998: 254) provides a “lowest common denominator definition” of policy networks “as a set of relatively stable relationships which are of non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests acknowledging that co-operation is the best way to achieve common goals.” She also points out that there is “a ‘Babylonian’ variety of different understandings and applications of the policy network concept.”

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• Defining characteristics. Networks are social arrangements, are forums for social exchange and open opportunities (i.e., opportunistic in the positive sense); they strengthen and sustain capacities and enable creativity and risk-taking.16

• Structures and functions. Member cooperation is essential; leadership is important for coordination; the network produces personal and professional satisfaction of the members; there may be different levels of membership; networks are effective when they allow, accommodate and facilitate; most networks have a well-defined central coordinating mechanism to maintain communication flow; a capacity for learning is most crucial.

• Conditions of success. Flexible internal management that creates solidarity around a shared purpose and ownership; diversity of membership is needed for effective learning; clear goals and limited focus are needed to create shared agreement; ability to adapt over time to changing circumstances, facilitated by “charismatic leadership, counter-balanced by a proactive and engaged membership, a minimal hierarchy and a limited and flexible bureaucracy, [along with] a need for tolerance, for ambiguity and variability in planning and execution, to suit different members and changing contexts; letting members negotiate their own conditions across their institutional and individual divides.” (p. 27; author’s emphasis).

• Risks and balances. Networks are difficult to monitor; their costs in money, time and energy are high, and take several years to produce fruit; they risk being too broadly focused; these risks can be mitigated by effective balances between levels, between product and process, between the micro and the macro levels, and between the needs of the different members.

• Comparative advantage lies in the mutability of networks, their “minimal structures, voluntary membership and flexible agenda” (p. 40).

An extensive review of capacity building networks in Africa leads (English 1995) to identify a number of lessons applicable for such networks. They include the following: it is easiest to do it through an existing regional institution, providing that it is sound; administrative structures can be a special problem; it is time-consuming, all the more if its to be participatory and with many participants; low-cost or loose networks are unlikely to have much capacity-building impact; it is better to start small; thematic focus is preferable; it is necessary to strike a balance between demand-driven, participatory planning and leadership; external support is important; development agency resources should be pooled; it is necessary to distinguish between personal capacity-building and institution building; and it all takes time.

16. The history of ADEA’s “Prospective, stocktaking” exercise that provided the theme and the content for ADEA’s 1999 Biennale is an excellent example of this. See Association for the Development of Education in Africa 2001, & the ADEA Newsletter of October-December 1999 (11:4). Methodologically, organizationally and, even, financially the approach to developing the content for that meeting involved some risk. It is difficult to imagine such risks undertaken by the more traditionally established (and more traditionally accountable) organizations.
McGinn (1996b) sees networks between researchers and policy makers as being nonhierarchic organizations. The problem, according to him, is how to generate sufficient internal consensus to be able to influence the environment. As he points out, “only if networking approaches what might be called intimate conversation can we begin to develop a shared understanding of the problems that need to be addressed, and the ways to address them” (p.28).

Focusing specifically on ADEA, along with references to other networks, Sack (1998) sees «structured informality» as an effective modus operandi. Several factors promote this: the ease and imperative of quick, lateral communications, especially among professionals and, increasingly, among policy makers; globalization and the democratization of communications; the perceived unresponsiveness of many of the more established institutions; flexibility in terms of entry, exit, and operations. This structured informality lowers transaction costs thanks to a sense of common commitment to shared objectives, ease of entry and departure, a low level of administrative procedures, and effectiveness defined in terms of both process and product. One implication of this is that the personalities of the individual actors play a determining role.

The most comprehensive review of networks for international development is that of Reinicke, Deng, et al. (2000). This study focuses on Global Public Policy Networks (GPPN), which are closer to our concerns than research networks. They see the GPPN as

“a means of responding to the uncertain and rapidly changing conditions of our relentlessly liberalizing and technologizing global environment. They address problems that defy disaggregation and parcelization among technocrats within a territorial hierarchy. Yet, like the global challenges they seek to address, the solutions they offer both reflect and embody the underlying forces of technological change and integration.” (p. 3).

According to Reinicke, Deng, et al. (2000), these GPPNs have six functions: (i) establishing a global policy agenda; (ii) facilitating processes for negotiating and setting global standards; (iii) they help develop and disseminate knowledge; (iv) they help create and deepen markets; (v) they provide innovative mechanisms for implementing global agreements, and (vi) for creating inclusive processes that build trust and social capital in the global public space (p. 27). They find that GPPNs are “best understood in terms of a four-stage policy cycle” of agenda-setting, negotiation, implementation and policy reformulation and institutional learning (p. 28). They then find that

“successful advocacy networks make strategic use of the media and influential individuals, articulate clear goals (often through a normative lens), and frame issues so as to have maximum impact. They create a transnational public discourse around policy issues that require a global approach.” (p. 35)
“Crucial management issues” for GPPNs are seen as:
“getting the network off the ground through leadership and the creation of a common vision; balancing adequate consultation and goal delivery; securing sustainable funding; maintaining the ‘structure’ in structural informality; finding allies outside one’s sector; and tackling the dual challenge of inclusion (North-South and local-global).” (p. 65)

What education policy networks in Africa are doing

This section focuses on seven African networks working in education. Four of these networks are linked with ADEA, itself a network. These networks were studied closely by the authors of this paper who undertook extensive enquiry into their operations (Mafela 2001; Niane 2002). This was done by visits to the networks’ secretariats and extensive interviews. Selection of the networks was based on perceived reputation, and a concern for geographical balance.

Contextual factors

The environment in which education policy networks in Africa are operating is necessary. Although essential, this is not at the center of our analysis, which focuses on the theory and practice of networks. The context should be seen in institutional, social, cultural, political, economic and educational terms and characterized by the following points.
• The relative lack of economic growth, political instability, endemic poverty, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic are difficult challenges that the education system must face.
• The relatively low level of access for girls and rural children in most countries must be overcome.
• Good governance and democratic institutions are gaining ground, along with increasing decentralization in the supply of educational services.
• NGOs and other aspects of civil society are gaining legitimacy, along with alternative development approaches.
• The new technologies of information and communication are increasingly present.
• Priorities tend to shift, especially under the influence of new priorities of the external development partners. This is the “fad” syndrome and is related to the syndrome of the pilot project; characterized by initiatives that evaporate once the external support has moved elsewhere (Maclure 1997:10). Although much appreciated, this support can also hamper the autonomy of national structures and actors.
• Research conducted nationally is insufficient to cover all the knowledge needs of African education systems. In particular, there is insufficient
research in the areas of financing and management. Furthermore, many of the studies that are done are poorly disseminated (Maclure 1997).

**ADEA, a network of networks**

ADEA, itself, is part of the context in which several of the networks discussed below are operating. As the evaluation of the ADEA Working Groups (Damiba & Prouty 2000) points out, ADEA’s transparency, the strong degree of commitment of its members/partners, openness and trust contribute to the workings and overall coherence between its constituent parts, some of which are networks themselves.17

*Figure 7* attempts a graphic presentation of ADEA’s structure. A quick look at this figure may give the impression of chaos. Actually, there is method to the appearance of madness in *Figure 7*. What provides the order is the commitment of all participants, their tolerance for ambiguity, their ability and their willingness to participate in a direct, professional, and collegial manner. The Steering Committee is the core of the network, its very essence. It is composed of education ministers and agency representatives; the agencies that voluntarily make a basic, statutory contribution to the Association in order to participate in the Steering Committee. At the time of the Arusha Biennial (October 2001), there were ten ministers representing sub-regions on a rotating basis, and twenty agencies. The Steering Committee sets ADEA policies and programs; its deliberations focus largely on matters of substance. It meets twice a year and, surprisingly, politics do not seem to be present. Decisions are reached by consensus; in ten years, there has never been recourse to a vote in order to come to a decision.

The Working Groups, networks themselves, (ten at the time of the Arusha meeting) focus on matters of professional and policy concern, such as female participation, statistics, education financing, books and learning materials, non-formal education, etc. They are sponsored by a variety of institutions, development agencies and, increasingly, African institutions. They work with their respective communities of professionals and practitioners in ministries, agencies and elsewhere. Increasingly, the WGs are collaborating among themselves. The ADEA Steering Committee, working through the secretariat, provides initial approval of the WGs, and then approves their annual programs and budgets.

The Biennial meetings gather about 250 senior policy makers and researchers from Africa and the North. Most African education ministers attend. Each Biennial focuses on a theme that is selected by the Steering Committee. The

17. See http://www.adeanet.org/ for more information.
meetings are all about substance; they are highly interactive and manage to avoid the formalities that characterize many such meeting.

The Secretariat is the network server and facilitator with a small permanent staff of five. It is housed within the International Institute for Educational Planning, its host institution, which provides its juridical and physical roof. It prepares Steering Committee meetings, the Biennial meetings; it produces the ADEA Newsletter, manages ADEA’s finances (but formal accounting is done by the IIEP); it organizes special tasks, such as that concerned with communication and education; and it produces databases on ADEA activities, external assistance to Africa, and statistics, and members of the ADEA community (over 4500).

Although very real, with activities, a budget, meetings, outputs, publications, etc., there is “something virtual” about ADEA. In the most formal, legalistic of terms, it does not exist! The host institution assures formal accounting, accountability and responsibility. Nonetheless or, perhaps, because of this ADEA is quite dynamic. The “structured informality” that prevails seems to work, perhaps to the surprise of many of its participants. One more paradox to ponder!

**Figure 7. ADEA’s structure**

ADEA’s Primary Constituency

Ministers of Education

Development Agencies

Steering Committee

Biennial meetings of the ADEA community:
±250 participants: education ministers, senior agency staff; ADEA WGs; professionals. Informal atmosphere; Theme selected by Steering Committee

Secondary constituency: Individual professionals in ministries, agencies, universities, etc; professional associations, education practitioners in schools, ministries, etc; NGOs; civil society organizations such as teacher unions, parent-teachers associations, media.
**Education statistics: “National Education Statistical Information Systems” (NESIS)**

The National Education Statistical Information Systems is a program initiated by the ADEA Working Group (WG) on Education Statistics. This program was conceived in 1991 as a project to develop training materials for education statisticians in Africa. Since then, it has become a multi-donor, Africa-wide capacity building program that has succeeded in developing a professional community of education statisticians across the continent. The role of this program is to bring together institutions, agencies and experts in joint ventures and networks as agents of change in order to develop the capacities of the professional staff of statistics sections of education ministries. 

Although this program is one activity, in order to ensure maximum effectiveness and coverage, it has two nodes one in Harare and one in Dakar. Each node works with countries within the broad frame of its respective sub-region; each node is housed at a UNESCO office and staffed by 1-2 professionals and 1-2 support staff. The research conducted for this paper focused on the Dakar node that works actively with nine countries. This node has a staff of three people who work in a non-hierarchical manner.

The NESIS network has three functions: (i) training; (ii) providing up-to-date information to national experts on technical and methodological matters of concern to education statistics; and (iii) mobilization of national teams around well defined activities, including provision of technical assistance between experts of participating countries.

NESIS has a five-pronged approach for the mobilization of its members that is based on the commitment of its staff and extensive use of email and its web site:

- Developing country involvement through a diagnostic survey of countries’ systems education statistics in order to identify capacity gaps.
- Capacity development through an approach that uses capacities in one country to help develop those in another. This way, existing capacities in a given country are rewarded and recognized.
- An integrated approach using technical training modules for data collection and analysis.
- Interactive management for the validation of the modules and other technical tools.
- Dissemination and cooperation with other ADEA working groups and with journalists.

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Figure 8 shows the linkages NESIS has developed in order to ensure its technical and financial cooperation with a variety of partners.

This high degree of interaction between the stakeholders, especially the strategy of capacity development based on the transfer to technical knowledge and competence from within, augers well for the sustainability of this network. This is accomplished through the use of adaptable approaches, building on the diversity of experiences of the participants. Organizing meetings to fit the time constraints of the members, however, remains a problem.

**Educational research: the Education Research Network for West and Central Africa (ERNWACA)**

This network was founded in 1989 and is presently composed of researchers and policy makers from twelve West African countries. It aims at promoting African capacities for education policy research. For this, it has a five point strategy of (i) strengthening national and regional capacities for research and policy assessment, (ii) improving the quality of research, (iii) facilitating exchanges and collaboration between researchers and policy makers, (iv) dissemination of research to promote dialogue on education issues, and (v) improve the image of research in Africa.\(^{19}\)

ERNWACA is organized around its national chapters, with a small coordinating unit (composed of a coordinator, an accountant and a driver), a

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19. See ERNWACA (2002) for an overview of research on issues of access, quality and community participation.
scientific committee of seven members, and a steering committee of nine members, including two education ministers. Each chapter is housed in a host institution (e.g., university education faculty, pedagogical institute) and is relatively autonomous. Membership is composed of education researchers and policy makers from institutes, universities, government service, and international development cooperation agencies. The latter provide almost all of the financing. Based on available data, there are at least 200 members in the eight Francophone countries; information for the four Anglophone countries was not available. The current coordinator is using organizational methods of borrowed from the private sector, where she had worked previously. Although most of the chapter coordinators assumed their positions in the past 294 years, they have been members for an average of nine years. Figure 9 provides a view of the structure and linkages of ERNWACA.

**Figure 9. ERNWACA’s network of partners**

At present, there is a contradiction between the proactive stance of the regional coordination, which is seeking to bring new life to the network, on the
one hand, and the relative lethargy of the national chapters, which are not responding to opportunities for research or initiating dialogue with policymakers. Nor do they appear to benefit from their relationship with their host institutions. This may be related to the lack of physical meetings and the infrequency of virtual ones. This may partly explain the lack of clear objectives widely shared by the members. Another factor for the lack of dynamism might be that the education research in Africa that has the greatest currency is that produced in the North, often for and/or by agencies of development cooperation (Maclure 1997). Most of the exchanges between the regional coordinator and those for the national chapters focus on administrative and financial matters. In other words, there is a lack of interaction around matters of substance and ERNWACA’s capacity for initiative, agenda setting, policy advice and research is weak.

**Economic research and training: the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC)**

The principal objective of AERC is to strengthen local capacity for conducting inquiry into problems pertinent to the management of economies in sub-Saharan Africa. AERC creates capacity for economic policy analysis and economic management through programs to support graduate training and research. AERC views itself not as a network but as a consortium. AERC does, however, perform a networking function by bringing together cooperating universities, institutes, and researchers. Unlike other networks covered in this study, it has no national chapters to further its agenda.20

AERC’s mission has three parts: (i) to enhance capacity of locally based researchers in economics; (ii) to promote retention of such capacity; and (iii) to encourage application of economic research output to the policy context.

Membership in AERC is multi-tiered. On the first level, membership comprises individual researchers with at least a Masters or doctorate degree in economics. The second level of the network comprises universities that participate in its Collaborative Masters Program. The Consortium links individual and teams of researchers and academics at these universities who are involved in training and research coordination activities. Participating universities are placed into either Category A or Category B, depending on their level of participation. The membership encompasses a number of bilateral and multilateral agencies, some of which are its financiers as well.

The AERC secretariat in Nairobi operates under the leadership of a Board of Directors and an Executive Director. The board sets policy, provides support,

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20. See [www.aercafrica.org](http://www.aercafrica.org) for more information.
and approves the program of work and budget. AERC’s governing bodies include an Advisory Committee and an Academic Board. The Advisory Committee members are scientists drawn from professional academics, African scholars, policy makers, and international resource persons. They set the agenda for training and research activities and review the annual program of work before approval by the board. The Academic Board reviews applications for training programs and makes decisions related to admissions procedures and academic regulations.

AERC’s original mandate was confined largely to assisting scholars with costs of doctoral research-support for data collection and writing of theses. A training component was added to incorporate Masters and doctoral-level training. The expanded mandate encompasses both training and research programs.

The Training Program features the Anglophone Collaborative Masters Program (except Nigeria) that brings together a network of 20 universities in 15 countries. This collaboration rationalizes the use of limited teaching capacity, attains a critical mass of students, offers a relatively larger menu of electives and jointly enforces high standards for graduate training in economics. Similar initiatives in the francophone countries and in Nigeria originate from AERC studies and are based on the same concept. The universities jointly enforce standards with annual evaluation and assessment by external examiners, develop a common curriculum and teaching materials, and share a joint facility for teaching electives. The Academic Board, with members drawn from the participating universities, is responsible for the substance of the program. Seven of these universities have adequate capacity to offer core courses that meet jointly determined and enforced standards. The rest of the participating universities send their students to these universities.

The Research Program networks individual researchers in the region, supported by resource persons doing research on selected themes designated by AERC’s Advisory Committee. This alleviates professional isolation, encourages exchange of experiences and creates peer pressure that enhances the quality of research. Grants are made through the Research program for research on four themes: poverty, income distribution, and labor market issues; trade, regional integration, and sector policies; macro-economic policy, stabilization and growth; finance, resource mobilization and investment.

AERC uses a range of measures to ensure that its research and training is relevant to policy interests in Africa. Researchers prepare executive summaries that are easily digested. The executive summaries are based on outputs from the research program and are targeted at policymakers in an effort to encourage them to use and incorporate research output into policy and to enhance AERC’s policy relevance. The organization also mounts user-iden-
tified courses for government departments and central banks. It involves senior policymakers in AERC workshops; these individuals contribute to healthy debates on issues critical to the formulation and implementation of sound economic policies. Their involvement has been underscored by a recent evaluation as being critical for closer alignment of theory and practice (Horton 1999 #211) 32).

AERC has evidence that its products are used by policy makers. Some of the professionals, who are members of the network by virtue of their role as researchers, have already joined the ranks of the policy makers and policy analysts. Appearance of publications of AERC research output in high quality journals is another indicator of the quality of the program. AERC is also used as a sounding board for major policy considerations by agencies, such as the World Bank.

The cost-effectiveness of AERC is a strong feature that helps justify its existence and strengthen its accountability to donors and consumers of its products, in both the public and private sectors. Regular use of performance indicators is intended to improve efficiency and effectiveness of the AERC programs. Several evaluations have noted the cost-effectiveness of the Consortium's operations in relation to its functions, particularly the training program. It has been shown, for example, that the cost of training an economist in North America and Europe is equivalent to training three students through AERC.

Twelve of the 15 members of the Board of Directors are funders of AERC. The Consortium accounts to its financiers through production of annual reports, and five-year strategic plans. The accountability keeps the Consortium on its toes, as continued funding is dependent upon good research output. This practice also safeguards the interest of the financiers.

The facilities and equipment at the disposal of AERC are important resources, as they facilitate the operation of its various programs, particularly its outreach program. Ideas contributed by policy makers involved in the Senior Policy Seminars are also considered an important resource, as they are integrated into the policy-oriented research agenda.

The Consortium’s information dissemination strategy is aimed at enhancing the use of economic research for sound economic management on the continent. Thus, dissemination forms a crucial aspect of its overall function and helps to diffuse policy-related research output to members at the supra-national level. AERC disseminates the various types of information it generates in a number of ways.

- Policy Forum enhances dissemination of policy-related research output.
- The AERC Newsletter contains useful information on its activities.
• Publications on specially commissioned papers are also put on the organization’s website, which has recently been upgraded with the purchase of a new server.
• Executive summaries disseminate information widely in a useable format.
• Policy seminars for policy makers help bring researchers together with policy makers.
• A database of economic researchers and potential users is being built; it will enhance AERC networking and information dissemination efforts.

**Book publishing: Africa Publishers’ Network (APNET)**

APNET was set up in 1992 with the mandate to strengthen African publishing through building the capacity of indigenous African publishers to produce quality books. APNET’s training program has formed the main thrust of the network’s mission. The other thrust is the creation of National Publishing Associations (NPAs) to facilitate networking on issues of common concern. Through close partnership with ADEA’s Working Group on Books and Learning Materials (WGBLM), APNET focuses on issues that affect publishers and their commercial publishing interests.²¹

The APNET secretariat is the hub of the network, and the NPAs in each country are its principal members. The secretariat has a staff of six and acts as a clearinghouse for information generated from commissioned studies and from deliberations with the WGBLM, which is then relayed to the NPAs. The network brings members together for an annual General Council. At these meetings, NPAs receive guidance and advice on their responsibilities to APNET, and they are asked to account for their activities. APNET is also increasingly requiring NPAs to take more responsibility for driving the agenda at the local level and appropriate accountability to the hub as a basis for continued assistance.

The main activities of APNET are carried out through the African Publishing Institute, participation in book fairs, and dissemination of information through regular and occasional publications. The African Publishing Institute was set up following a study that recommended that APNET establish an itinerant “institute,” which could help respond to problems identified in the publishing industry in Africa. These problems included a lack of shared knowledge of the book trade and publishing activities continent-wide. Another problem was the domination of the industry by multinational corporations, thereby excluding or marginalizing indigenous African organizations. As the

²¹ See http://www.africanpublishers.org/ for more information
executive secretary of APNET put it, “African publishers tended to work in their own little corners.”

The institute moves around according to need, offering training to publishers in marketing, book publications, commissioning, manuscript assessment, and printing. It helps individual publishers share titles, and it forges closer links between NPAs. The institute organizes regional workshops, which have generally succeeded in breaking down barriers that have kept publishers apart. It also offers national-level workshops to address issues identified by national chapters. The hub organizes, funds, and supplies personnel to run the workshops.

NPAs generate knowledge about publishing within their countries, which they relay to the hub for integration into the network’s annual plans. In this way, the network communicates information from the members to the hub and to each other, as well information that originates at the hub.

Attendance and displays at book fairs are an important adjunct activity to APNET. The secretariat coordinates attendance at national fairs organized by the NPAs and at international book fairs in Africa and elsewhere. Participation by APNET members in fairs beyond Africa helps publishers showcase books and market publications. It also familiarizes them with problems and solutions that the industry faces in on other continents as well as in Africa.

APNET disseminates information about its activities to members and others through several channels.
- The APNET Newsletter (The African Publications Review) is published in French and English; it covers issues of concern to publishers and features serious and reflective articles and information on book fairs.
- Occasional publications emanate from the various programs with which APNET is involved and which are designed to empower African publishers, including Trade Promotions, the Research and Documentation Center.
- Publicity and promotions are usually done through radio, television, and print media, targeting popular journals to feature advertisements. Although the long-range plan is to disseminate information about APNET worldwide, publicity is presently confined largely to the African context.
- CD-ROM versions of publications are to be produced to enhance dissemination efforts and make them available on-line.

APNET’s achievements include: the training program; publications; assistance to Book Development Councils in lobbying governments to liberalize the book sector and remove taxes that work against the development of a viable trade across Africa; African regional organizations to introduce policies that recognize the needs of the publishing industry, and the World Bank to relax its cumbersome tender procedures in order to facilitate greater
participation of Africans in bank-funded textbook procurement programs. The network also provides textbook materials and facilitates development of a reading culture, which results in informed and empowered citizens, who are better able to participate in development.

APNET has developed various means of intra-network communication, but these are still insufficient. It convenes an annual General Council with members. The network also takes the opportunity at international book fairs to convene a meeting with country representatives of the NPAs to discuss strategies and activities. It also works with a number of other networks involved in the book sector, such as the Pan African Booksellers’ Association, the Caribbean Publishers’ Network (which it has helped to nurture) and the ADEA Working Group for Books and Learning Materials. Conferences and seminars are also used for discussions of problems afflicting the publishing industry.

Communication between the secretariat and the APNET Board of Directors and between the network and its members is often problematic, as board members are not always readily available to respond to issues. Many of them do not have frequent access to e-mail or even regular mail, due to electricity shortages and unreliable postal services. Communications with NPAs can also be difficult. APNET is moving to strengthen the capacity of NPAs by providing basic equipment, including computers.

The activities of the NPAs are regarded as critical to the attainment of the network goals. In this regard, APNET is encouraging NPAs to get registered and attain a legal status, which will strengthen their advocacy capability. Their enhanced status should also enable them to lobby for formulation and implementation of book policies and education policies that have a bearing on their overall objectives. About two-thirds of the NPAs are registered, and efforts are underway to encourage the remainder to regularize their status.

**Girls’ education:**  
*Forum of African Women Educationalists (FAWE)*

Created in 1992 within the context of the ADEA working group for female participation, FAWE’s overall goal is to increase access, retention, and participation of girls in school and to improve performance of girls at all levels of the education system.\(^{22}\) Though the mandate of FAWE has not changed over the years, it has incorporated new approaches in line with the goals and progress attained thus far. For example, FAWE’s original objective was to put the agenda of girls’ education on the table in policy discussions and formulations at ministries of education. The original strategy involved get-

ting African women ministers of education to do this, and FAWE used every available opportunity to push its agenda. This goal has largely been accomplished and there is general agreement that FAWE played a significant role in ensuring that girls’ education issues are on the agenda of all, in African and in the development agencies. Much remains to be done, however, in terms of resource provision and attitude change in some communities that still view the education of girls differently from that of boys.

Operationally, FAWE is consists of its regional secretariat, located in Nairobi with a staff of 23, and 33 national chapters. The regional secretariat is a Kenyan international NGO, and the national chapters are national NGOs, recognized as such within each country. FAWE is governed by its General Assembly and Executive Committee. The Executive Director heads the secretariat, which handles professional and administrative functions. The Executive Committee coordinates activities at both the national and the supranational level, and relies on its members to drive its agenda at national levels.

Given its objectives at the time of its founding, advocacy was FAWE’s major vector for developing support for girls’ education. This strategy determined the nature of FAWE’s membership, which consists of three levels:

- **Core or full membership** is accorded to women who are ministers of education or deputies, permanent secretaries or directors, vice-chancellors, and presidents of universities or deputys. The other members in this category are prominent women educationalists, including retired executive directors of FAWE and founding members.
- **Associate Membership** extends to serving ministers of education who are men, women ministers of ministries other than education, and former women ministers and executive heads of education ministries and universities.
- **Affiliate Membership** comprises FAWE national chapters and individuals and institutions committed to FAWE’s mandate, who are invited at the discretion of the Executive Committee.

Given the high profile of its leaders, and the priority given to advocacy activities, the leadership style of often directive and charismatic. This is best seen in the national chapters where the chairwoman is often a minister or other high-ranking official.

One noteworthy aspect of FAWE’s development is that it has assumed full governance and managerial leadership and control over its own destiny. FAWE was founded in the context of the ADEA Working Group on Female Participation, of which it was one component. Within the ADEA context, this Working Group was founded and led by an external development partner. In 1999, leadership of the WG was transferred to FAWE, resulting in a rare instance of
external assistance being replaced by the object of its assistance. This said, FAWE remains financially dependent on its external development partners.

Figure 10 provides an overview of the nature of FAWE’s structures and the relationships between them.

**Figure 10. FAWE’s structure and interrelationships**

FAWE is a particularly dynamic and successful structure. FAWE’s original mission of ensuring that the issues of girls’ education are high on the agendas of African policy makers and their external development partners has been achieved. Now, the challenge is how to move from agenda-setting to developing realistic strategies and implementing them so that the actual results (girls in schools) are as visible as the declared priorities and policies. This is FAWE’s new challenge — one that is more likely to be tackled in individual countries than on a broader, international scale, as were the challenges of advocacy. In this context the question of “network vs. organization” is raised (Sack 2002). FAWE has always been both. The issue, rather, is one of trade-off and the extent to which the current challenges should favor more of one or the other.

**Girls’ education: The Network of African Women Scientists and Engineers (NAWSE)**

Inspired by FAWE, this network was founded in 2000 in order to advocate for scientific and technological education for girls and women, and to enable participating members organizations to play a more effective role in promoting socio-economic development. Fifteen national associations are part of this network, which does not accept individual members. The basic structural unit
is the “national components (NC)” which group several associations. This is a federal network with a high degree of flexibility in its operations. Management is light, with a coordinating committee of three members and a secretariat in Bamako. The management style is focused on promoting sustained coordination between the autonomous national components. Most communication takes place by e-mail. Figure 11 shows this structure.

**Figure 11. NAWSE’s Structure**

Education for All and civil society: African Network to Campaign for EFA (ANCEFA)

This is a network of activists lobbying to promote the Education for All (EFA) goals. It was launched by a forum of NGOs working on the preparation of the Dakar EFA-2000 meeting. They felt that Africa was not well prepared to participate effectively in this meeting. After the Dakar meeting (April 2000), five national civil society coalitions (South Africa, Tanzania, Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria) decided to meet to construct a network for EFA. Subsequently, the African Federation of Parents of Pupils joined in. ANCEFA’s objectives are: advocacy for EFA; to monitor the EFA process; and to organize civil society for the promotion of the EFA goals.  

ANCEFA now has 23 national coalitions composed of stakeholders from civil society. It has a federal type of structure (see Figure 12), with an executive committee that appoints the coordinator and the national groups, which make decisions at a general assembly. National coalitions within a sub-region appoint a moderator who federates suggestions and reports them to the executive committee.

The regional coordination is in Dakar. The executive committee is composed of the four sub-regional moderators. Leadership style is collegial. Financing is from external development cooperation agencies.

ANCEFA’s activities have largely focused on lobbying international agencies for financing. This dependence on external financing is a major risk for this network. It has also met with NGOs from Latin America and Asia.

**Figure 12. Structure of ANCEFA**

**Conclusions: What the networks are telling us**

Several messages emerge from this review of policy networks in Africa. For one, we see that ADEA is in good company both in theory and in practice. Secondly, we see that out of a diversity of organizational forms and styles comes a strong potential for action. Moreover, the sum of these networks these fragmented organizational forms adds up to action on a scale that any one organization, or any one network, would have a hard time achieving.

Two sets of common threads transpire from this review: the factors that enable the networks to function and thrive, and the challenges they face. The enabling factors include: a clear understanding of the issues; well-defined objectives; an identified constituency; firm commitment and shared dedication to these objectives; adaptability and quick responsiveness to a changing environment; tolerance for ambiguity, especially when it comes to the roles people play within the network context; collegial, interactive and
relatively informal relations among members; organizational flexibility; a lack of organizational hierarchy; and facilitation of communication among members, often using electronic means. It is not clear, however, what, if any, is the “right mix” of these factors.

A closer look at these factors suggests that they form three strands: cognitive, attitudinal and organizational. As with any thread, these strands are interwoven; indeed, conceptually there is some overlap. Well-defined objectives come from an (cognitive) analysis of the issues. Commitment and dedication are attitudinal; they refer to the values and the resolve of the people concerned. Adaptability and responsiveness require information about the changing environment and knowledge on how this affects the objectives; this is cognitive. The ability to translate this into action, which may mean stepping out of a business-as-usual mold, is more attitudinal in nature. Recognition of ambiguity requires knowledge of dissonant realities and the personal ability to live with this and, even, build upon it. Collegiality and informality, especially in contexts usually more formal and hierarchical, are attitudinal characteristics. Finally, there are the organizational strands flexibility, lack of hierarchy, defined constituency, facilitation of communication that must be determined but, also, need to operate in a mode of responsiveness.

Our common experience with the organizational world leads us to place the emphasis on the cognitive and organizational strands. Propitious attitudes, we think, will follow; appropriate structures and incentives will facilitate people to adapt to the information and organizational patterns in which they find themselves. This may well be the case. Attitudes trust, in particular take top billing in the literature on social capital. Adaptability was considered an essential component of “attitudinal modernity”, a concept that was in vogue around 1967-1975 (Inkeles & Smith 1974; Kahl 1968). The literature on social capital suggests that trust develops slowly from social interaction and structures that promote community. Education, work experience and urban living were identified as being most closely associated with attitudinal modernity.

The challenges are mainly organizational in nature and include: the continual search for sustainable financing; the gathering and synthesis of relevant information, often through the construction of databases; effective communication with and between members who may not be well connected to the Internet; and accountability. Dubbeldam (1996) suggests that the size of a network determines the type of communication it uses: smaller networks can rely on personal contacts and larger networks, requiring greater outreach capability use newsletters and mailings. However, this approach views communication as essentially a one-way activity. Increasingly, we see that communication in effective networks approaches conversation in that it is multi-directional, uncontrolled by the hub and, at best, spontaneous. For this, e-mail and the Internet are powerful tools.
Sustainable financing seems to be a constant struggle. It is a major concern for all the networks discussed here. It is also linked to issues of accountability and the mechanisms put in place to monitor and report activities. However, it may well be that networks are the most cost-effective means of delivering certain types of services, especially those that are process oriented. It behooves network practitioners to identify those areas in which they are particularly cost-effective i.e., their comparative advantages.

It's one thing to identify enabling factors and challenges, threads and strands. It's quite another to come up with prescriptions on what must happen, what must be there. Indeed, our review of the literature on networks along with a close look as several education policy networks in Africa leads to the suspicion that the only prescription is that a well-functioning network needs to be well suited to its goals and its environment. For example, in Figures 1-6, we have seen a variety of structures that work well. Each one is adapted to the specific needs and design of its respective network. In some cases, the structure evolved over time to better reflect the realities and the needs of the situation at-hand.

One of the more interesting distinctions in the network literature suggests that there are two schools or types of policy networks the “interest intermediation school” and the “governance school” (Börzel 1998). The former tends to focus on the facilitation of negotiations, and the latter on problem solving. ADEA’s initial focus on “donor coordination”, suggests primary concern for interest intermediation. The strategy for this was to develop common, knowledge-based understandings of the issues at-hand, such as how to: educate all of the girls; develop strategies for cost-effective textbooks in the classrooms and tools for education statistics in the ministries; promote educational policy research; develop effective procedures and relations between ministries of education and finance; etc.

Over the years, however, ADEA and its working groups have moved closer to a problem-solving mode. The move in this direction has come, largely, from ADEA’s African ministerial constituency. It was they, for example, who determined that the theme of ADEA’s 2001 Arusha Biennale would be the logical extension of that of the 1999 Johannesburg Biennale. That Biennale focused on what works, but mostly at the pilot level. For Arusha, the ministers wanted to focus on what works on the scale of entire education systems (Ndoye 2002; Sack 2001). Most of the education policy networks discussed in this paper are, increasingly, focusing on solutions and testing them, sometimes beyond the pilot stages. NESIS is an example of this. Other networks, such as FAWE, implement pilot activities combined with emulation strategies in order to promote solutions and provide concrete examples of what works to the policy makers.
In order to reach out, the education policy networks discussed in this paper have been reaching around. They have extended their reach to other networks and other actors. They have spawned new networks, related in purpose, such as those concerned with various aspects of girls’ education. Indeed, this is where the metaphor of the web takes on its full meaning. These signs of proliferation could indicate real opportunities for development of education policy initiatives in Africa where ownership is both anchored in the continent and broadly distributed and shared. There could be perverse effects, such as we see with the development of fads. And, as we witness and encourage the development of such networks, it is useful to continue working on our theoretical and practical understanding of these new forms of development cooperation for education in Africa.

References


Learning How to Mainstream: Experiential Knowledge and Grounded Theory
by Cream WRIGHT

This paper is based on the main presentation made at the session on “Mainstreaming Non-Formal Education: Towards a Grounded Theory”, during the Arusha Biennial meeting. It has been extensively revised to incorporate as far as possible the issues, perspectives and contentions of the other presentations made during the session.\(^1\) However the author takes full responsibility for the views expressed in the paper in its present form.

Introduction

For well over two decades now, education in Africa has been subjected to a plethora of innovations and experiments intended to promote positive change in policy and performance of the sector. This has given rise to a critical paradox in that education systems in Africa reflect a wide range of exciting innovations, yet continue to be plagued by seemingly intractable problems that thwart development efforts in the sector. The main response to this paradox has been to advocate for the scaling up and mainstreaming of those innovations that have proven to be successful. However, it is clear that despite efforts in this direction, we have not been very good at transforming a successful pilot innovation into a system-wide phenomenon that impacts on quality basic education for all. The concepts of scaling up and mainstreaming are tantalizingly attractive, but in practice we still have much to learn about how to make them work in the real world.

There is little doubt about the richness of what has been attempted in terms of education in Africa, as catalogued in the recent ADEA publication on what works for Africa (ADEA 2001). This shows that educational innovations in Africa span areas of policy-making, planning, strategy design, new pedagogies, program development, management and organization, inspection and supervision, etc. In the main, they are intended to contribute to increased provision, equitable access, improved quality, effective delivery and efficient

\(^1\) The other presentations were made by Rosa-Maria Torres (Amplifying and Diversifying Learning), Ekundayo Thompson (Successful Experiences in Non-Formal Education and Alternatives to Basic Education in Africa), and Mulugeta (The rise and decline of Non-Formal Education in Ethiopia).
management of the education system. Most of these innovations originate from external sources or from externally funded projects, but some are also home grown in response to problems and challenges encountered locally. More significantly, while some of these innovations are within the so-called formal system, most of the more promising ones are to be found outside the formal system. These features may hold the key to understanding why we have not been very successful in scaling up or mainstreaming promising innovations. They raise the issues of how far innovations are grounded in local reality (home grown / locally owned) and how far they are estranged from of the mainstream.

What is most striking about educational innovations in Africa is the sense in which they tend to generate a vicious cycle of rising expectations and unfulfilled promises. Typically, there is much hope and enthusiasm at the start of an innovation. This is followed by investment of much time, effort and resources to put the innovation into practice. Some innovations do take hold and can be regarded as successful, but even these tend to be limited in scope and scale. In far too many cases however, innovations seem to fade away for various reasons and eventually suffer “death through decay”. The issue often, is only partly due to problems and inherent weaknesses in the innovations. In many cases failure has more to do with the resilience of the formal system, which seems capable of thwarting and marginalizing innovations that threaten to change it in significant ways. Many African countries therefore have a wide range of education innovations at various stages of design, implementation and decay. Usually, there is also a prevailing sense of tension and poor engagement between innovations and what is accepted as mainstream education.

Against this background, the contention of this paper is twofold. Firstly, African countries need a more systematic approach to harnessing and mainstreaming the potential of their most promising educational innovations. Without this, education in Africa will continue to be haunted by a sense of crisis and challenged by the constant threat of decline, despite commendable progress by many countries and strong support from their development partners. Secondly, the paper contends that the most effective way of mainstreaming innovations is to create a holistic system that embraces all forms of education within and outside the mainstream. Such a holistic system would, by definition, be more flexible, more diversified and open to change. African countries can therefore make better use of innovations for expanding equitable access to education and for improving educational quality on a sustainable basis. The trend in development education is clearly towards coordinated program design and sector-wide support, rather than on continuing with individual projects and separate funding support for such
projects. The main argument of this paper is that there should be a similar move away from the fragmented approach of trying to scale up individual innovations, and move towards a more comprehensive approach for mainstreaming educational innovations in general by creating and sustaining a holistic, flexible and self-renewing education system.

The focus of this paper therefore is on using what we know from educational innovations (especially those outside the mainstream), to help develop a systematic approach for harnessing and mainstreaming innovations as part of a holistic system of education. In this regard the paper seeks to show how we can draw from case studies that provide us with experiential knowledge, in order to develop a grounded theory on how to mainstream innovations. In essence this paper is about learning how to mainstream!

**Basic concepts and working definitions**

To deal adequately with mainstreaming, we need to first address some ongoing conceptual difficulties concerning the use of terms like formal education, non-formal education, informal education and alternative education. These difficulties stem from the fact that there is a confusing array of boundary crossings and a mixture of similarities and differences between these various forms of education, such that the terms no longer define exclusive categories. In many ways most formal education systems have been able to learn lessons over the years from successful strategies and practices in non-formal education. By the same token, many non-formal or alternative forms of education have sought to emulate key features of the formal system, and some were even modeled on it in the first place. In the face of such reality, the ADEA Working Group on Non-Formal Education has been concerned with ways of bridging the divide between so-called formal and non-formal education. Various interested parties associated with the working group have persuasively argued that:

- This distinction is redundant and the very concepts of formal education and non-formal education are themselves obsolete.
- We need to revisit the whole range of concepts such as formal, non-formal, informal and alternative, to be clear about these widely used labels that influence and affect so much of what we do and how we perceive education provision in its various forms.

Beyond issues of typology, there is concern over what seems to be a strong convergence in the development community in favour of the more formal and mainstream versions of education. In this regard, Torres (2000) provides us with a provocative and controversial summary of how countries and development partners have interpreted and responded to various elements of education for all (See Table 20).
Table 20. Education For All (Jomtien)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposal</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Education for all</td>
<td>1. Education for children (the poorest among the poor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Basic education</td>
<td>2. Schooling (and primary education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Universalizing basic education</td>
<td>3. Universalizing access to primary education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Basic learning needs</td>
<td>4. Minimum learning needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Focusing on learning</td>
<td>5. Enhancing and assessing school performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Expanding the vision of basic education</td>
<td>6. Increasing the duration (number of years) of compulsory schooling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Basic education as the foundation for lifelong learning</td>
<td>7. Basic education as an end in itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Enhancing the environment for learning</td>
<td>8. Enhancing the school environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. All countries</td>
<td>9. Developing countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Responsibility of countries (government and civil society) and the international community</td>
<td>10. Responsibility of countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Torres 2000

In view of the above arguments on education typologies, this paper will not enter into a detailed debate about these concepts, because that can easily lead to being trapped in the dead end of semantics. Instead the focus is on a single categorization that embraces and subsumes the old typologies. This is the basis on which the notion of mainstream education is used in this paper, to define a category of education that is based on certain key characteristics as well as on some status features (recognition, perception, acceptance, etc.) and norms that are symbolic of the category. It is therefore critical to develop the concept of mainstream education and link it to the objectives of mainstreaming innovations and creating a holistic system of education. In addition it is necessary to outline and clarify the concepts of experiential knowledge and grounded theory, which are regarded in this paper as key tools for mainstreaming. By outlining and clarifying these three concepts, the paper will provide a conceptual framework within which we can develop practical strategies for learning how to mainstream.

Defining mainstream education
The so-called formal school system is a relatively recent social invention, but it can readily be portrayed as the core of what is being termed mainstream education in this paper. Mainstream education is therefore defined firstly by certain basic characteristics that are normally associated with the formal school system (See Table 21). These include the following:
### Table 21. Some basic characteristics that help to define mainstream education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Characteristics</th>
<th>Outline Of Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location specific</td>
<td>Specific place or location (school) prescribed at which the learning/teaching process is designated to take place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Bound</td>
<td>Learners and teachers assemble at the location at designated times and stay on for prescribed time periods (day, term, year) for schooling to take place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Structured</td>
<td>School day structured into periods during which different subjects / curriculum areas are covered. School year also structured into terms, with prescribed number of weeks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learner Structured</td>
<td>Learners usually grouped by age (cohorts) and channeled into levels or «classes» corresponding to age and prescribed learning for that age group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Structured</td>
<td>Prescribed learning structured into subjects or disciplines that are taught separately and together form a program for a given grade level or education cycle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prescribed Learning</td>
<td>Curriculum reflects national goals and priorities, possibly open to regional/local variations, and involves set standards enforced through national tests and examinations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequenced Learning</td>
<td>Curriculum sequenced so objectives need to be achieved at one level before progression to the next level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialist Staffing</td>
<td>Staffing by qualified/trained professionals (teachers) with knowledge of subject matter and pedagogical skills, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialist Resources</td>
<td>Standard furniture, equipment, etc., unique to schools and part of key characteristics (desks, seats, chalk, blackboard, etc) of a normal school.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The basic characteristics illustrated above constitute one of the strands through which we can define mainstream education. These characteristics help to make schools recognisable throughout the world, and have come to represent the visible symbols and short-cut icons of schools as social institutions at the core of mainstream education. But these characteristics do not completely define mainstream education. Many schools are now more flexible and do not necessarily conform to all the characteristics highlighted.
above. Similarly some community schools and other learning centers that are regarded as non-formal display quite a number of the characteristics associated with formal schools. Hence, whilst these characteristics provide a reasonable rule of thumb to help distinguish formal institutions at the core of mainstream education from non-formal and other alternative forms of education, they do not constitute necessary and sufficient grounds for making such distinctions. There are at least two additional strands through which we can make this distinction in a more comprehensive manner.

**Official recognition as a defining strand of mainstream education**

In addition to the basic characteristics outlined above, mainstream education can be defined by a number of features that cluster around the strand of official recognition (See Table 22). Most governments have mechanisms and procedures in place for granting recognition to educational institutions that are owned and/or operated by NGOs, community based organizations or private sector providers. Such official recognition usually means that certain standards have been met and conditions fulfilled that effectively make the learning institution part of the mainstream. In principle, government recognition gives a new status to an institution, regardless of whether it is viewed as formal or non-formal. In practice however institutions that gain such recognition are usually closely akin to the formal institutions that are already part of the mainstream. So why is official recognition seen as a defining feature of mainstream education? When an institution gets official recognition there are other things that follow:

**Table 22. Factors associated with official recognition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access to Public Funding</th>
<th>Official Budget line with allocation of resources on a regular and reliable basis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to key National Tests and Examinations</td>
<td>Programs recognized as preparation for these tests/exams and candidates eligible to take the examinations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance by Employers</td>
<td>Programs recognized for employment purposes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion in National Statistics</td>
<td>Learners, staff, scores, etc are included in the statistics on the national education system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valued by Stakeholders</td>
<td>Popularly perceived as real education, not second rate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These factors are linked in various ways as part of mainstream education. For instance many innovations that do not feature in official statistics on education do not receive regular funding in the education budget. It seems that governments will not fund what they cannot or do not count. Even more
importantly, governments do not invest on policy, standards, inspection, monitoring and supervision for these innovations in the same way as they do for mainstream education.

Thompson’s (2001) account of the evolving status of non-formal education in Kenya richly illustrates the struggle for official recognition and support:

“In the early ’90s the Kenyan Ministry of Education set up a non-formal education desk which has subsequently been upgraded to a non-formal education unit. It is expected that a department with responsibility for non-formal education will soon evolve. The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology in collaboration with bilateral partners has formulated draft policy guidelines on NFE which are currently being discussed with a view to finalizing them. Under the aegis of the Government of Kenya – UNICEF Program of Cooperation in Non-Formal Education, non-formal schools and centers have received various types of support towards quality provision of education.”

All these factors influence the extent to which the public will value an innovative education program. If public perception of the value of a program derives largely from these factors, it can be argued that an education program with readily identifiable characteristics akin to those of the formal school system, and with official recognition by the government, will generally be perceived as being of value. Target groups are more likely to regard it as “real education” and “the right thing to pursue”. We are constantly reminded for instance, that whilst some alternative education programs in Asia appear attractive we should be aware that they are not popular options for the target groups concerned. “The poor almost never willingly choose non-formal alternatives. It is simply that they do not have a choice and must either access such alternatives or go without education.” Innovative programs sometimes fail because of the wrong perception. Target groups can easily see such programs as an attempt to offer them an inferior form of education that is different from the formal system and that lacks the recognition and acceptance that give social-economic value to any education program. There are even some programs within formal school systems that are effectively marginalised because of the perception of learners and their parents that these programs lack the recognition and acceptance that would provide social-economic value. This was a major problem with efforts, supported by the World Bank, to mainstream diversified curricula through the introduction of technical and vocational subjects in secondary schools.²

² Extensive studies of curriculum diversification suggest that failures were partly due to resistance on the part of learners and their parents to embrace technical/vocational subjects that were perceived as being low status and not fully part of the prestige examination system leading to tertiary education.
Experiential knowledge

The concept of experiential knowledge is crucial for understanding how we can learn from practice in order to inform theory that can help us develop pragmatic solutions to the problems facing our education systems. What is termed experiential knowledge in this paper is essentially practitioner knowledge. It comes as much from doing as from thinking about doing. For instance, effective teachers do not simply do various things in their classrooms to promote learning, they also reflect on their practice and learn from it (Schon 1990). This notion of the “reflective practitioner” is at the heart of building and using experience in the form of experiential knowledge.

The “reflective practitioner” is the source of experiential knowledge. This term can apply equally to classroom teachers, managers and administrators, curriculum designers, policy analysts, and researchers. When they are effective, all of these practitioners display the same sequence of eclectic action and reflection that propels them towards mastery of their field. They typically draw on some body of theoretical knowledge and understanding to plan, design and prepare for their work. They then do their work (practice) and they also reflect on what they do in order to learn how to do things better over time. This is the essence of experience! The experienced teacher not only draws on his/her knowledge of subject matter, learning theory and syllabus interpretation, but also uses an intrinsic and instinctive form of knowledge and understanding developed over years of practice and reflection. This has to do with what works in different classroom settings, how best to help different groups of learners to understand a subject, making best use of resources in the classroom and dealing with difficult topics in different ways. The same is true for other education practitioners such as policy advisers, curriculum planners, researchers, managers, etc. This cumulative build up of experiential knowledge is what leads to the type of mastery that we recognize and value in outstanding master practitioners.

In dealing with innovations, experiential knowledge can be used as a tool for developing a theory of how to do things better. By repeatedly gaining experience of what works and how things work with a variety of educational innovations in different settings, we begin to develop the know-how to deal with factors that support or obstruct progress with innovations. It is this approach that is advocated in this paper, and it implies that we need a cadre of professional innovators or innovating agencies that can help to build a bank of experiential knowledge on how to make innovations work on a large scale. In contrast we appear to be stuck with an evaluation model of knowledge, through which we attempt to mainstream educational innovations without first learning how to mainstream! This prevailing model typically involves evaluating a number of projects (or even just one project) and extrapolating from this to scale up the innovation in question. So, on the basis of study-
ing a few projects on multi-grade teaching or accelerated learning we try to mainstream these innovations by large-scale teacher training programs and the mass provision of pedagogical materials.

**Grounded theory**

Theories are usually the result of observation, experimentation and hypothesis testing. In most cases, particularly for the social world, theories do not provide us with certainties. They give us a framework and conceptual tools for understanding and acting on our world, in a manner that would lead to outcomes that are predictable within certain limits. In the case of grounded theory, the main features are that it is rooted in practical reality, it is context sensitive, it is heuristic in nature, and it is linked to action.

This means that grounded theory relies critically on experiential knowledge, which derives from reflection on practice. By systematically reviewing and organising reflections on the practice of innovation, we begin to develop a "feel" for the factors that support or inhibit successful innovation. However, this applies to specific contexts rather than to innovations in general. Hence, grounded theory starts with understanding how an innovation was made to work (or failed to work) in a specific context. This gives us a basis for doing further innovations in that context or in very similar contexts. Grounded theory progresses further when practitioners use "reflection in practice" as a reiterative tool to better understand how a series of innovations succeed or fail in a variety of contexts. In this sense, grounded theory is always work in progress in that it constantly needs to be extended and refined to reflect the variety of changing contexts in which we attempt to innovate. Practitioner reflection on an innovation in a particular context gives us the initial makings of a grounded theory. This then needs to be extended and refined on the basis of further reflection in practice, for an increasingly widening range of innovations and innovation contexts.

As practitioners become more reflective in their practice for different innovations and different contexts, grounded theory becomes more robust and useful as a practical tool for doing innovation. The theory is thus both heuristic and action-oriented. When developing grounded theory we are not so much concerned with establishing causality and statistical significance in the relationship between various factors. Rather, the focus is on gaining sufficient understanding of how different factors relate to each other and the ways in which they influence success or failure of an innovation. It is through the heuristic process of confirming and modifying our initial understanding, as we work on different contexts that we begin to build a feasible grounded theory that can guide future efforts at innovation. This approach to mainstreaming innovations has a number of very critical implications for development assistance that will be explored in a future paper.
Living on the margins

Education programs and institutions that are outside the mainstream share a common fate of living on the margins. If we are serious about mainstreaming, then we need to understand how and why such programs tend to be marginalised. From various case studies on non-formal education programs we can begin to map out some of the factors that keep NFE on the margins:

- **Small scale** – Many innovations were designed to cope with specific problems on a small scale and in fact become successful and manageable precisely because of this characteristic. However this has the disadvantage of making such innovations appear unworkable in the mainstream, with its large-scale features.

- **Localised** – Innovations are designed in specific contexts and are therefore suited to the local situation. This raises the problem of transference to different contexts and localities, and tends to keep such innovations in the margins.

- **Under resourced** – In terms of staffing, materials and other resources, innovations outside the mainstream tend to be poorly resourced, especially after the initial phase of enthusiasm and support. This can sometimes make them appear to be inferior versions of mainstream programs. There is therefore a reluctance to transfer or scale up such innovations.

- **Unconventional** – Innovations can be scary. They often have unconventional features that make target groups pause and ask questions such as “is this really education?” “How far is this recognized and what guarantees do we have that it will deliver quality learning?”

- **Risk prone** – As with anything new and different there are always risks associated with education innovations. Who wants to take risks with their future?

- **Highly fragmented** – The plethora of innovations outside the mainstream is often difficult to consolidate and make sense of. This gives the impression that mainstream education is an island of stability in a sea of experimentation.

- **Isolated and protected** – Sometimes stakeholders who start and promote successful innovations are so protective of their work that they resist attempts to adapt it in any way or to move it out of their sphere of influence. Innovations become possessions to be forever associated with certain individuals or groups and therefore do not appear to be attractive to those who wish to generalise the innovation to other settings.

- **Patronized (curios)** – In some situations there is a strange patronizing attitude that does not wish to see some innovations modified or adapted to make them part of the mainstream. It becomes almost sacrilegious to interfere with these well-known and often cited innovations once they achieve legendary status in the literature.
The case for mainstreaming

Mainstreaming involves a number of processes such as moving from the margins and going to scale. More importantly it is facilitated by such things as gaining official recognition and public acceptance, as well as having access to regular public funding and being an integral part of the examination system and the education statistics system (EMIS). The key challenge of course is to achieve all of this without sacrificing the essence of what makes these alternatives so attractive as education innovations! This raises the question in some quarters about the need for mainstreaming. Purists suggest that we leave well-enough alone. There will be interesting innovations that succeed or fail and we can learn from them, but we do not need to try to make these innovations part of mainstream education. In reply, it can be argued that mainstream education in most African countries has proved perennially incapable of learning key lessons from innovations precisely because it is so inflexible and monolithic. The case for mainstreaming is therefore firstly, to infuse mainstream education with new types of programs, structures and forms of organization, etc. that would transform it into a more holistic system that is capable of responding to change and learning from experience. In other words mainstreaming is about creating a self-innovating education system that is capable of learning from innovations and is sufficiently flexible to make use of the best that these innovations have to offer in order to improve its own diversity.

Secondly, mainstreaming is critical for equity reasons. Why do so many African countries continue to spend such a high proportion of public resources on the so-called formal school system and mainstream education, whilst ignoring the alternatives through which a sizeable proportion of their population manage to access learning opportunities? There is a deep sense of social injustice in this pattern of expenditure, but there is also a reluctance to change things because of uncertainties over the implications and consequences of change. The key questions to be asked in changing this situation have to do with what to fund and why. Governments keen to pursue EFA should not be stuck on supporting institutions, but should try to understand where, when and how their citizens access and acquire quality learning opportunities. Educational statistics as well as allocation of public funds and quality assurance mechanisms should all then be based on the answers to these types of questions. In this way it should be possible to support access to quality education wherever and however it takes place. It should also be possible to move towards a type of mainstream education that is diversified, versatile, flexible and responsive in meeting the basic needs of all learners.
Learning how to mainstream
This paper has argued that the business of mainstreaming involves drawing on experiential knowledge through a systematic, reiterative process of reflection in practice whilst working on a succession of innovations in different settings. These settings involve not only education but also many other contextual features such as political climate, economic conditions, social/cultural patterns, etc. All these features as well as the mainly educational factors would come into play as practitioners work to better understand how to mainstream, say, community schools that operate multiple shifts, localised curriculum and flexible attendance policy, community involvement in school management, etc.

An initial case of reflection in practice whilst working on, for example, community schools, could help us begin to identify the factors that make this successful as a viable, effective and efficient provision of learning opportunities for the particular context. We could also begin to identify those factors that appear to impede the success of this type of innovative education. As we move to reflection in practice for community schools in other settings, we would need to ask questions about all these initial factors, as well as trying to identify new ones:

- How do these factors manifest themselves and work out in other settings?
- What are the lessons from other countries or regions with community schools?
- Are there new factors prominent in these lessons from outside?
- What factors appear to hold strong in different settings?
- Which factors/features appear transferable to other contexts?
- How can we make this innovation work well in different settings?
- What do we need to do to gain official recognition for this type of education?
- What are the useful indicators that can be used to include this in the statistics?
- On what basis can we advocate for regular funding for this type of education?
- How can we improve this type of education so that it becomes socially acceptable?

Towards a grounded theory
As we reflect in practice and accumulate valuable experiential knowledge of how to mainstream educational innovations, we can move towards developing a grounded theory. This would be an increasingly complex mosaic of factors that promote innovation as well as those that inhibit innovation. They would typically be set out in a diagram that shows how they relate to and influence each other to impact on innovations in different settings.
and contexts. Most importantly a grounded theory would be the invisible guiding hand, the mental GPS that innovation practitioners use to navigate successfully through an ever-changing landscape of educational innovations and contextual settings. Using grounded theory, education systems can move from simply trying out innovations that never seem to go beyond their initial success in a specific context, to mainstreaming innovations on a regular and systematic basis. In this way innovations can become a much more organic part of education systems. By the same token, education systems will become increasingly diversified, dynamic, responsive, flexible and capable of introducing innovations that will have fairly predictable outcomes in different settings.

A grounded theory would become one of the essential tools for practitioners engaged in doing innovations and promoting change that is aimed at creating a more holistic and flexible type of mainstream education. From the start of any innovation, the chances for success could be strengthened by using “reflection in practice” to understand the factors that enhance experiential knowledge and help build grounded theory.

References