Lessons Drawn from Twenty Years of Aid
The following article is a critical analysis of the current practice and instruments of aid. It questions the future of development cooperation. The study it summarizes takes stock of the action of twenty years of aid in the Sahel. Though Sahelian countries have specific characteristics, this investigation on the instruments, results and future legitimacy of aid can easily be applied to other contexts, including sub-Saharan Africa.
A mixed balance sheet
Twenty years has left its mark on the Sahel region. The effects are visible through advances in infrastructure, telecommunications, and institutional growth, as well as the development of agriculture, better access to clean drinking water, and the progressive eradication of endemic diseases. The effects of aid have extended to other spheres as well: to manpower training and education, policy definition and the rise of civil society. In a more global manner, aid has probably been a significant factor in the opening of the Sahel countries to the international community and the circulation of information. Finally, several observers believe the crisis prevention aspect of aid may explain the relative economic and social stability of the region.
Progress, however, appears limited when measured in terms of living standards. Human Development rankings produced by the UNDP show three of the Sahel countries appearing at the bottom of the table. More than 60% of the rural population subsist below the international standard of poverty, as defined by a minimal consumer "basket". Private investment towards the region is extremely weak. For all its achievements, foreign aid has nonetheless failed to raise the general standard of living.
A general sense of dissatisfaction
A second conclusion is that aid flowing to the Sahel region leaves a feeling of dissatisfaction, shared by donors, recipients and aid workers alike. This arises from a sense of disappointment with results achieved but also from a criticism of aid practices in the field. There are two main criticisms.
- Aid is agency-driven. From the initial concept to the final evaluation, the aid cycle is controlled by the donors; the recipients are simply participants in the process. As a result, responses are rarely adequate to the real requirements of local institutions and populations whose involvement remains minimal.
- The aid system lacks cohesion. It tends to hamper the capacity of Sahelian institutions. The aid system generates a saturation effect: too many programmes, too many conditions, too many projects and initiatives, too many different procedures. The net effect is to overwhelm the beneficiary institutions. Finally, the aid system dulls the sense of responsibility among local managers, leading frequently to institutional passivity.
These criticisms go a long way towards explaining why there is dissatisfaction. The prospects of future aid initiatives depends, in part, on the capacity of donors and recipient authorities to overcome these inadequacies. Past experience leads us to consider four principal lessons.
Lesson 1 : Construct instruments that are more flexible and better adapted to the problems facing beneficiaries
Analysts are unanimous in noting that aid leads to the adoption of similar predetermined acts in very different local situations, which are therfore poorly adapted to specific problems.
This situation arises in part from the aid instruments used. The definition phase of frequently restricts possible future actions within a standardised approach that the operational phase, geared primarily to executing the project or programme, can modify to a limited extent. The aid scheme is devised on the basis of an a priori an earlier diagnosis which is frequently built not around the problems or hopes of local actors, but around available "solutions". Probles are defined, consciously or not, according to the instruments, budgets and solutions that experts know they can mobilize.
This criticism has been partially heeded. Over the past few years there has been an increase in more flexible approaches, linked more closely to implementation and follow-up. These initiatives place greater importance on assisting the aid partners rather than on the strict observance of targets established at the outset. In addition, they require aid agencies to change their ways by less planning, the dispensing of smaller sums more frequently, and through sustainable intervention.
Lesson 2 : Reinforce the mechanisms of expression for a motivated request for aid
The aid "market" appears to be supply driven. Requests from Sahelian countries frequently play but a minor role in actions finally undertaken. Indeed, one might ask who is the supplier and who the "client". With the progressive disappearance of requirements for real financial counterparts, the aid market has in many cases been inverted. Donors often appear as solicitors rather than as suppliers of aid. The "sale" of a project is accompanied by various advantages for the beneficiary institutions, from the supply of equipment, to subsidies and, in many cases, even to salaries.
The absence of counterpart funding is at the heart of the malfunctioning of aid. It hides limits to the absorptive capacities of the beneficiaries and, as a consequence, contributes to generating numerous cases of " aid surfeit ". It contributes to losing sight of the real demand of the Sahel.
Increasingly, Sahel institutions, governments and civil society are prepared to assume greater responsibility in the management of external aid. This slow but profound evolution must be nurtured. Above all, mechanisms such as counterpart funding must be established, which promote this sense of responsibility and provide the means for donors to identify and assess demands coming from the Sahel.
Lesson 3 : Less visibility for greater impact
The requirement by donors for precise, visible and measurable results often outweighs more long term preoccupations such as the accompaniment of (slow) internal processes of development. In order to guarantee visible results and justify the amounts invested to their constituencies back home, donor agencies establish financial and reporting circuits within beneficiary institutions which permit close supervision of their undertakings. These monitoring tools derive from the legitimate requirement by donors for results, but they also contribute to undermining the beneficiaries’ sense of ownership. Furthermore, these mechanisms result in the duplication of established administrative procedures and add to the loss of coherence within Sahel institutions.
Risk management is at the heart of this problem. Numerous aid instruments, notably the circuits mentioned above, are set up by donors in order to eliminate risk and to arrive at the intended result. These instruments cannot but contradict the uncertainty that characterizes the area of intervention. Minimal risk strategies may guarantee a certain level of results, but may also limit the opportunities for appropriation and wider success.
Risk incentives could be transformed through the system of aid evaluation. The present system comprises multiple detailed studies addressing individual initiatives. This system leads to a narrow vision of the results of aid, to individual failure-avoidance strategies and, finally, to the poor functioning of the learning process.
Donors are conscious of the need to redefine the results of aid and to place greater emphasis on impact rather than visibility. This requires, in particular, a look at the effects of activities across sufficiently broad sectors over the long term and, of course, taking into account the totality of external interventions. New types of evaluation are required which would provide common ground for debate and dialogue among partners.
Lesson 4 : From managing crises to accompanying devlopment
The Sahel experience shows that the approaches and instruments of aid are too often linked to crisis situations. Indeed, the international community has several times been faced with major problems that threatened to overwhelm Sahel societies, for example recent food emergencies and the financial crises of the 1980s. In such cases, where the goal was to manage extreme situations, the aid system intervened promptly in a massive way.
Aid designed to improve Sahel capacities and develop opportunities must, however, respect a different rhythm. There is too often a tendency to consider each Sahelian village, economic activity or administrative service as an institution in crisis that must necessarily be reformed.
Donors now agree that capacity building and institutional development are major factors in development. But do they possess the proven instruments needed to assist in these areas? It is not enough to stress institutional development. This must be accompanied by real efforts to devise innovative methods and instruments capable of tackling this question in the future.
Conclusion : A necessary restraint ?
The malfunctioning of the aid systems in practice must be put in perspective. It should not hide the results obtained but should, on the other hand, be taken very seriously.
If aid efforts have failed in the past, this has often been due to excess. The desire to assist, to reform, and to fund has sometimes prevailed over the need to respect the fragile structures of transformation processes within Sahel societies. This conclusion should not be interpreted as a global condemnation of aid actions. The challenges facing the Sahel remain considerable. Private investment has yet to reach this part of the world. Aid must, however, evolve in tandem with Sahelian societies.
In the first place, the Sahel’s sense of ownership for the aid received by the region must increase. This must be accompanied by a modification of the aid system. Donor agencies have acquired much experience and savoir faire but need, in future, to be more willing to listen and to debate (with the Sahelians), to use instruments that are more flexible and less demanding, to erect safeguards and constraints (such as counterpart funds) and, probably, to introduce a stricter code of ethics. These could define a new, more restrained attitude for future generations seeking support for the Sahelian region.
This article is based on a study carried out by David Naudet(1) for the Club du Sahel (OECD) entitled: "Finding Problems to Suit the Solutions: Introduction to a Critical Analysis of Methods and Instruments of Aid to the Sahel"
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